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Summary 
At the heart of my pragmatic theory of truth and ontology is a 
view of the relation between language and reality which I term internal 
justification: a way of explaining how sentences may have truth-values 
which we cannot discover without invoking the need for the mystery of 
a correspondence relation. The epistemology upon which the theory depend~ 
is fallibilist and holistic (chapter 2); places heavy reliance on 
modal idioms (chapter 4); and leads to the conclusion that current 
versions of realism and anti-realism are deficient (chapter 5). Just 
as my theory avoids the need for an epistemic 'given', it avoids the 
need for a metaphysical 'given' or 'joints'. I offer a view of the 
, , 
nature of philosophy and what it can properly achieve with respect to 
ontological questions (chapter 3); since those views lead me to believe 
that philosophical discussion about what exists should be restricted to 
'entities' discussed in non-philosophical contexts, my views on how 
we should understand claims made about the existence of middle-sized 
physical objects (chapters 2 and 6), theoretical entities in science 
(chapter 6), and abstract entities in mathematics (chapter 7), give 
the thesis a schematic completeness. My theory leads me to a conception 
of inquiry which defends the cognitive status of moral statements whilst 
being critical of Kantian and utilitarian approaches to morality 
(chapter 8). Chapter 1 explores the views of my closest philosophical 
allies: William James and Nelson Goodman. 
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"Can we actually 'know' the universe? My God, it's hard enough finding 
your way around Chinatown." Woody Allen.l 
Introduction 
What is pragmatism ? Why a pragmatic theory of truth and ontology ? 
Essentially, the conviction that all pragmatists share is that concepts 
are meaningful only to the extent that they are explicable in terms of 
1 our experience. Peirce wrote, 
And,2 
" ••• consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, 
our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of 
the object ... 
" ••• reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, 
but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think 
about it ... 
The pragmatistts insistence that 'concepts are meaningful only if they 
can be explaine.d in terms of our experience applies equally to the 
concepts of 'truth' and 'reality'. James wrote that the3 
..... notion of a reality independe~t of ••• us, taken from ordinary 
social experience, lies at the base of the pragmatist definition 
of truth. With some such reality any statement, in order to be 
counted true, must agree. Pragmatism defines 'agreeing' to mean 
certain ways of 'working', be they actual or potential." 
Peirce wrote of the pragmatic maxim (quoted above) that,4 
"This maxim once accepted - intelligently accepted, in the light of 
the evidence of its truth, - speedily sweeps all metaphysical 
rubbish out of one's house. Each abstraction is either pronounced 
to be gibberish or is provided with a plain, practical definition. 
The general leaning of the results is toward what the idealists 
call the naive, toward commonsense, toward anthropomorphism." 
Above all else, pragmatists are opposed to absolutism - the view 
that (real) knowledge of how the world is is knowledge of the world non-
relatively to hUman experience. An absolute conception of the world may, 
I think, reasonably be defined as one which is: entirely non-
anthropocentric, and absolutist philosophers as those who believe that 
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entirely non-anthropocentric knowledge is (in principle) obtainable. 
This, effectively, is the view that Williams took in his (1978) when 
he said that,5 "Knowledge is of what is there anyway." The absolute 
conception of the world requires it to be possible, in principle, to 
separate any contribution to knowledge of the world that might be 
peculiar or parochial to us from that of the world. Note that this is 
what the classical empiricists tried to do (in part) by employing the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Absolutism is the 
attempt to describe the world ~ specie aeternitatis and all 
pragmatists share the view that that attempt cannot succeed. (See figure 
1 overleaf). 
So far I have merely characterized pragmatism as the claim that all 
meaningful concepts must be explicable in terms of ~ relationship to 
human experience. The central problem for pragmatists is to specify 
exactly what that relationship is, and it is here that differences 
between pragmatists begin to emerge. The central tension within 
pragmatism is caused by the desire of pragmatists to insist that the 
meaning of concepts must be explicable in terms of our experience 
without endorsing subjectivism. 
Peirce, characteristically, specifies the relationship of meaningful 
6 concepts to our experience in terms of the long-run. 
"The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who 
investigate is what we mean the truth ••• " 
That way of specifying the relationship suited Peirce temperamentally 
and was of a piece with his realism. James, however, was not only 
temperamentally a very different philosopher from peirce,? but his 
interests and nominalist tendencies led him to stress the concrete 
historical situation facing any inquirer.8 James, much more than Peirce, 
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Figurel 
Four Kinds of Philosophical Positions 
Is there a true, w~t~escr1Pt1on 
Rela:lvi Bm AbS01:r:sm 
Can some Vie)es) of the 
world be justified* 







of the world ? 
* in any way, e.g. epistemologically, metaphysically, morally. 
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was inclined to stress that whatever may ultimately come to be regarded 
as true, here and now one must simply act on the best available evidence. 
My own way of dealing with the tension within pragmatism rather 
cuts across the different emphases o·f Peirce and James. My overall 
approach resembles that of Peirce insofar as I rely upon modal idioms 
to state my views, although my view does not incur the difficulties ot 
the idea of the 'long-run'. Temperamentally, however, I am much closer 
to James and, like him, I stress the view that inquiry is shaped by our 
various purposes. Unlike both James and Peirce I am inclined to think 
that the nominalist/realist debate is ill-conceived. (See chapters 3 and 
1). 
Referring to figure 1 it will be seen that in addition to relativi~ 
pragmatists uphold both non-subj~ctivism and pluralism. Taking the 
second view first, I define pluralism to be the view that there is more 
than one justifiable way of knowing the world, monism to be the view 
that there is only one such way. At first glance it might seem odd to 
draw this distinction under relativism at all; and it is true I think, 
that all absolutists are monists, but not conversly. (That all absolutist. 
should be monists stems not only from the fact that it sounds odd to 
speak of absolute conceptions (plural) of the world but also that it 
is very unclear what would distinguish one absolute conception from 
another. By the definition of 'absolutism' it cannot be anything which 
depends on £!, e.g. our purposes.) One might, however, be both a 
relativist and a monist on the grounds that whilst the absolutist 
programme cannot be carried out, neVertheless one is still left with 
only one justifiable way of knowing the world - scientifically perhaps. 
A philosopher who holds such a view might be Quine.9 The issue between 
monism and pluralism might appear to be merely verbal for it is 
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certainly true that which position one adopts will depend upon how 
one is prepared to describe certain kinds of statements (whether, for 
example, one is prepared to describe commonsense everyday beliefs about 
the world as proto-scientific or as non-scientific). I shall argue, 
however, that this issue is more than verbal, that what distinguishes 
some ways of knowing the world from others are differences in purpose. 
An emphasis on the variety of purposes has been a traditional pragmatic 
theme. 
Pragmatists have from time to t~e been accused of being 
subjectivists and it is one of my tasks in this thesis to show that 
there is a viable p'osition between the rejection of absolutism and the , 
endorsement of subjectivism. One way of being subjectivist is scepticism 
since scepticism often takes the form of claiming that certain kinds of 
beliefs cannot be justified. Rather than tackle scepticism head on I 
would say that to the determined sceptic there is little one can say; 
the reluctant sceptic I would hope to convince by my positive arguments. 
A natural question to be asked in 'relation to figure I is where 
the later work of Wittgenstein fits. All is plain sailing I think, until 
one reaches the question concerning the justification of one view over 
another. Two questions then arise: what would Wittgenstein's attitude 
have been ?; and ~ Wittgenstein's work fall into subjectivism? 
With respect to the first question, I think that Wittgenstein simply 
refused to answer it - I don't believe that he explicitly endorsed or 
denied subjectivism (although he denied the sceptical reason for being 
a subjectivist). I think it is clear that if Wittgenstein had chosen 
the path of non-subjectvism he would also have chosen the option of 
pluralism. Wittgenstein's work, then, is close to pragmatism whilst not 





! essentially derived from reading Wittgenstein's work.) Wisely or not, 
I 
my attitude is more robust than Wittgenstein's, partly because I believa I 
that some views of the world can be justified over others, and partly 
because I find nothing reprehensible about a philosopher wanting to 
change the world as well as to understand it. On the second question, I 
think that Wittgenstein's work sometimes totters on the edge of 
subjectivism even if it manages not to fall into it. (See chapter 2). 
So far I have given'some indication as to how my conception of 
pragmatism relates to the work of philosophers who are absolutists, to 
Quine, and to Wittgenstein. What of the philosophers whose work does not 
easily fit into either the rel~tiv1st or absolutist camps? (Assuming 
that they are working within epistemology and metaphysics). In my Tiew 
the work of Davidson (in semantics) falls into this category although 
it has been claimed by absolutists (see chapter 5). One may not be able 
to cat~gorize the work of a philosopher as relativist or absolutist for 
one of two reasons: (i) the work in question simply does not touch on 
the issues which would enable one to be able to categorize it; (ii) it is 
not possible to decide whether their work is relativist or not because 
of ambiguity. With respect to point (i) I do not regard it as a criticis. 
of someone's work that it is not commited one way or the other. I would 
comment however that the question which heads figure 1 is a question 
which philosophers have tried to answer at least since Plato; not to haVe 
a view seems to me rather like being the conductor of a symphony 
orchestra, but having no interest in music ! With respect to (ii) I 
would argue that the work in question must be unstable; the choice 
between relativism and absolutism is mutually exclusive.10 
I think that I have sufficiently indicated what I mean by 
pragmatism, and it will be obvious why I desire a theory of truth, but 
I 
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perhaps I should explain why I also discuss ontological questions. 
The essential reason is that my defence of pragmatism would be incomplete 
if I did not; prima facie it appears to be a good argument against 
relativism to say that unless one adopts idealism (which I do not) then 
what there is exists independently of us and that describing what there 
is a way of viewing the world sub specie aeternitatis. I admit the 
plausibility ot that argument and I meet it by providing at various 
points an account of what it means to say that middle-sized objects, 
theoretical entities in science, and abstract entities in mathematics 
do or do not exist independently of us. One reason why, for instance, 
I have to deal with abstract entities in mathematics is that it 
, 
Platonism in mathemktics (that numbers exist timelessly and independently 
of us) were the correct or the only acceptable view within the philosophy 
of mathematics, absolutism would, in part, be justified. 
One important point ought to be made concerning figure 1. Figure 1 
is not intended to suggest that all philosophers are equally absolutist 
or subjectivist with respect to every ~nd of statement. That is 
manifestly not the case. One important example is where a philosopher is 
absolutist with respect to science and subjectivist with respect to 
ethics. Given that very few, if any, philosophers now believe that there 
is an absolute realm of values it is not difficult to see why that 
combination of views should be frequently adopted. Such views are of a 
pi~ce with some kind of epistemological or metaphysical dualism but an 
important feature of my theory is that it provides a unified account 
of knowledge. I do not rely upon, or accept, sharp distinctions between 
analytic/synthetic; facts/values; or the categories of the abstract and 
the concrete. Temperamentally I am somewhat like Dewey: when shown a 
dualism I reach for my arguments. It is true that I am free and easy 
with distinctions but distinctions are, I think, the acceptable face of 
- 8 -
dualisms. 
'M ~'L(.\'1"·O .... 
My theory simultaneously offers both comfort and uneaseLto 
subjectivists and absolut~~ts alike. To the absolutist I say, 'yes, it is 
correct that given a linguistic context or vocabulary, statements may 
be true or false independently of whether we believe them to be true 
or false.' Against the absolutist I say, that 'the choice of linguistic 
context or vocabulary cannot be justified absolutely - the choice may 
justified by reference to some criteria or other but not by reference 
to what is 'purely given". My fallibilism therefore has two sources: 
(i) we may falsely believe that some criteria are satisfied when they 
are not (and vice versa); (ii) that it is always open to challenge as 
to whether one is employing the most appropriate criteria. Often (ii) 
is the source of the unease and uncertainty we feel when defending our 
views. Often it is more difficult to know whether one does have the best 
theoretical framework or the most appropriate moral vocabulary than it 
is to know what the 'correct' conclusions are given that framework or 
vocabulary. To the subjectivist I say, .'yes, it is the case that we are 
fallible, and that no view can be justified absolutely', but against the 
subjectivist I argue that this does not justify the conclusion that 
there cannot be any non-arbitrary justification for one view over 
another. All in all, my view implies a shift towards the idea that, 
directly or indirectly, inquiry is always more or less normative. 
(A theme I take up in chapter 8). 
Had pragmatism been a more fashionable philosophy it would not have 
been necessary for me to attempt to provide a general reworking of a 
framework to enable a reasonable defence of pragmatism to be made. ¥~ 
largest regret about this is that some of the themes of the thesis 
deserve an entire thesis to themselves. (I think that this is especially 
- 9 -
true of the themes of chapter 8)~·There is also some irony in this 
situation. By and large the general drift of analytic philosophy in 
this century seems to me have been in a pragmatic direction (with the 
odd rearguard action here and there); but analytic philosophy has 
moved in this direction without most philosophers realizing it and 
without the wider implications becoming apparent. I am not surprised 
at the general direction since I believe that serious thought about 
philosophical issues in the 20th century will, other things equal, lead 
in a pragmatic direction. The lack of awareness of the wider issues, 
however, has meant both that there is still much to be learnt from 
Peirce, James and Dewey, and that we have not been able to focus on the 
. \ 
issues and tension~ which remain. 
I have already made reference, at various pOints, to future 
chapters but I think it may prove useful to provide a brief description 
of the contents of each chapter here. 
Chapter 1: Two Pragmatists 
I place my work in an historical context by discussing the pragmatisms 
of William James and Nelson Goodman. James and Goodman are, with few 
qualifications, paradigm cases of pragmatist philosophers. Discussion 
of their work enables me to introduce my approach. 
Chapter 2: Relativism 
This chapter and the next form the core of my argument. At the centre 
of my relativism is a view which I term internal justification. The 
essential claim of this view is that because the relation between 
language and reality is holistic rather than atomistic, one does not have 
to accept a correspondence theory of truth in order to accept a 
relational theory of truth. Internal justification also makes it clear 
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how sentences can have truth-values which we cannot discover, without 
supposing either that we ever confront 'unconceptualized reality', or 
that we need the notion of 'unconceptualized reality' to defend a 
fallibilist epistemology. 
Chapter 3: Philosophy and Ontology 
What role philosophers, gua philosophers, may play in answering the 
ontological question of 'what there is' partially depends upon one's 
.conception ot the nature of philosophy. I argue for a view of philosophy 
as the 'inquiry into inquiry'. This metaphilosophical view does allow 
that philosophers may have a role to play in answering the ontological 
question but, crucially, I believe that this role must be secondary to 
the task of explaining how knowledge of various subject areas is 
possible. 
Chapter 4: Possible Problems 
The epistemological and metaphysical views developed in chapter 2 rely 
heavily upon the use of modal idioms. This chapter provides an analysis 
of modality in order to show that that employment of modal idioms is 
consistent with my general epistemology and metaphysics. Additionally, 
this chapter represents the approach to ontological questions argued 
for in chapter 3. 
Chapter 5: Realism, Anti-Realism and Truth-Conditions 
By employing the epistemological and metaphysical views developed in 
earlier chapters, together with the analysis of modality developed in 
chapter 4, I am able to argue against both sides in the recent realist 
vs. anti-realist debate. On the one side of the debate, I argue that 
Dummett's anti-realism is, ironically, the result of his adoption of a 
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realist premise that needs to be qualified according to my analysis of 
modality. On the other side of the debate, I argue that a proper 
understanding of the notion of truth-conditions shows that neither 
Tarski's theory of truth, nor Davidson's truth-conditional semantics, 
vindicate absolutism; contrary to the claims that Popper makes about 
Tarski's theory of truth, and contrary to the claims made by some 
Davidsonians about Da~on style truth-conditional theories ot meaning, 
both--Tarski's theory of truth, and Davidson's truth-conditional 
semantics, are compatible with the relativism that I favour. 
Chapter 6: Realism in Science 
This chapter considers the claim that science represents a vindication 
of absolutism. I present two arguments against that view: part I argues 
that whilst it is reasonable to uphold a realistic view of science, the 
most reasonable variety of realism does not justify absolutism; part II 
presents an argument against absolutism by considering the relation 
between 'common-sense' and scientific theory. 
Chapter 7: Mathematics - Epistemology and Metaphysics 
In this chapter I sketch a view of the epistemology and metaphysics of 
mathematics. The view developed, which I call structuralism, provides 
a view of mathematics which is not only consistent with my other views 
but also, I believe, interesting and attractive in its own right. 
Chapter 8: Philosophy and the Norms of Inquiry 
In this final chapter I extend my rejection of both absolutism and 
subjectivism to the area of morality. My views uphold the cognitive 
status of moral statements whilst being critical of Kantian and 
utilitarian theories. I sketch a view of inquiry which stresses its 
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historical and normative nature. I conclude with some reflections on 
philosophy and pragmatism. 
Chapter 1 
Two Pragmatists: William James and Nelson Goodman 
In this chapter I want to give a general account of the views that 
will be developed throughout the rest of this thesis by considering 
some aspects of the work of W.James and N.Goodman. The purpose of this 
chapter is not, therefore, purely historical; although by presenting my 
views in relation to theirs I hope that I aay be able to correct what I 
believe to be misunderstandings of their work. Although James was not 
blameless he has been subjected to a great deal of needless criticism 
that seems to have resulted from a lack of sympathy and imagination on 
the part of critics. If James was thought to be too radical to be taken 
seriously perhaps Goodman has suffered the opposite fate - that of being 
taken seriously but not being recognized as a radical. Goodman's 
radicalism (especially before his (1978)} has, perhaps, tended to lurk 
quietly in the background. I intend to bring it to the fore. 
James and Goodman might be thought to be an unlikely combination. 
Certainly they differ considerably in style; James is the flamboyant 
stylist, Goodman the careful technician. Yet I hope to show that under-
lying these differences and others there is fundamental agreement both 
in the content and aims of their philosophies. The two basic doctrines 
that James and Goodman share are pluralism and relativism. Accordingly 
this chapter divides into two parts that explicate these views. Two 
caveats ought to be made now. First, that my treatment of James and 
Goodman has been cavalier in the sense that I have felt no obligation 
- 13 -
to treat all aspects of their work that might rightly be considered 
important but I have dealt only with those aspects of their work that 
concern my general aims. Second, that the aims of sections 2a and 2b 
is merely to indicate the prima facie case in favour of their pluralism. 
The justification for any liberties that I take with their work is my 
conviction that they themselves would much prefer the rough and tumble 
of continuing debate to fossilized historical admiration. 
My major criticism of James will be that he failed to develop his 
theory in sufficient detail to be able to answer the accusations of 
subjectivism that were leveled against him. That is not to say that 
~verything he did say was satisfactory but I do believe that much ot 
I 
what he said does provide a reasonable base for a pragmatic theory ot 
truth. In one way I feel much the same about Goodman. Goodman says 
relatively little about truth but there is, I feel, a theory lurking in 
the background waiting to be made explicit. 
Part I: Pluralism 
(1) Sources 
Pragmatism has been accused of being an 'engineer's philosophy'. 
This accusation stems, I imagine, from the assumption that 'pragmatist' 
as in 'pragmatist philosopher' and 'pragmatist' as in everyday usage 
has the same meaning. In this section I want to show how utterly 
misconceived this view is and how wide of the mark the idea is that the 
philosophies of either James or Goodman are limited in either aim or 
achievement to the 'merely practical'. In fact only by realizing the 
very broad and ambitious nature of their philosophies can one understand 
them and, incidently, their relevance to this thesis. James said that 
the great thing about a person is their vision and this is no less true 
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of him than of others. 
One of the major aims of James' philosophy was to reconcile 
science and religion. It was this aim, I suggest, which led James 
radically to question the picture of the cognitive process that emerges 
if one takes science as exhausting the field of knowledge, or takes its 
pretensions at face value. In other words it was because James took 
religion seriously that he questioned a positivist view of knowledge. 
James took religion seriously for he knew as an empirical psychologist 
how important people's spirtual views could be to them. This fact alone 
1 
i 
makes the jibe about an 'engineer's philosophy' ridiculous. Whether or ! 
not Goodman takes religion seriously, there is, I believe, an underlying I 
structural similarity in the aims of their philosophies: whereas James 
questioned the claims of science on behalf of religion, Goodman does so 
on behalf of art. Of course art is not threatened in the same way that 
religion was, but the positivist picture of cognition has a strong 
tendency to relegate the status of art to that of emotional outburst. 
Defence of art or religion has two aspects, a positive aspect and 
a negative aspect. The negative aspect consists of an attack on the 
pretensions of science to exclusive truth about the world. It is 
important to stress that it is the pretensions of science that are under 
attack and not science itself. James was himself a scientist of course 
and (with the possible exception of his views on sets) there is nothing 
in Goodman's work which is anti-science. l The attack on the claim that 
only science tells us about the world is of course the source of 
pluralism: there is more than one justifiable way of knowing the world. 
The other side of the coin, the positive aspect, is the attempt to 
provide a better account of the cognitive process which makes due 
i 
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allowance for the claims of religion, art, or any other way of knowing 
the world. 
One problem with pluralism has been expressed by Goodman as fOllows, 
"If there is but one world, it embraces a multiplicity ot contrasting 
aspects; it there are many worlds, the collection of them all is one." 
What, then, is to be said in favour of emphasizing the plurality ot 
aspects of the world? The answer that Goodman gives is that,3 " •• many 
different world-versions are of independent interest and importance 
without any requirement or presumption of reducibility to a single base. tt ! 
What, though, makes for 'irreducibility' ? Two things, I believe, both 
hinted at in a pas~age from James,4 
"There are so many geometries, so many logics, so many physical 
and chemical hypotheses, so many classifications, each one of 
them good for so much and yet not good for everything, that the 
notion that even the truest formula may be a human device and not 
a literal transcript has dawned upon us." 
The two things are these: (i) plurality of purpose; (ii) the 
inseperability of the human perspective from knowledge. The second of 
these will be considered below. As to the former one can perhaps 
explicate it this way: even if one confines one's attention to the 
purpose of explaining the world, we seek explanations of many things 
and actions where the claim that those explanations are scientific could 
only be defended by relying upon a highly tendentious definition of 
science. For example, one might seek to explain why a certain political 
or artistic movement arose at a particular time and it is at least open 
to question whether such an explanation could count as scientific. 
So described such a pluralism sounds plausible but trivial -
whoever denied that there are many different pOints of view from which 
the world can be known or theorized about ? Perhaps such a pluralism 
does deserve to be considered trivial but it is in fact deeply at odds 
- 16 -
with deep-seated and cherished conceptions ot the world which depend 
upon either the primacy of science or the primacy of certain kinds of 
descriptions ot the world. In explicating what he takes to be Quine's 
ontological programme, Campbell says that,5 n ••• to establish a reasoned 
inventory of the categories [of the kinds of things there are] would 
be achievement enough." The basic question is: from what point ot view 
is this reasoning supposed to take place ? It is not scientific since 
it is a-priori. Well, philosophic then; but then this conception of 
philosophy - that it is p~ilosophy that will tell us how the world is, of 
what kinds of things it is composed - is, from the point ot view here 
adopted, a kind of scientism. This supra-science is supposed to have 
only one purpose, namely to give us the description of the world; but 
whether there. is only.2.!!! real (proper) kind of description of the world 
is what is here being questioned. At least relative to what some 
philosophers have thought, the pluralism which looked innocuous may turn 
out to be absolutism's Achilles heel. 
Having said that the source ot James' pluralism is respect for 
religion, whilst Goodman's is respect for art, I want briefly to consider 
the relation between their respective conceptions of religion and art 
and their epistemology. James first. 
(2) Pluralism: Justification 
(a) James and the right to believe 
I said above that it was a major aim of James' philosophy to 
reconcile the claims of science and religion. James was never able 
finally to commit himself to theism but he certainly wanted to defend 
the right of others to do so. I do not want to attempt to provIde a full 
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defence or explication of James' views on religion here but I do want 
to suggest how James' religious sympathies in fact led him to a 
(psychologically) more realistic epistemology than that of his opponents. 
James' defence of the right to believe occured in his collection 
of essays entitled The Will to Believe (a phrase James came to regret 
in the light of subsequent misunderstandings). There are two main theses 
relevant here which I shall call the weaker and the stronger. Both have 
their difficulties although it is the latter which requires some 
reconstruction. I will discuss each in turn. 
The weaker thesis is the view that where an option is "live, forced, 
\ , 
and momentous", and the evidence for or against option is inconclusive, 
someone has the right to opt for whichever view would bring most 
benefit to that person. This the.sis was opposed to the views of Clifford 
and Huxley who said that one should never adopt a view for which there 
was not conclusive evidence. Clifford wrote, forinstance,6 "It is 
wrong in all cases to believe on insufficient evidence ••• " Surely, in 
general, James is on the stronger ground epistemologically here: the 
evidence for scientific theories (let alone other kinds of theory) may 
always and in principle be inconclusive. If we were only to accept those 
beliefs for which the evidence is conclusive we would have very few 
beliefs. 
The stronger thesis is that the very act of believing may itself 
produce or provide the evidence for the belief. In describing what I 
have called the stronger thesis Kennedy writes,? 
" ••• there are cases where the belief in the existence of a future 
fact may itself help to produce that fact. As James puts it, there 
are 'cases where faith produces its own verification.' The first 
of these Cthe weaker thesis:l propositions is the only one which is 
disputable. The second is a question of psychological fact which in 
any given instance may be true or false. Surely there!!! cases 
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where belief in the possibility of a future fact may help to bring 
about the existence of that fact. For example, to enter a marriage 
believing that it can be a permanently successful union may well 
help to make it so." 
The interpretation Kennedy gives here fails, I think, to do justice to 
James' aims. Certainly there !E! cases where someone's having a belief 
may be a factor in making that belief true but of what relevance is this 
fact to James' defence of religion ? Only by asking that question do we 
begin to see the import of James' case but, at the same time, the 
difficulties also. One problem is this: what reason is there to suppose 
that the case of a religious believer is analogous to that of a person 
who believes in the success of the marriage ? Prima facie the cases are 
very different since it is easy to see how the belief in the success of 
a marriage may be a causal factor in that succes~ but very difficul~ 
to see an analogy here with belief in God. Moreover, the weak thesis 
! 
seems to establish little from James's point of view. All it says, after r 
all, is that where the evidence for or against an option is inconclusive 
one may chose. But what constitutes 'evideAce'·here'and is it entirely 
independent of believers? The answer to this question, I believe, 
provides James with a stronger defence of religion, and with a general 
epistemological insight. 
First, consider what James meant by calling an option 'live, forced, 
momentous'. To see what this might amount to, consider two individuals 
A and ~ who have had very different educational backgrounds. !, suppose, 
was brought up by religious parents, attended a religious school etc. 
~, by contrast, had atheistic parents and went to a secular school. In 
those circumstances it would be easy to imagine that for! the question 
of God's existence could become an issue of tremendous importance; ! 










for doubting the existence of God, but their whole background and 
personality at some stage of their life, may make the question of God's 
existence of passionate importance. (I am not, of course, saying that 
this kind of background always produces that sort of outcome - someone 
'cynical' about the effects of religious education might say that if 
one wants to produce an atheist the best way is to give them a religious 
education.) For A, then, the question of God's existence is a question 
which is 'live, forced, momentous'. B, by contrast, might be almost 
indifferent to the question of God's existence - ~ may hear arguments 
for and against the existence of God but be virtually unconcerned about 
them. It needn't be the case that ~ has firm convictions one way or the 
other - it is simply that the issue does not really 'touch' him, does 
not arouse curiosity or interest at all. 
Now one traditional epistemological view would say all of the above , 
• 
" t is merely of psychological interest which may affect the context of f 
discovery but cannot affect the context of justification. That is to 
say that on the traditional view, the psychological motivations of 
individuals may contingently affect their predispositions to hold one 
view or another, but it cannot affect the question of which view is 
rationalll justified. James' strong theSis, however, raises the question 
of whether things really divide as neatly as that view claims. 
ConSider, first, claims that have been made to the effect that 
there can be direct religious experience - claims that through some 
mystical experience someone can obtain direct knowledge of God's 
existence. Supposing that A wants to believe in God's existence, ! may 
have some experience that can be interpreted in that kind of way. Now 
of course atheists (like myself) won't accept those claims, they will 
say that there is some other (probably psychological) explanation of 
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the experience in question. And, of course, atheists are not likely to 
have 'religious experiences' since even if they have phenomenologically 
similar experiences to those described by theists, they will naturally 
offer a different explanation of what caused them. From the atheist~ 
point of view, A's religious background etc. will be seen as a part of 
the cause for their 'misinterpreting' certain experiences. The trouble 
for the traditional epistemological view however is that theists can 
make an exactly symmetrical claim with respect to B. That is, they can 
say that because of B's background, ~ is simply insensitive to the 
kind of experience which would enable them to know of God's existence. 
So far I have presented the argument in terms of religious 
I 
experience where the case is perhaps at its strongest. I think, however, 
that something analogous is true of arguments. For someone of atheistic 
predisposi tions the first good looking argument against God's existence ~' 
will be considered fairly conclusive, whereas for those of theistic 
predispositions it will set them to work to show what is wrong with it. 
Similarly, an argument for the existenc,e of God which looks good to the 
theist will appear fairly conclusive, but to the atheist it will present 
the challenge of finding the fallacy. 
The general moral of this tale, I believe, is that for people who 
do not share fundamental assumptions the notion of 'evidence' becomes 
problematic. Now I do not draw the conclusion, and neither did James, 
that this entails that rationality is a 'sham'. James wanted to encourage 
tolerance and acceptance of fallibilism. More generally, and perhaps more 
contentiously, the argument may be taken as pointing to the historical 
nature of inquiry. The pursuit of any inquiry requires a set of 
background assumptions against which to work; now the claim is not that 
those background assumptions don't change - on the contrary - a part of 
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the moral of the tale is the impo~tance of those changes. For example, 
many people like myself have been in a position not unlike B's; it 
is not the case that such people have meticulously examined all of the 
arguments for and against the existence of God and then reached the 
'rational' conclusion. For many of my generation, the issue never was 
a 'momentous' one - the background assumptions had changed from what 
they were for earlier generations. That, of course, does not entail these 
background assumptions are the correct or the best assumptions, but the 
demand that each assumption one makes should be rationally justified 
is unreasonable because impossible to fulfill. One is not precluded 
from bringing those background assumptions into question but I think it 
\ 
is true that one can't provide or produce non-question begging 
arguments (relative to some rival view) for every assumption presupposed 
by one's overall world-view. On major questions, the history of 
philosophy is less the history of arguments won as it is the history 
of assumptions changed. 
I think that one other point is worth stressing with respect to 
James' view of religion. Partially because of an argument like the 
abOVe, and partially for temperamental reasons, James was often more 
interested in the overall effects of sets of beliefs than he was in 
the individual justification for each one. For James, if there were a 
religion E which, for those who believed it, had benefical effects 
(e.g. that it gave them a zest for living, that it encouraged sensitive 
human relationships) he would have thought highly of E whatever he 
thought of the epistemological or metaphysical status of any of the 
beliefs that constituted B. Indeed, James was on occasion inclined to 
imply that the benefical effects were evidence for its truth. Now that 
does indeed look like the subjectivism of which James was accused but 
one thing to be bourne in mind is how broadly James was inclined to use 
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the concept of truth. Non-academics are sometimes inclined to speak 
of 'seekers after the truth' in something like the sense 'seekers after 
wisdom'. James' use of the concept of truth sometimes has more in 
common with the non-academic usage than the academic usage. If that is 
the usage in question then it seems to me that James' view is less 
objectionable than it may appear. (See part II for more comments in this 
vein). 
The recognition of ineliminable historical factors in the very 
nature of inquiry seems to me to be both psychologically realistic and 
(partly for that reason) healthy. James astutely recognized that 
temperamental factors in philosophy divided the 'tough-minded' from the 
'tender-minded~. 8 (There i~ an affinity with Goodman here.9) Apart 
from the psychological realism of this view, recognition of the influence 
of historical factors is a guard against humbug and an ally of 
fallibilism. I have heard it said that philosophers cannot support 
radical politics because they must commit themselves to the disinterested 
pursuit of truth. That view seems to me, as I think it would to James, 
to be nonsensical humbug. The view is nonsensical since the philosopher 
who does support radical politics presumably thinks that that is where 
the truth (or 'the good') resides. The view is humbug because those who 
take this view implicitly pass their own value-judgements off as though 
they were the final arbiter of truth. James wrote,lO "The human mind 
always has and always will be able to interpret facts in accordance 
with its moral interests." 
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l.b) Goodman: Art as Cognition 
The kind of monism which James and Goodman oppose is the kind 
which says that only science tells us about the world. This doctrine 
was held explicitly by the logical positivists and implicitly by others. 
The plausibility of the doctrine has depended, I beli.ve t on fixing 
the evidence. That is to say that the contrast between science as 
cognitive, and any other kind of inquiry as non-cognitive, has depended 
upon both exaggerating the claims of science (in a positive direction) 
and mimimizing the claims of non-science. I want to consider the 
positivist's view of art from a Goodmanian perspective. I think that 
the positivist's view of art may be not unfairly summarized as fOllows,ll 
science is cognitive because it: 
- is discovered 
- is capable of being true/false 
- is non-emotive 
art is non-cognitive because it: 
- is invented 
- is not capable of being true/false 
is emotive 
Of these allegedly sharp contrasts I believe that Goodman would say 
different things; of the invention/discovery dichotomy and the true/false 
capability of science vs. art, Goodman would argue that neither is 
exclusively true of science or art. Of the emotive/non-emotive 
distinction, Goodman agrees that there is some contrast between art and 
science along this dimension but denies that it corresponds to the 
cognitive/non-cognitive dichotomy. 
(b)(i) Invention vs. Discovery 
The claim that science is discovered whilst art is invented appears 
to be patently false: scientists are required to invent their theories 
no less than artists are required to create their works. Moreover, the 
methodology according to which scientists simply construct their theories 
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after observing the world has long been discredited. still, perhaps the 
view can be represented this way: whereas science does not invent its 
subject-matter, art does. This is of course oversimplistic given the 
long tradition ot representation in the arts. One version of this view 
could be based upon what below I call a weakly activist epistemology. 
This would be the view that whilst science requires invention to discover 
truth, insofar as the enterprise is successful we can later discern our 
contribution from that of the world. That we can do this in the case 
of art would be wildly implausible. If there is one central tenet of 
Goodman's epistemology however it is that the idea behind weakly activist 
epistemology cannot be carried out~ To suppose that we could strip 
away our contribution to knowledge would require that the remainder 
, stand in some relationship to what is 'purely given'. On Goodman's view 
(and mine) we can make sense neither of what that relationship would 
be, nor ot the idea of the 'purely given'. Goodman constantly, and 
effectively, reminds us that relationships like 'resemblence' or 
'copying' can't be understood outside ot a tradition or a set of 
conventions. (For my arguments against the given see chapter 2, sections 
land 2). However, even given this view I don't think that this entirely 
disposes of the idea that science has more to do with discovery than 
invention since there is a more general source for this intuition. 
The more general source might be described as the idea that science 
faces the recalcitrance of the world, art does not. Goodman quotes 
sessions,l2 " ••• it is not SUfficient to have the whole world at one's 
disposal - the very infinitude of possibilities cancels out possibilities 
as it were, until limitations are discovered." Of course anyone is 
free to put what squiggles they like on a piece of canvas but equally 
anyone is free to propose any crazy hypothesis or explanation they like. 
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Still, that does not entail either will be considered as art or as 
science. In the case of both art and science there is a symbolic system 
operating within a tradition that enables us to make relative 
judgements of success and failure. Recalcitrance has its analogue in the 
ar~s in terms of artistic success and failure, and if it-is said that 
the cannons of artistic success and failure are difficult to codify the 
reply is obvious. 
One variation on this theme would be to say that whilst there may 
be an analogue of recalcitrance in the arts there is no analogue of 
evidence. Goodman, like Gombrich, is fond of quoting Constable's remark 
that,l3 "Painting is a science •• of which the pictures are but the 
eXperiments." It is no doubt 'very difficult to say what it is that makes 
for artistic success or failure but it is tempting to say that whatever 
it is provides the analogue of evidence in art. (That is not to suppose, 
of course, that there is anyone thing which makes for artistic success _ .. 
just as there is not one thing which counts as 'evidence' for the 
sciences.) If that idea seems far-fetched, I find Goodman's way of 
putting the boot on the other foot conVinCing,l4 
It •• to suppose that science is flatfootedly linguistic, literal, 
and denotational would be to overlook, for instance, the analog 
instruments often used, the metaphor involved in measurement when 
a nummerical scheme is applied in a new realm, and the talk in 
current physics and astronomy of charm and strangeness and black 
holes. Even if the ultimate product of science, unlike that of art, 
is a literal, verbal or mathematical, denotational theory, science 
and art proceed in much the same way with their searching and 
bu;Llding. tI 
(b)(ii) Truth and Art 
If one takes the view that it is sentences that are true or false 
then of course some of the arts are immediately disqualified from 
having truth as their goal. Not all arts would be disqualified since 
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novels employ sentences. Nor is this point trivial; even if one leaves 
aside metaphorical truths, novels seem eminently capable of expressing 
literal but general truths about the world. The larger and more important 
question however is whether the dichotomy between activities capable of 
expressing truths for falsehoods and those which are not should be 
thought of as corresponding to the difference between cognitive and non-
cognitive activities. Goodman expresses his view thus,15 
"Truth and its aesthetic counterpart amount to appropriateness 
under different names. If we speak of hypotheses but not of works 
of art as being true, that is because we reserve the terms 'true' 
and 'false' for symbols in sentential form. I do not say that this 
difference is negligible, but it is specific rather than generic, 
a difference in field of application rather than in formula, and 
marks no schism between the scientific and the aesthetic." 
What may underlie the intuition that science is concerned with 
reality and art not, is what may well be a correct view of art captured 
succintly by the statement that "art is not a copy of the world'. 
If so, however, what would be questioned here is the contrast this is 
supposed to provide with SCience; giving up an epistemology based on 
copying and a correspondence theory of truth, whilst accepting a 
strongly activist epistemology (see below), makes it impossible to say 
how much of science is invention or imitation. The viability of this 
alternative has yet to be shown and is here defered. However, if it is 
granted that the existence of some art forms such as the novel do blur 
the distinction between science conceived as the pursuit of truth and 
art as not, perhaps one should look to the third dichotomy between 
emotive and cognitive meaning for the correct explanation of the 
difference between art and science. 
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(b) (iii) Emotive vs. Cognitive Meaning 
Intuitively, art would seem to involve emotion in some essential 
way that science does not; but what way? It is certainly tar trom 
obvious that science requires any less emotional commitment or yields 
any less emotional satisfaction than art. One answer, favoured by the 
positivists, sees a difference in intention: art is intended to give 
emotional satisfaction, science not. Goodman asks ~he rhetorical 
question of whether the scholar seeks knowledge or the satisfaction of 
knowing. These seem so much the same that trying to do one without the 
other would seem to be a precarious enterprise. It seems as difficult 
~o locate the role of emotion i~ aesthetic experience in a work of art 
I 
as it is to locate it in the intentions of the artists themselves. Is a 
painting by Mondrian more or less emotive than Newton's laws? One way 
or another most of the 'obvious' --views as to the special role of emotion 
in aesthetic experience do not stand up to scrutiny - yet there does 
seem to be some special role. Goodman argues, following in a tradition 
16 17 that includes Langer and Herbert Read, as follows, 
"On the one side we put sensation, perception, inference, 
conjecture, all nerveless inspection and investigation, fact and 
truth; on the other, pleasure, pain, interest, satisfaction, 
disapPOintment, all brainless affective response, liking and 
loathing. This pretty effectively keeps us from seeing that in 
aesthetic experience the emotions function cognitively. The work 
of art is apprehended through the feelings as well as through the 
senses. Emotional numbness disables here as definitely if not as 
completely as blindness or deafness." 
What I say in chapter 8 offers a similar view placed in the context of 
a general view of the nature of inquiry. 
Two things need to be said in concluding this section. First, that 
I do not claim to have shown that Goodman's conception of art is correct 
(which is, in any case,more complex and subtle than I have intimated 
here) but rather to have given some indication of what his view is. 
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I hope that the following chapters will support, in broad terms, the 
conception of ,the cognitive process that Goodman offers. Second, that it I 
is not being claimed that there are no important differences between 
art and science, rather that the differences are other than has often 
been supposed. Goodman puts it this way,18 
"The difference between art and science is not that between feeling 
and fact, intuition and inference, delight and deliberation, 
synthesis and analysis, sensation and cerebration, concreteness 
and abstraction, passion and action, mediacy and immediacy, or 
truth and beauty, but rather a difference in domination of certain 
specific characteristics of symbols." 
Part II: Relativism 
I want to begin my accou'nt of James' and Goodman's versions of 
relativism by considering three general epistemological views. (See 
figure 2 overleaf). The first distinction I want to mention was drawn 
by Lakatos in his (1970).19 
"There is an important demarcation between 'passivist and 'activist 
theories of knowledge. 'Passivists' hold that true knowledge is 
Nature's imprint on a perfectly inert mind: mental activity can 
only result in bias and distortion .. The most influential passivist 
school is classical empiricism. 'Activists' hold that we cannot 
read the book of nature without mental activity, without inter-
preting it in the light of our expectations or theories." 
Lakatos then went on to draw a further distinction between conservative 
and revolutionary activists; a distinction between those (the 
conservatives) who believe that we are trapped within our conceptual 
scheme and those (the revolutionaries) who believe that although we 
always work within our conceptual scheme we can nevertheless improve it 
as we proceed. James and Goodman are certainly revolutionary in that 
sense, but more important to my concerns here is a distinction I draw 
between strong and ~ versions of activism. Hardly any philosophers 
now maintain a purely passivist view of knowledge; no one today 
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of our interests. However, it is still argued that although our 
interests and activities provide a necessary background for the 
acquisition of knowledge, real knowledge will be that knowledge from 
which we can isolate those interests. Thus Williams (reconstructing 
Descartes) writes,20 
!'Are not all our concepts ours, including those of physics? 
Of course: but there is no suggestion that we should try to describe 
a world without ourselves using any concepts, or without using 
concepts which we, human beings, can understand. The suggestion is 
that there are possible descriptions of the world which are not 
peculiarly ours,and not peculiarly relative to our experience. tI 
The weak activist, then, agrees that in the acquisition of knowledge 
we will have to rely upon, say, linguistic conventions or our sensory 
mechanisms, but then suggests that we can later separate what we 
contribute from what the world contributes. The strong activist says 
, that whilst it is the case that we can say how the world is from our 
point of view we can't make sense of how the world is absolutely. To 
say how the world is relative to a point of view is to say (in part) 
how the world is, and therefore, relative to that viewpoint says what 
the world contributes, but this does not say how the world is absolutely. 
That both James and Goodman are strong activists is, I think, 
clear. James said,2l "You see how naturally one comes to the humanistic· 
principle: you can't weed out the human contribution." 
And, 22 
"What shall we call a thing anyhow? It seems quite arbitrary, 
for we carve out everything •• to suit our human purposes •• We break 
the flux of sensible reality into things •• at our will. We create 
the subjects of our true as well as our false propositions." 
Goodman writes,23 
"Not only how but what Lthe eye] sees is regulated by need and 
predjudice. It selects, rejects, organizes, discriminates, associates 
classifies, analyses, constructs. It does not so much mirror as 
take and make; and what it takes and makes it sees not bare, as 
items without attributes, but as things, as food, as people, as 
enemies, as stars, as weapons. Nothing is seen nakedly or naked." 
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And,24 
" ••• what has been recieved and what has been done to it cannot be 
distinguished within the final product. Content cannot be extracted 
by peeling off layers of comment ... 
The whole emphasis of these quotations raises the spectre of subjectivis~ 
," 
they raise the question of whether James and Goodman can, consistently 
with the views quoted, maintain that truth and reality are in any way, 
to any extent, independent of our desires and wishes. Now in figure 2 
I labeled strong activism as internal justification. The term 
'justification' appears to emphasize that neither James nor Goodman hold 
that every view, or theory, or practice is as good as any other given 
some purpose, framework or vocabulary.25 The term 'internal' appears 
in order to emphasize that i~ James' and Goodman's view it is only 
relative to some purpose, framework or vocabulary that some view or 
theory can be justified relatively to some other. The whole thrust of 
26 internal justification was neatly summarized by James when he wrote, 
"Theoretic truth is •• no relation between our mind and archetypal 
reality. It falls within the mind, being the accord of some of 
its processes with other processes and objects - 'accord' 
consisting here in well definable relations." 
I have so far given some indication of the overall view that James 
and Goodman want to defend; the question remains as to what extent they 
were successful. My overall view is that in both cases they did not 
sufficiently develop their view in order to be able to rebut the charges 
of subjectivism that may be leveled against them. Further, I think that 
James did fall into saying formally inconsistent things but that it is 
possible to rescue him from this inconsistency whilst fulfilling all of 
his major ambitions. My feeling about Goodman is somewhat different: the 
way in which I at any rate can see of defending Goodman's overall 
position does not show his views to be inconsistent but it does leave 
one wondering about the motivation for some of his views (on the eschewal 
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of non-extensional languages; his. views on sets, for example). To develop 
these points, and to further explain the concept of internal justification 
I want to look at James' theory of truth. 
James said,27 
"Truth ••• is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their 
'agreement', as falsity means their disagreement, with 'reality'. 
Pragmatists and intellectualists both accept this definition as a 
matter of course. They begin to quarrel only after the question is 
raised as to what may precisely be meant by the term 'agreement', 
and what by the term 'reality', when reality is defined as 
something for our ideas to agree with." 
James, then, was at least commited to a relational theory of truth. 
James said three things about truth which give rise to worries that his 
view may entail subjectivism. H~ said that truth was, 
I 
- man-made, 
- satisfactory to believe, 
- mutable. 
What James meant by saying that truth is 'man-made' has already been 
hinted at: we make a contribution to knowledge which cannot be isolated. 
James did not mean that any statement can be made true. Whether that 
view can be justified depends upon spelling-out the theory of internal 
justification, which depends in turn upon the other things James said 
about truth. 
Why should truth be 'satisfactory to believe' ? James' view was 
that it was satisfactory because a belief which is true will be one that 
is immune to overthrow by subsequent experience - with its attendent 
upheaval of our belief system. Two related misunderstandings give rise 
to fears of subjectivism here. First, there would seem to be many 
beliefs that we find satisfactory to believe but which are false. 
However, to the claim that28 "'The true' •• is only the expedient in our 
way of thinking" James added " ••• expedient in the long run and on the 
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whole of course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight 
won't necessarily meet all further experience equally satisfactorily. 
Experience, as we know, has ways of boiling Q!!!, and making us correct 
our present formulas." 
If one misunderstanding of the thesis that the truth is satisfactory 
to believe is the supposition that a belief is true if it is satisfactory 
~, another is the view that a belief may be true merely in virtue of 
satisfying our practical .interests. R.B.Perry wrote two articles in 
which he said that the meaning and truth of ideas should be identified 
with their cognitive use. James reply in a letter is instructive and 
well worth quoting fUlly,29 
, 
And, 
"tPragmatism J seems to most people to exclude intellectual interests 
and relations, but all it means to say is that these are subjective 
interests like all the others, and not the sole aim in determining 
the beliefs that count as true ••• The pragmatic test of a concept's 
meaning is a possible experience somewhere, but the experience may 
be a pure observation with no 'practical' use whatsoever. It may 
have the tremendous theoretical use of telling us which concept is 
true however; and that may remotely be connected with practical uses 
over and above the mere verification or it may not." 
"You speak •• as if the 'degree of satisfaction' was exclusive of 
theoretic satisfactions. Who ever said or implied this ? Surely 
neither Dewey, Schiller nor I have ever denied that sensation, 
relation and funded truth 'dispose', in their measure, of what we 
'propose'. Nothing that we propose can violate them; but, they 
satisfied, what in addition gratifies our aesthetic or u~ilitarian 
demands best will always be counted as ~ true. My position is 
that, other things equal, emotional satisfactions count for truth -
among the other things being intellectual satisfactions." 
Where James did run into difficulty, I believe, was with his thesis 
that truth is 'mutable'. James notion of mutability is evident in such 
passages as the follOwing,30 
"The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. 
Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. 
Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of 
verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity is the process 
of its validation." 
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And,3l 
"The most fateful point of difference between being a rationalist 
and a pragmatist is now fully in sight. Experience is in mutattion, 
and our psychological ascertainments of truth are in mutation - so 
much rationalism will allow; but never that either reality itself 
or truth itself is mutable. Reality stands complete and ready-made 
from all eternity, rationalism ~nsists, and the agreement of our 
ideas with it is that unique unalyzable virtue in them of which she 
has already told us. As that intrinsic excellance, their truth has 
nothing to do with our experiences. It adds nothing to the content 
of experience. It makes no difference to reality itself; it is 
sUperVenient, inert, static, a reflexion merely." 
But now I think that the 'intellectualist' or 'rationalist' may 
legitimately object that it is inconsistent for James to begin by 
agreeing that truth is 'agreement with reality' and then claim that truth 
is 'mutable'; that is, it is hard to see how some statement which agrees 
. , 
with reality at so~e particular time could yet cease to be true at some 
other time unless this were trivally the case, e.g. that the stateme=t 
in question is indexical. 
There is, I think, a genuine difficulty for James's theory here 
but there are three things I want to say about it. James's pragmatism 
led him to emphasize the concrete hist~rical situation faced by each 
inquirer rather than the long-term theoretical possibilities. In this 
vein he wrote,32 
"Of course, it you take the satisfactoriness concretely, as somethin, 
felt by you now, and if, by truth, you mean truth taken abstractly 
and verified in the long-run, you cannot make them equate •• Yet 
at each and every concrete moment, truth for each man is what that 
man 'troweth' at that moment with the maximum of satisfaction •••• ; 
and similarly, abstract truth, truth verified in the long run, and 
abstract satisfactoriness, long-run satisfactoriness, coincide." 
It seems to me that James needed an account of modality which he did not 
provide. I believe that a correct analysis of modal idioms allows one 
to show how James' overall ambitions are consistent with the rejection 
of subjectivism but James himself did not provide this account. 
(Strangely enough, I believe that something similar is true of Goodman, 
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for although Goodman has written'brillantly on modality he refuses to 
employ modal idioms in defending (or explicating) his own views). 
The second, and more fundamental, thing I want to say concerning 
James' notion of mutability of truth relates:it to the central concept 
of internal justification. Internal justification, as I see it, requires , 
two elements: it requires something like a framework, or vocabulary, or 
purpose, and then it requires relatively better or worse satisfiers of 
the framework, vocabulary, or purpose. When James stressed the mutability 
of truth I think he intended to deny that the framework, vocabulary or 
purpose can be justified absolutely by what is 'purely given'. In 
stressing the mutability of truth James was stressing that the framework, 
vocabulary or purpose is, quite properly, alterable in the light of 
experience. Consider, for example, a Newtonian vs. an Einsteinian 
'framework'. Argument still rages as to whether it is better to say that 
the Newtonian world-view has been falsified or whether it has merely been 
shown to be true within a more limited domain. James would here, I think, 
have sided with those who say that the.Newtonian framework has been 
falsified for the truth, on his View, consists in whatever the ~ 
theory says. (A point I shall return to below). What James failed to 
emphasize sufficiently is that a sentence such as 'Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon', given that the framework (and, hence, the meaning) remains 
constant, is either true or false eternally.33 The general point is so 
important to the concept of internal justification that it is worth 
dwelling upon. 
External theories of justification ~which in terms of figure 2 
include both the weak activist and passivist views) typically take one 
of two forms: (i) there is the view that there is an epistemic 
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'unconceptualized given' to which statements must be true. (Lewis 
argued for this view - see chapter 2). (ii) that there is an ontological 
structure to the world (sometimes called 'jointsl) to which statements 
must be true. (Williams, Platts and others seem to accept this view -
again see chapter 2). Now both of those views are that there is a 
'given', something entirely independent of our conceptualizations which 
true statements must describe. Both of those views would ensure, so to 
speak, the absolute immutabiliJz of truth, tor if a statement does 
describe that 'given' which is entirely independent of our concept-
ualizations that is the end of the matter. As James put it, truth is 
here thought of as mere 'reflexion l • However, James (like Goodman) 
, 
rejects both of those views and it is not difficult to see why this is 
of a piece with the stress on the mutability of truth. Roughly the view 
is this: given some framework or vocabulary etc. statements are true or 
false, but since no framework or vocabulary is, or can be, justified 
purely by the 'way things are' there always remains the possibility of a 
better framework or vocabulary. Now I don't think that this does remove 
the inconsistency from James' view - if a statement really is true (as 
opposed to our merely believing it to be true at a given time) then it 
will always remain true - but it does I think explain why James was led 
to say what he did. The third thing I shall say will reinforce this 
point but first I want to make two further pOints concerning internal 
justification. 
A part of the attractiveness of ideas of the given no doubt resides 
in the fact that they obviously provide a reason why truth and ontology 
should be independent of us. A major task in the chapters that follow 
is to show in what sense truth and ontology are independent of us 
consistently with a theory of inte.rnal justification. 
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Above I have spoken of the two forms that external theories ot 
justification typically take but those two forms do not exhaust the 
possibilities. Consider, for example, possible accounts of the nature 
of 'logical laws'. One kind of account might speak of the 'laws ot 
thought', another of the set of a-~riori truths, but the advocate ot 
internal justification is likely to take a different approach. Goodman, 
considering the justification of deduction, writes,34 
..... deductive inferences are justified by their conformity to 
valid general rules, and •• general rules are justified by their 
conformity to valid inferences. But this circle is a virtuous one. 
The point is that rules and particular inferences alike are 
justified by being brought into agreement with each other. A rule 
is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept 
and an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling 
to amend. The/process of justification is the delicate one of 
making mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; 
and in the agreement achieved lies the only justification needed 
for either." 
This strategy of viewing the cognitive process as a process ot mutual 
adjustment between different parts of our conceptual scheme provides a 
typical example of a theory of internal justification for it avoids the 
need to suppose that there is an a-priori or absolute starting point 
from which inquiry must commence. The only 'given' starting point that 
pragmatists accept is the historicalll given problem situation in which 
inquirers find thems.elves. That is to say, each member of a cognitive 
community finds themselves with a cognitive inheritance (e.g. !!! the 
process of language aquisition) and a number of 'problems'. Inquiry is 
then seen as the attempt to solve the problems, an attempt which may 
require the inquirer to modify or to reject parts of their cognitive 
inheritance. One distinguishing feature of pragmatist philosophy, as 
opposed to most other schools of analytic philosophy, is its tendency 
to stress the historical nature of the cognitive process. In broad terms 
this is a major aspect of the pragmatists' rejection of the idea that 
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we can understand the world ~ specie aeternitatis to which I refered 
in the introduction. (This theme is taken up in chapter 8 but echoes of 
this view will be found throughout the thesis). 
Above I quoted James as saying that tI •• other things equal, 
emotional satisfactions count for truth - among the other things being 
the intellectual satisfactions." This comment by James suggests two 
distinct attitudes that one might adopt toward the notion of truth. I 
can illustrate this difference by supposing that we have two theories 
Tl and T2 which are adequate for some purpose. Suppose further that 
Tl is preferable along certain pragmatic dimensions - simplicity, 
economy etc. Supposing that it is not the case that one theory is 
really true and the other isn't true (this kind of situation, many 
believe, obtains with respect to various forms of set theory - see 
chapter 7) two further attitudes are possible: some will say that both 
theories are equally true but that Tl is pragmatically better, whilst 
others might want to say that TI is a truer theory. James opts for the 
second option because 'intellectual interests and relations' are 
'subjective interests like all the others'. My attitude differs from 
that of James here. I suspect that there may be good reason for prefering 
the first to the second alternative. One reason, for instance, might be 
that truth does not come in degrees.35 However I would entirely agree 
with James in rejecting a bad reason for taking the first view. A bad 
reason would be one which patronized the pragmatic criteria or, in 
James's terms, held that truth was the paramount consideration because 
truth is 'objective' whereas the pragmatic are held to be 'merely 
subjective'. My attitude is this: one can either argue that truth does 
not come in degrees and distinguish truth from 'pragmatic criteria' 
or one can argue that truth, like other considerations, is only one 
of many pragmatic criteria provided that one adopts compensating 
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attitudes to the importance that attaches to the pursuit ot truth. 
That is, it one takes the former view, which apparently supports the 
attitude that truth is 'objective l , one must recognize tha~ truth is 
not the sole or necessarily paramount consideration. This view is taken 
by GOodman when he wribes 36 , 
"The scientist who supposes that he is single-mindedly dedicated 
to the search for truth deceives himself. He is unconcerned with 
the trivial truths he could grind out endlessly; and he looks to 
the multi-faceted and irregular results of observations for little 
more than suggestions ot overall structures and significant 
generalizations. He seeks system, simplicity, scope; and when 
satisfied on these scores he tailors truth to fit.1t 
The second viell, which James takes in the passage quoted, takes 'truth' 
to include considerations of scope, simplicity etc. If one adopts this 
conception of truth then it is indeed appropriate to call science a 
pursuit of truth but it is also to make truth itself pragmatic. I am 
suggesting, therefore, that there are two major options for a pragmatic 
theory of truth the choice of which involves no important difference of 
principle. For convenience I will term them the indirect pragmatic 
theory of truth (the first view) and the direct pragmatic theory of 
truth (the second view). The indirect view still deserves to be called 
pragmatic, in my view, lor two reasons. First, because it rejects 
absolutist or 'external' theories; second, that although within some 
theory truth appears to be non-pragmatic, independent, tobjective', 
choices between. theories can, even in principle, only be made on 
f\ 
pragmatic grounds. (See figure 3 overleaf). 
The distinction between direct and indirect pragmatic theories of 
truth accounts for two things: {i) it helps to explain James' stress 
on the mutability of truth· since clearly if one includes considerations 
of simplicity etc. the rate at which we change our assessment of 
theories as true (or as likely to be true) will be all the faster; (ii) 
this distinction accounts nicely for a difference between James and 
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Goodman. I suggest that it is because James is inclined to take the 
direct view, and Goodman the indirect view, that accounts for the fact 
that although their epistemology is strikingly similar, James said a 
good deal about truth whereas Goodman says little. Since it will 
. 
simplify the attainment of my objectives I shall, in subsequent 
chapters, be developing an indirect theory. 
I have said less about Goodman than about James in this section. 
Partially that is because, as just noted, Goodman s~s little about 
truth. r shall however return to some of Goodman's views in future 
chapters (see chapter 3 in particular) as I now proceed to develop my 




In this chapter I outline my general approach to epistemology and 
metaphysics. The first two sections give a preliminary outline of the 
reasons I find for rejecting the idea ot an epistemic or metaphysical 
given. Although section 1 only considers one philosophers's arguments 
(those of Lewis) in favor of an epistemic 'given', the conclusions 
reached are, I believe, generally applicable to foundationalist 
epistemology. Section 2 considers an intuitive picture of inquiry which 
involves the notion of 'joints'. Arguably one of the things wrong with 
this picture is that it requires the idea of a private language. I 
sketch one way of viewing Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility 
of a private language and my response to it. Section 3 develops the 
concept of a 'linguistic context', that to which truth and ontology are 
relative. The central problem is how one may view the relation between 
language and reality without relying on a 'correspondence' relation on 
the one hand, or falling into subjectivism on the other. That, indeed, 
is a problem of the whole chapter (and thesis), but in this section 
I show how certain linguistic phenomena (e.g. open-texture) motivate 
my view and may be accomodated within it. Section 4 considers some of 
the epistemological implications of my views and shows them to be 
compatible with fallibilism. 
(1) Epistemology and the 'given' 
fI ••• the purpose of knowledge fl , Lewis writes,l " ••• is to be true 
to something beyond it.fI This meant, on the view Lewis developed, that 
there must be a 'given' which is independent of the activity of the 
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mind,2 "The two elements to be distinguished in knowledge are the 
concept, which is the product of the activity of thought, and the 
sensuously given which is independent of such activity." Concerning 
their relationship Lewis claimed that,3 "The pure concept and the 
content of the given are mutually independent; neither limits the other." 
Lewis's fundamental argument for the given is this,4 
"If there be no datum given to the mind, then knowledge must be 
contentless and arbitrary; there would be nothing which it must 
be true to. And if there be no interpretation or construction 
which the mind imposes, then thought is rendered superfluous, the 
possibility of error becomes inexplicable, and the distinction of 
true and false is in danger of becoming meaningless." 
Importantly, however, Lewis did not argue that the mind first rec~lves 
the given and then processes it for he was not concerned with an actual 
separation of the process of observation from conceptualization, but 
with a theoretical analysis of different components of experience. ~he 
given is an abstraction,5 It •• it is !!!, not before, experience." Indeed 
he says,6 "This given element is never, presumably, to be discovered in 
isolation. It 
The independence of the given is n'ot, then, the isolation of the 
given: it doesl\ot\tar'Y that there can be pure observational states which 
precede the act of interpretation. How, then, are we to identify the 
given for theoretical purposes? He gives the following example,7 
"At the moment, I have a fountain pen in my hand ••• I abstract this 
item from the total field of my present consciousness and relate 
it to what is not just now present in ways which I have learned and 
which reflect modes of action which I have acquired. It might 
happen that I remember my first experience of such a thing. If so, 
I should find that this sort of presentation did not then mean 
-fountain pen' to me. I bring to the present moment something which 
I did not then bring; a relation of this to other actual and 
possible experiences, and a classification of what is here presented 
which I did not then include in the same group. This present 
classification depends on that learned relation of this experience 
to other possible experience and to my action, which the shape, size, 
etc., of this object was not then a sign of. A savage in New 
Guinea, lacking certain interests and habits of ac~ion which are 
mine, would not so classify it." 
- 44 -
And,.8 
" ••• suppose my present interest to be slightly altered. I might 
then describe this object which is in my hand as 'a cylinder' or 
'hard rubber' or 'a poor buy'. In each case the thing is somewhat 
differently related in my mind, and the connoted modes of my 
possible behaviour toward it, and my further experience of it, are 
different. Something called 'given' remains constant, but its 
character as sign, its class~fication, and its relation to other 
things and to action are differently taken." 
It is, then, the constancy of the given through all variation of 
interests that characterizes the given and limits possible 
co~ceptualiztion,9 "I can apprehend this thing as pen or rubber or 
cylinder, but I cannot, by taking thought, discover it as paper or soft 
or cubical." He pOints out however,lO 
"While we can thus isolate the element of the given by these 
criteria of its unalterability and its character as sensuous feel 
or quality, we cannot describe any particular given as such, 
because in describing it, in whatever fashion, we qualify it by 
bringing it under some category or other, select from it, emphasize 
aspects of it, and relate it in particular and avoidable ways." 
And,ll 
"So that in a sense the given is ineffable, always. It is that 
which remains untouched and unaltered, however it is construed by 
thought. Yet no one but a philosopher could for a moment deny this 
immediate presence in consciousness of that which no activity of 
thought can create or alter." 
This view is therefore one version of foundationalist epistemology: 
unalterable, directly intuited, ineffable, certain, the given provides 
an independent control over conceptualization and a firm foundation for 
knowledge. It is not difficult to see, however, that this view faces 
serious internal difficulties. When Lewis said that he could not, by 
taking thought, discover the pen as soft, paper or cubical, he inte~ded 
to illustrate the distinction between the given and its interpretation,12 
liMy designation of this thing as pen reflects my purpose to write; as 
'cylinder' my desire to explain a problem in geometry .... " and these 
descriptions do not reflect the given because they are 'alterable' 
according to purpose. In that case however, how can the inability to 
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to apprehend the pen as paper, or soft, or cubical, be a constraint 
on the given, for are not the descriptions 'non-paper', 'non-soft', and 
'non-cubical' equally available for different purposes? Perhaps the 
reason for asserting the 'givenness' of the things being non-paper, non-
soft, and non-cubical, is that under any variation of interest I cannot 
bring myself to use the contrary notions 'paper', 'soft', or 'cubical'. 
But if the inability to entertain contrary notions is the mark of the 
given then 'pen', 'cylinder' and 'rubber' must equally Delong to the 
given since their contraries are equally inapplicable. 
There is a more general problem with Lewis's notion of the given 
than the one just discussed. The doctrine of the ineffability of the 
given seems to be inconsistent with the example he gives of its 
unalterability. The alleged impossibility of apprehending the pen as soft 
seems to imply that its hardness is given and to provide the description 
of it as hard or non-soft. More generally still, either the given must 
be describab~ (and thereby subject to error in Lewis' view), or ineffable 
as he says it is - but in the latter c~se its epistemological role must 
be severly limited. This last point can be expanded thus: if we are to 
justitr the claim that observation may provide some independent control 
over conceptualization in science for instance, we need to explain how 
this can occur at the level of descriptions rather than at the level of 
experience private to individuals. Evidence for . 5~ntific theories 
must be amenable to intersubjective verification but on Lewis's view 
that which is capable of intersubjective verification is E£i that 
which is certain. 
The rejection of a certain, conceptually untainted foundation for 
knowledge seems to leave us impaled on the second horn of a dilemma 
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posed by Scheffler,13 
"Observation needs to be construed as independent of concept-
ualization if conceptualization is not to be simply arbitrary; yet 
it cannot plausibly be thought to be independent of conceptualizatio 
On the contrary, it is shot through vdth interpretation, 
expectation, and wish." 
And,l4 
"So, on the one hand, observation must be independent, and, on the 
other hand, it cannot be. To suppose it is independent commits us 
to an implausibly pure observational given, and makes a mystery 
of observational control over thought. To suppose, on the other 
hand, that it is not independent commits us •••• to the view that 
apparent observational control is always circular and hence 
incapable of restricting the arbitrariness of conception •••• " 
He answers the dilemma as follows,l5 
"Conceptualization relates both to the idea of categories for the 
sorting of items and to the idea of expectation, belief, or 
hypothesis as to how items will actually fit available categories; 
it links with the notion of category and, also, with the quite 
different notion of hypothesis. The very same category system is, 
surely, compatible with alternative, and indeed conflicting 
hypotheses: that is, havi~g adopted a given category system, our 
hYpotheses as to the actual distribution of items vlithin the 
several categories is not prejudged." 
I believe that this answer to the dilemma is fundamentally correct and 
it provides the cornerstone of my relativism. What makes this view so 
important in my view is that it allows one to understand how observation 
can provide independent control without it being the case that we ever 
confrontunconceptualized reality. A prosaic example might help. 
Faced with the question, 'is there a table in that room ?' I know what 
kind of thing to look for; I know what would count as evidence for or 
against one answer from my background knowledge of the English language. 
When I look in the room I do not confront an unconceptualized set of 
facts but neither does this mean that the truth or falsity of any 
answer I give is not independent of me. 
This case is an instance of what in chapter 1 I called internal 
justification and it is worthwhile explaining this description. The 
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strategy of internal justification is to suggest that we should view 
some of the changes in our beliefs as the result of adjustments we may 
make between principles (or 'categories') and particular judgements 
(or'~theses'). I hope to show that by adopting this strategy one 
can explain in what sense truth and ontology are independent of us 
without the need for a mysterious correspondence relation and consistentl) 
with fallibilism. The strategy of internal justification can be extended 
beyond showing we do not need the idea of an epistemic 'given', to show 
that there is no need for a metaphysical 'given' either. Perhaps I 
should make it clear that my talk of categories is a falon 2! parler 
invoked to explain the theory. I do not believe that there is a set 
I \ 
.of categories that we must possess and that someone could list - indeed 
WH I Co'" 
it is partly that factt:ermits fallibilism. (But see section 4.a. below). 
I call this view internal since it is a crucial consequence of the 
theory that epistemologically we don't need the concept of data 
unsullied by conceptualization, and metaphysically we don't need the 
idea of a pre-existing ontology to which our true theories must correspond 
It is, or ought to be, uncontroversial'that we ££ always work with our 
concepts but I claim further that we have no need of the idea that if 
,.p.c:. 
wel.!-uckY those concepts will be ones that pick out 'what is there 
anyway. ,16 In my view it is just as well that we don·t need such things 
for they have always defied explication in the past and they continue 
to do so today. I call my view relativist (to contrast with absolute) 
since I claim that relative to a particular 'category' a statement 
may say something true or false about the world, and relative to a 
'category' one may make true or false existential statements about 
what exists. Which • categories' to adopt is subject to revision in the 
light of our experience and purposes. 
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(2) Metaphysics and the 'given' '. 
An intuitive picture of how inquiry is possible might go as follows: 
imagine the world before there were any sentient beings in it; at that 
time there would already have been certain things and kinds of things, 
e.g. mountains, trees. Now imagine a solitary sentient being appearing 
on the scene; this solitary being is to be imagined as having a certain 
sophistication - in particular it has the capacity to form concepts 
and to use language. After the elapse of some time, the sentient being 
starts to utter sentences. Now it is possible that if the sentient 
being happens to utter the correct sentences, the ontological 
commitments of thoee sentences ~ay correspond to the things and kinds 
of things that existed before the sentient being arrived. 
Intuitive though the picture may be I believe that just about 
everything is wrong with it. My targets are the ideas of the ontology 
which exists prior to the sentient being (which from here on I shall 
refer to as 'joints') and the idea of 'correspondence'. One way of 
arguing against those concepts is to employ an argument developed in 
the later work of Wittgenstein. I will first sketch this argument and 
then indicate my att.itude toward it. 
Kripke's presentation of the private language argument in his 
(1982) takes the central problem to arise from what have been called 
the 'rule following considerations,.l? Kripke first presents the 
problem in the form of a sceptical paradox and then offers Wittgenstein's 
'sceptical solution t • Following Kripke I will present the problem by 
using a mathematical example but the argument is intended to cover any 
use of language. 
English speakers use the word 'plus' and the sign '+' to denote 
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the mathematical function of addition. This function is defined for all 
pairs of positive integers. An important fact about all English 
speakers is that they will have only computed the value of the function 
for a finite number of cases. Imagine one speaker S, and suppose that e 
has never previously computed the value of 68 + 57. ~ performs the 
computation and gets the solution 125. Perhaps after checking, ~ is 
confident that 125 is the correct answer both in the sense that it is 
arithmetically correct and that t+, has been used in accordance with 
SIS past intentions. Now suppose that a bizarre sceptic queries ~ about 
about this result and suggests that as S had used '+' in the past the 
answer ~ should have given was 5 ! S's confidence that 125 and not 5 
is the correct answer cannot·be because ~ had previously performed the 
computation. ~ may say that they intended to use the same rule or 
function that they had used in the past but, the sceptic asks, who is 
entitled to say what that rule or function was? Suppose that all of the 
computations 2 has performed in the past have involved numbers smaller 
than 57, so perhaps the function ~ used could be the 'qunus function', 
symbolized as'e'and defined thus: 
x e y = x + y, if x, Y < 57 
= 5 otherwise. 
Bizarre though the sceptic's proposal is it does seem logically 
possible. Imagine that 2 did mean addition but that under the influence 
of LSD § misinterpreted past uses of '+' as the function e and computed 
68 + 57 as 5. In those circumstances S would have made a mistake 
concerning their past intentions and if, as it seems to be, that is 
possible, the sceptic asks why it could not happen the other way around, 
i.e. that S has made a mistake of that kind but with ·'plus' and 'qunus' 
reversed. 
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The sceptic's proposal is bizarre but if it is false then there 
must be some fact about S in virtue of which S meant '+' and not 'Q'. 
~ will undoubtedly have felt 'directed' by a rule to answer 125 and not 
5 but those directions cannot have been (~ hypothesi) that S would 
answer 125 if queried '68 + 57 1'; nor of those of acting in accordance 
with the rule exhibited in previous examples since quaddition (defined 
by the $ function) is compatible with that. Thus the sceptic poses two 
challenges: (i) is there any fact about S that ~ meant '+' and not '.' ?; 
(ii) does e have any reason to be so confident that they should answer 
125 and not 5 ? If the sceptic is correct, the concepts of meaning and 
intending one function rather than another make no sense, for the 
sceptic holds that no fact about 2 establishes that he meant plus 
, rather than qunus. (Note that this would hold in one's own case - the 
argument does not presuppose a first/third person asymmetry). 
A full examination of the various responses to the sceptical 
problem is not possible here but two points are worth making. One 
possible response is to suggest that the problem can be overcome by 
appeal to a dispositional analysis. On this view the fallacy in the 
argument consists in supposing that one must find some occurent mental 
state in virtue of which 2 meant 'plus' rather than 'qunus'. The 
dispositional response concedes that there was no such state but points 
out that there was all along the disposition to respond in a certain 
way. Certainly if S was a typical speaker, under normal circumstances, 
then S would have had the disposition to respond '125' rather than '5'. 
How to spell out 'normal circumstances' and 'typical speaker' need not 
detain us for the sceptic need not challenge the fact that ~ does 
indeed have this disposition, but the sceptic will cl"aim that this is 
irrelevant. The problem with the dispositional response is that the 
sceptic is seeking justification for the fact that ~ would respond '125' 
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rather than '5'. The fact that S would respond that way does not justify 
the response. The second point is that what gives the sceptical problem 
its force is that it looks unlikely that the nature of ~ mental 
states could provide the kind of justification sought. Even if it were 
true that some particular kind of mental state accompanied every 
disposition to respond in one way or another to '68 + 57 ?' how could 
that fact justify one response rather than another ? 
What, then, is Wittgenstein's answer to the sceptical problem? 
Scepticism is a substantive philosophical thesis and cannot therefore, 
officially at least, be Wittgenstein's view. (Philosophy It ••• leaves 
everything as it is. n18 ) Kripke argues, convincingly to my mind, that 
Wittgenstein proposes a sceptical solution to the problem. Whereas a 
'straight' solution to a sceptical problem would show what was wrong 
with the argument (in this case it would point to some fact about 2 
which distinguished ~ meaning 'plus' rather than 'qunus') a sceptical 
solution accepts the facts that the sceptic points to but disputes the 
contention that our ordinary beliefs and practices stand in need of 
the kind of justification the sceptic has shown to be untenable. (Compare 
Hwme's 'solution' to the problem of induction). The Wittgensteian view 
appears to concede to the sceptic that for a speaker considered in 
isolation, there is no substantive content to the idea of a rule 
guiding behaviour. If our attention is restricted to one person alone, 
following a rule 'privately', all one can say is that they are entitled 
to follow 'the rule' as it strikes them. Wittgenstein says,19 
tI •• to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it 
is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking 
one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it." 
However, the situation appears differently when one considers the rule 
follower in relation to the wider community. A teacher training a child 
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in the practice of addition will only accept certain responses as 
correct, but once the child gets most of the responses 'right' then 
the child will be said to have learnt addition. Something similar can 
be said of adults: if someone starts giving bizarre (qunus like) 
responses we will say that they are not following a rule. From this one 
can discern rough assertability conditions for sentences of the form, 
'Jones means addition by 'plus"je.g. if Jones generally gives the 
responses accepted by others, and will accept correction it he makes a 
mistake. Generally, of course, there is a great deal of uniformity in 
responses and this fact makes the usefulness of certain practices 
possible. 
I think, as Kripke says, that it is important to stress that 
Wittgenstein's view is a view about assertability conditions rather than 
truth-conditions. One can understand, at the communal level, how one 
may be justified in asserting of someone that they have such and such 
concepts and follow such and such rules. The only justification required 
or possible for those assertability co~ditions is that they make possible 
a ~ £!~. It is not Wittgenstein's view that the fact that 
someone's response agrees with the response expected by the language 
community that that makes that response ~. Those who do not have the 
dispositions to make the responses we do cannot participate in our form 
of life. 
Reverting to the intuitive picture from which I began, the 
Wittgensteian argument is intended to show its incoherence not because 
the sentient being is physically isolated but because that picture 
wrongly presupposes that one can make sense of an individual possessing 
concepts when considered in isolation. 
The interesting, important and difficult question concerning the 
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rule-following considerations is what they show. Wittgenstein's view 
is not, as I noted, a theory of truth-conditions but does it entail 
that a theory of truth-conditions is impossible? I shall try to show 
that understood one way the rule-following considerations are compatible 
with a theory of truth-conditions; understood another way they are not 
compatible with a theory of truth-conditions but this view leads to 
subjectivism which, arguably, is inconsistent with Wittgenstein's non-
revisionism. 
Above it was noted that that the dispositional account did not 
seem to meet the problem posed by the sceptic: the fact that some people 
are disposed to respond one way rather than another does not provide 
justification for 'one rule' rather than another. What I think was wrong 
with the dispositional view is that it was brought into the analysis at 
the wrong place; what the dispositional account may be used to achieve 
is to say when two people are following ~ rule. We can say that two 
people ! and ~ are following one rule governing a sentence S iff they 
would be disposed to give the same response to a question based on S, 
'S ?', under roughly similar circumstances. Spelling this out fully 
would take some time but I shall make two comments. First, one response 
by ! which differs for B's would not show that they are following 
different rules - some allowance has to be made for 'mistakes'. We can 
say that they are following the same rule if either! or ~ would 
withdraw their response when requeried, they had been given time to 
reevaluate the evidence etc. Second, 'similar circumstances' must include 
their intention to respond sincerely. Note that I have so far made no 
assumptions that violate the rule-following considerations: the sceptic 
did not deny that people do have dispositions to resp'ond in similar ways 
under similar circumstances, merely that that in itself does not 
justify one way of responding over another. Against this background, 
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imagine that I say to an English speaker of my acquaintance, 'Come 
into my room and see my new desk.' When we get into the room however, 
the vistor, call him !, says 'But there isn't a desk in this room.' 
Futher suppose that the vast majority of English speakers would be 
disposed to assent to the question, 'is there a desk in that room ?' 
Now there could be many reasons why ! would deny that there is a desk 
in the room: ! might have taken LSD and not perceive in the 'normal' 
way; ! might be playing a philosophical game to see what my response 
will be. These hypotheses would be unusual, caused by unusual 
Circumstances, but suppose something more bizarre is going on. Suppose 
! is following a qunus like rule for desks. The day before! would have 
agreed that there is a desk in the room but after that time W thinks 
, that there are no more desks, only quesks. The question now is whetbsr 
there would be any more justification for one way of responding rather 
than another. I think that we need to distinguish the claim that the 
choice of rules may only have a pragmatiC justification from the claim 
that no question of truth or falsity arise. Suppose that a quesk is 
merely a desk after time t. In those circumstances W would have a true 
belief that there is a quesk and I would have a true belief that there 
is a desk. However, ! would have a false belief if he believed that 
my belief that there is a desk is false. If a quesk = a desk after time 
t, and if it is after time t, then there is a quesk iff there is a desk. 
In chapter 1 I drew a distinction between the direct and the 
indirect pragmatic theory of truth: whereas the former includes pragmatic . 
considerations in the process of attributing truth-values to statements, 
the latter keeps those considerations separate. This distinction cam be 
applied here: given my definition the term 'quesk' would seem to offer 
no advantages over the familiar 'desk', but some new term might well 
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have pragmatic advantages. On the direct approach one would say that 
the class of statements which employ the more pragmatically useful terms 
are truer; on the indirect approach one would say that statements 
employing the term 'desk' or the term 'quesk' may be equally true even 
if one set of statements does have advantages over the other. One way 
of viewing Wittgenstein's work might be to see it as taking something 
like the direct approach but there 1s a possibility of a more radical 
interpretation. On the more radical view, it is inappropriate to speak 
of truth or falsity at ail; various uses of statements may have their 
role in our form of life, and we may call those statements 'true' which 
are most useful, but there can be no question of statements being true 
or false in virtue of a 'way ,the world is' (even in the impure and 
modest sense in which I would defend that phrase). On this radical view 
all notion of the idea that statements may be true or false independently 
of us has gone, subjectivism reigns. I don't wish to argue that the 
radical view is Wittgenstein's but I do want to indicate my attitude 
toward it. 
When I began discussing the imaginary W asserting that there isn't 
a desk in the room, I said that ~ may have said that because he had 
taken LSD. Now it is that kind of case, rather than the contrast between 
'desk' and 'quesk' where we need to keep a grip on the notion of 
statements being true or false independently of us. When W asserts that 
there is no desk he may perfectly well understand what a desk is etc., 
and when the effects of the drug have worn off he may well concur that 
there is a desk. Now it is true that without a background of pragmatic 
interests the concepts of truth and falsity would have no applicabilty 
(without interests in writing etc. we would not have the concept of 
a desk. This theme is taken up in chapter 8) but it is vital that we 
retain the idea that we can't make any belief true that we might want 
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to make true - it is vital for pragmatic reasons. When critics of the 
pragmatic theory of truth have complained that it mistakenly identifies 
the true with the useful they have overlooked the fact that one of the 
most useful things about truth is that we can't make any statement true 
at will. Attempting to make one's theories 'true' by ignoring evidence, 
for instance, is not likely to be a pragmatically useful thing to do 
since one's theories will soon cease to work. 
On my view, and on Wittgenstein's, it is not community-wide 
agreement on the use of statements which makes them true; on my view 
community-wide agreement only provides necessary conditions for statement 
to be true or false. In the introduction I said that Wittgenstein's latte, 
work tottered on the brink of subjectivism; I don't believe that 
Wittgenstein commited himself to either the radical or the non-radical 
views discussed, but if Wittgenstein did favor the radical view I should 
say that his work actually fell into subjectivism. Given Wittgenstein's 
official policy of non-revisionism one might argue, although I won't 
develop the pOint, that this would make his views inconsistent since the 
concept of truth plays a vital role in ~ 'form of life'. 
To say that statements may be true or false independently of our 
knowing which they are invites the question of whether one can say more 
than the unhelpful, 'well, they are true or false according to whether 
they correspond to reality or not.' I believe that one can, and to begin 
to show how, I define the truth-conditions of a sentence as follows: 
the truth-conditions of a sentence ~ are those conditions such that if 
someone could discover that those conditions obtain ~ would be true; or 
those conditions such that if someone could discover that they do not 
obtain S would be false. 
My definition of truth-conditions employs the modal auxilIary 
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'could' and this proves essential to my ambitions. By employing modal 
idioms I am able to endorse the view that there are verification 
transcendent sentences (i.e. sentences which have a truth-value that we 
cannot discover) and fallibilism. I shall discuss these points at some 
length (modality in chapter 4; truth-conditions and verifiability in 
chapter 5) but the crucial point at this stage is why my endorsement 
of verification transcendence is not also an endorsement of 'joints'. 
I allow a gap between our knowing what the truth-conditions of a 
sentence are and our knowing whether those truth-conditions are satisfied 
Now a 'joint' theorist will also allow that gap but the difference 
between us concerns the way in which the truth-conditions of a sentence 
may fail to be satisfied. On my view a sentence can only be false for 
reasons which are, or could become, conceptually available to us. My 
talk of 'conceptual availability' is a way of insisting that it is not 
sUfficient to say that a sentence may be false because it 'fails to 
correspond' to reality. If someone claims that a sentence I believe is 
true is really false because it 'fails .to correspond to reality', and 
that is !!1 that they can say, I would not be overly concerned. If they 
say that my belief may be false for reasons I have never entertained I . 
would concur, but so long as no further chacterization of how my belie! 
may be false has been given I would have no reason for abandoning my 
belief. By way of further explanation, note that a 'joint theorist' must 
be commited to something stronger than the claim I have emphasized. The 
intuitive picture of inquiry supposed that prior to sentient beings the r 
world already contained an 'ontology', a purpose of inquiry being to 
discover that ontology. Now imagine a sentence of our language with an 
ontological commitment to ~. Suppose that we have a whole range of 
beliefs about what XS are and that all of those beliefs are true. If we 
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take 'joint theory' seriously then we must suppose that even that 
sentence may be false because ~ may not have figured in the pre-existing! 
ontology. That is, suppose that 2 is the sentence comm~ed to ~, 2 is 
true, and that we will never have reason for believing £ to be false; in 
those circumstances it seems to me that 2 is true (period), but the 
serious joint theorist must allow that 2 may be false - XS may not have 
existed before sentient beings. The short shrift I give to that view -
to deny that strictly speaking there was an ontology prior to our 
conceptual scheme looks radical and bound to entail subjectivism. In 
fact I think it merely rids of us some unwelcome mystery, in particular 
it rids us of the need for a mysterious correspondence relation. By way 
of brief reassurance that this is the case note that I spoken of 
sentences being true or false for reasons which could become available 
to us. It is likely that some of the beliefs that we now have are false 
for reasons we have never entertained. Putnam imagined the possibility 
of our one day discovering that pencils are organisms20 - subject to 
the question of open-texture (discussed below) that discovery might lead 
us to say, much to our surprise, that there weren't any pencils after 
all. Talking of that example has made it • available , but of course there 
are many other bizarre ways in which our current beliefs might turn out 
to be false - ways that we have never entertained. Note that the 'joint 
theorist' can never explain to us ways that our current beliefs may be 
false in a way that this view cannot acco~date - the explanation would 
make it available. I do not deny that a sentence such as 'There were 
mountains prior to the existence of human beings' makes sense and 
asserts something important, but I believe that its analysis calls for 
subjunctive conditionals. 
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(3) Linguistic Contexts 
(a) 'Contexts' 
Truth and ontology, on the view advocated here, are said to be 
relative to a linguistic context: liguistic because I take sentences to 
be truth-bearers (discussed below). The point of talking of contexts 
is less easily captured but of some importance. I may best begin to 
explain this concept by discussing Quinets paper "Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism". 'Two Dogmas' contained not only an attack on the analytic/ 
synthetic distinction but a highly condensed sketch of an alternative 
philosophy ('empiricism without the dogmas') which would not rely on 
, \ 
the concept of 'meaning' that Quine found objectionable. I shall 
consider the epistemological ramifications below; first I want to 
consider what the attack on meaning amounted to and its implications. 
Quine distinguished two classes of statements which philosophers 
had called analytic. The first class, of logical truths, consisted of 
those statements which remain true under all reinterpretations of the 
non-logical vocabulary. The second class comprised those statements 
which can be transformed into logical truths by the replacement of 
synonyms with synonyms. Quine's attack was primarily directed at the 
second class of statements but the outcome of the attack led Quine to 
suggest that even statements of the first class were revisable. Quine's 
strategy was to argue that no satisfactory account could be given of the 
second class of statements, or of the notion of synonmy upon which it 
rested. The difficulty was that any attempt to explain an unclear 
concept needed to define the second class of statements needed to 
appeal to equally unclear concepts: analyticity, synonomy or necessity. 
The second dogma that Quine attacked was the dogma of 'reductionism l : 2l 
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" ••• the belief that each meningful statement is equivalent to some 
logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience." 
Quine referred to radical reductionism as the view that,22 "Every 
meaningful statement is held to be translatable into a statement (true 
or false) about immediate experience." However, Quine detected 
reductionism in more liberal guises also,23 
"The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each 
statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of 
confirmation or infirmation at all. My countersuggestion •• 1s that 
our statements about the world face the tribunal of sense experience 
not individually but only as a corporate body." 
The natural way of reading this passage is .H"epistemological thesis 
and this reading gains support from the fact that QUine refers to 
Duhem's (1904) where Duhem h~d argued against the possibility of crucial 
experiments. However something else seems to be going on as well since 
Quine went on to say that,24 
"The dogma of reductionism, even in its attenuated form, is 
intimately connected with the other dogma - that there is a cleavag. 
between the analytic and the synthetic." 
And added that, "The two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical." It is 
possible to reconstruct an argument in'favour of an holistic attitude 
toward meanin~ as well as an holistic attitude toward confirmation. In 
crude outline the argument might go as follows: if statements had 
meanings in isolation we should expect to find statements which are true 
or false in virtue of experience in isolation from all other statements. 
However, we know (from Duhem) that statements are not true or false in 
isolation. Therefore, statements do not have meanings in isolation. 
The argument is crude partially because it is unclear exactly what 
statements 'having a meaning in isolation' amounts to. Moreover, if 
there is an argument for a kind of holism about meaning then there is 
the kind of objection raised by HOfstadter,25 
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" ••• science requires the efficient use of statements. For this, 
they must have determinate possibilities of use. The capacity to 
be used determinately is just the sort of thing one thinks of as 
uniquely connected with statement's being meaningful or significant. 
Hence statements should be individually, uniquely significant 
'in isolation'." 
Before replying directly to that argument, consiJer what an holistic 
attitude to meaning might amount to. Quine objected, on grounds of 
clarity, to the idea of a statement being true 'in virtue of meaning'. 
One could try to sharpen the point by saying that that phrase invites 
the picture of a statement having a meaning. Now the idea of a 
statement having a meaning is certainly obscure but if we are to avoid 
the absurdity of denying that statements are meaningful what else can 
one say ? Roughly the alternative is to say that a statement may be 
, meaningful because there are intersubjectively agreed patterns of usage 
of that statement in a language community. The idea, of course, is to 
attempt to get away from the mystifying picture of meanings as things. 
What, then, of HDfstadterfs objection? The first point is to agree 
with the normative should: if communication is to be possible at all 
statements must have at least roughly determinate possibilities of use. 
The second pOint, however, is that if we to understand how 'determinate 
possibilities of use' are possible we need not to reject an holistic 
attitude toward meaning but to embrace it. One can perhaps say that one 
should reverse Hofstadter's priorities: it is not a statement's 'having 
a meaning' that makes determinate possibilities of use possible, rather 
it is determinate possibilities of use that makes a statement meaningful. 
What has this to do with revisability ? Roughly, my view (if not Quine's), 
is that investigation of the world always faces two kinds of question: 
in the terminology of this section, one may face the question, is this 
sentence true? A necessary condition for a statement to be true is that 
it should be meaningful and, according to the above, its being 
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meaningful amounts to there being an agreed pattern of use in the 
lanGuage community. If that is 50, then there is always the possibility ~ 
( 
raising the second kind of question viz. should we retain or alter 
that pattern of usage ? In other words, the truth or falsity of 
statements is never simply a brute (or absolute) fact for the result will 
depend upon the pragmatic question of whether or not to make other 
adjustments to our conceptual scheme. Most of the time we do not make 
those adjustments, and there are often good pragmatic reasons for not 
50 dOing, but that does not entail that that choice does not exist. 
Before I attempt to clarify the relevance of the above discussion 
for my talk of 'contexts' it is worth making two points. First, I have 
adopted the same strategy in arguing against the idea of the 'given' 
as I have in explicating Quine, i.e. distinguishing two kinds of 
question: should we adopt this pattern of use/category system 1; and, 
given this pattern of use/category system, is this sentence true ? 
The second point is that there seems to me an underlying structural 
similarity in the work of the later Wittgenstein and Quine - an attempt 
not to reify meaning and an attempt to come to terms with the 
consequences of not doing so. 
Statements are meaningful, I have said, because they have inter-
subjectively agreed patterns of use; a linguistic context is just such 
any agreed pattern of use. It is the existence of linguistic contexts, 
in my view, that makes it possible for speakers of a language community 
to utter true or false sentences, and to make true or false existential 
statements about what does or does not exist. To talk of linguistic 
contexts is to immediately invite the question of how they may be 
individuated and I'm afraid that my answer may be disappointing: there 
is no better way of individuating them than that available to a 
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competent speaker of the language in question. The reason why there is 
no better way of individuating them is that the description one can 
give of what a speaker must know, if he knows what a sentence means, 
Can be, at best, schematic and incomplete. I think it is worth dwelling 
on this point, doing so provides a good antidote to the 'picture' 
picture of meaning. 
The first way in which the description of a speaker's competence 
can only be characterized schematically might be called the 
incompleteness of language. As an illustration, consider what someone 
must know if one can attribute the concept of a pencil to them. Three 
things immediately suggest themselves: a competent speaker must know 
(i) a pencil is a physical object; (ii) the general function of a 
pencil; (iii) that a pencil is an artifact. Consider (i). It is not just 
that it is difficult to characterize what someone must know if they 
know that something is a physical object (although that is true), 
at the margin it is unclear what a physical object is. Philosophers 
often have need (or feel they have need) to press language to its limit~ 
i.e. to ask such questions as 'well, what is a physical object really?'. 
The existence of such questions, and the difficulty of answering them, 
shows that language has a certain incompleteness - at the extremes the 
answers to such questions are not entirely determinate. The second way 
that a speaker's competence can only be characterized schematically 
concerns what one might call deviance. I take it that most of us believe 
a pencil left lying on a table, unaffected by any 'abnormal' physical 
forces, continues to exist when we leave the room. Suppose someone 
believes otherwise however: they believe that pencils come into and go 
out of existence according to the presence or absence of human beings. 
Suppose they only believe this of pencils. Does that person lack the 
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concept of a pencil, have a deviant concept of a pencil, or does that 
person have a deviant concept of reality ? Third, there is the question 
of vagueness. How large must a town become before it is a city? When 
does a hill become a mountain ? Vaugeness is akin to, but distinct from, 
what Mellor calls conceptual imprecision. He points out that a precise 
definition of a tributary of a river could easily be given were it not 
for the fact that one wants to draw several logically distinct 
inferences: that the tributary is shorter than the river; that it has 
26 smaller volume flow etc. But, 
" ••• as the two properties (of being shorter, of having smaller flow) 
do not always correlate, the term 'tributary' cannot always be 
applied without falsifying one or other accepted relation. Since 
'tributary' is not a variable term, this vagueness of application 
cannot be removed by ascribing a definable imprecision to its 
value, as can be done with length, temperature ••• All that can be 
done with a non-variable term is to recognize that it is ••• an '~nexad 
concept' for which there are 'neutral candidates'. The term is made 
'exact' by an arbitrary assignment of neutral candidates as 
'positive' or 'negative' instances." 
This phenomenon~- akin, in turn, to open-texture. I suggested that 
someone who had the concept of a pencil should know that pencils are 
artifacts. ~fuat, though, if pencils turned out to be organisms - should 
we say that there weren't any pencils after all, or that pencils were 
different from what we took them to be ? Finally, there is the phenomenon 
Putnam drew attention to of the li;guistic division 2! labour. 2? 
Someone can know that a pencil is a physical object, an artifact, and 
what the function of a pencil is. Other people ,however, will also 
know that pencils usually contain graphite and still others will know 
that graphite is a crystalline allotropic form of carbon. The linguistic 
division of labour is liable to give rise to different lists of 
properties something will have if it is to be called a so-and-so, 
The point of mentioning these linguistic phenomena is not to 
suggest (falsely) that in most cases it is not the case that sentences 
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don't have a perfectly clear meaning to most members of the language 
community. The point is rather that we should not think of the 
relationship of language to reality on the proposition/fact model. 
Talk of 'facts' may be innocuous but not when it conjures up the 
picture of a 'determinate part of reality' to which propositions must 
correspond. On that picture one can raise the absurd question, 'how 
can a vague concept or sentence correspond to reality which cannot be 
vague ?' The absurdity of the question does not show that we therefore 
need preciseGOftCepts to correspond to precise reality - it shows that 
we should forget about 'correspondence'. 'Vagueness' and 'precision' 
are properly applied to descriptions, not that described. This point 
appears so obvious that no one could have seriously entertained the idea 
that vague sentences cannot describe (non-vague) reality, yet I am not 
sure that something like this confusion doesn't underlie some worries 
about bivalence. (See below). 
A linguistic context then, as I use the term, is an inter-
subjectively agreed pattern of use of a statement by a language 
community. Whenever I make the claim that a given sentence is true 
relative to a linguistic context it is subject to the qualification that 
the case in point falls within that agreement. What I have in mind is 
this: if pencils did turn out to be organisms a decision would be called 
for, a decision which would result either in the conclusion that, 
contrary to what we previously believed, there weren't any pencils, or 
the conclusion that pencils weren't what we thought they were. The latter 
decision would preserve the truth-value of some of our sentences (those 
that asserted that there were pencils). I take it that which decision 
the community would make (different parts of the community might make 
different decisions) is not determined now. However, if the situation 
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arose, then subject to what future decisions might be taken, I take it 
that ~ either we have a false belief that there are pencils (because 
they are in fact organisms), or a true belief that there are pencils 
but a false belief about what pencils are. I take it that all of the 
linguistic phenomena discussed can be dealt with in a similar manner,ie. 
that we can make statements determinately true or false by appropriate 
decisions. In one way this example encapsulates much of what I want to 
say since (i) it provides a model of the relation of language to reality 
which does not presuppose a 'correspondence' relation; (ii) it 
illustrates how truth and falsity depend on an holistic relation,viz. 
how we adjust our 'categories' will affect which truth-value our 
sentences have; (iii) I take it that the reasons we would have for 
adjusting the categories one way rather than another would be pragmatic. 
(b) Truth-Bearers 
I do not propose to review the general state of the argument over 
the issue of truth-bearers. My justification for this is twofold: (i) 
that the arguments seem to be fairly inconclusive; (ii) a general review 
of the arguments against sentences as truth-bearers, showing them to be 
(at best) inconclusive is available elsewhere (see e.g. R.J. and S.Haack, 
1970). I do, however, wish to make some general comments and consider 
two arguments against sentences as truth-bearers since these arguments 
are germane to my conerns. 
The claim that sentence-tokens may be the primary bearers of truth 
ought to be distinguished from the claim that sentence tokens are the 
only bearers of truth. Throughout the thesis I speak of statements 
being true or false, where a statement is understood to be a declarative 
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sentence. That is a matter of convenience but I would not care to argue 
that statements defined as that which declarative sentences assert may 
not also be truth-bearers. 28 I am, however, somewhat sceptical conerning 
the claim that propositions are the primary bearers of truth. Generally 
speaking it seems to me that sentences have two features which drgue in 
their favour: (i) since sentence tokens are concretely inscribed they are 
publically accessible and this fact at least augu~s well for the 
possibility of explaining how intersubjective agreement in language use 
is possible. The difficulties, by contrast, of explaining how we 'grasp' 
propositions threaten to be insuperable. It is sometimes claimed that 
propositions have the advantage of being objective but this claim seems 
puzzling in the light of this observation. 29 Arguments that propositions . 
are more objective seem to rest on objections which are easily defused. 
(ii) Sentences possess a gramatical structure that may be exploited in a 
definition of truth as, for example, in Tarski's work. 
Having made those general comments I now wish briefly to examine 
two arguments against the claim that sentences may be truth-bearers. 
The first argument has been presented by pitcher,30 
"Suppose someone said truly 'It is raining', so that what he said 
was true. He spoke or uttered the English sentence 'It is raining', 
but that is not what we want to call true. If instead of 'It is 
raining' he had said 'II pluet' or 'Es regnet', then in the sense of 
'said' in which what he said was true, he would still have said the 
same thing; but he would have uttered a different sentence. 
Therefore what he said, in the relevant sense - i.e. in the sense 
according to which what he said was true it is not the English 
sentence 'It is raining' ••• it is this element which all three 
utterences have in common - this same thing that is said in all 
three cases - that is the real bearer of truth, not the different 
sentences which the speakers happen to utter." 
The trouble with this argunlent is that from the fact that more than one 
sentence can say something true it does not follow that none can,. i.e. 
just because one need not have uttered 'It is raining', one could just 
as well have uttered 'Es regnet', it does not follow that 'It is raining' 
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is not true or false. I mention this point since I can employ it to 
clarify my definition of truth-conditions of a sentence. I defined truth-
conditions thus: the truth-conditions of a sentence S are those 
conditions such that if someone could discover that they obtain £ 
would be true, or those conditions such that if someone could discover 
that those conditions do not obtain 2 would be false. The relevance to 
the above argument is that the person who discovers that the truth-
conditions of a sentence obtain need not know the language of which 2 
is a sentence. A German speaker who is unfamilar with English can 
discover that the truth-conditions of the sentence 'It is raining' do 
obtain although, of course, he or she won't know that they are the 
truth-conditions of that sentence. I don't bel~eve that this view 
Violates the 'rule following considerations' discussed in section (1). 
The point of those considerations is that there must be a language 
community if the attribution of concepts is to make sense. On my view 
there must be a language community if the attribution of true or false 
beliefs is to make sense. That is another way of saying that it is not 
the physical isolation of an individual that is important. In principle 
we could observe, without interacting with, a Robinson Crusoe whose 
non-verbal behaviou~ could exactly resemble that of a speaker of our 
language community to whom, and on the basis of which, we would 
unhesitatingly attribute a certain belief. In those circumstances I 
think we would be entitled to attribute that same belief to the Robinson 
Crusoe even though we may not know what, if any, language community he 
was from. Arguably something like this goes on when attributing 'beliefs' 
to animals. The point is that in some sense we would, to some degree, 
be treating them as a member of our language community. 
The second objection to sentences as truth-bearers that I wish 
to consider has been succintly stated by Cargile~l 
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"Before there were any languages or sentences or words or letters 
it was true that two plus two equals four. Since this truth existed 
before there were any sentences, it could not be a sentence. That 
two plus two equals four is a proposition, and all the linGuistic 
changes in history will not affect it." 
Assuming that one wants to uphold the view that two plus two equals 
four was always true, what can the upholder of the claim that sentences 
are truth-bearers say about this argument ? One thing they can say 
(I'm not sure that it is the only thing they can say) is that two plus 
two equals four was always true because if anyone had been able to 
utter the sentence '2 + 2 = 4' at any time they would have spoken truly. 
That way of meeting the argument allows both the concept of internal 
justification (we never get outside our conceptual scheme) with the 
thought that 'truth' is not simply invented. Similarly, the claim that 
mountains existed before language was invented can be handled by 
saying that the sentence 'There are mountains' would have been a true 
sentence if someone could have uttered it before they in fact could. 
Finally, it is worth noting something else Cargile says. He points 
out, rightly in my View, that positing.propositions cannot help explain 
what it is for two people to believe the same thing, or to explain 
what it is to understand a sentence. He adds,32 
" ••• we account for someone's understanding a sentence in terms of 
his being able to use it correctly, to answer questions about it, 
and such like ••• To say that propositions existed before language 
is not to say that our understanding of propositions is not entirely 
dependent on language. Anyone who undertakes to explain what it is 
to grasp a proposition or a concept or property is bound to be 
struck by the fact that ontological assumptions about the existence 
of these entities will not be helpful in this task." 
But when one adds the thought that 'truth' and 'ontology' are also 
words of our language and can therefore, presumably, be explained in 
same manner, what need propositions? This relates to a typical Jamesian 
thought: even if there are 'things' and 'truths' which cannot be 
captured within our conceptual scheme they ought, for that very reason, 
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to be of no concern. What lies forever beyond our conceptual scheme 
is of no interest. 
(4) Fallibilism, Logic and Truth-Conditions 
In the concluding pages of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine claimed 
that,33 "The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science." 
However, Hofstadter aSked,34 
"In what way •••• does my discovery that I have forgotten whether I 
have boarded the train at 12:12 or 12:13 affect the sunspot theory 
of economic crises ? Is it not a dogma to suppose that the whole of 
the language of knowledge is involved in every cognitive decision ?" 
That objection seems to me correct and was, I believe, accepted by 
QUine.3S From the rejection of the idea that a statement can be tested 
in isolation it does not follow that the whole of science is involved 
in every decision; between the two extremes there is the possibility, 
as Hofstadter put it, of a 'group' or 'island' theory of the relation 
between evidence and assertion. My concept of a 'linguistic context' is 
intended to be just such a 'group' or 'island' theory as I have 
intimated and will explain further below. My second reason for adopting 
a more limited form of holism springs from my acceptance of pluralism: 
one of the things that distinguishes one linguistic context from 
another is that they may serve different Eurposes. The importance of 
this point will be discussed in chapter 3. 
(a) Fallibilism and LogiC 
The epistemology sketched at the end of 'Two Dogmas' contained 
two complementary slogans: 'any statement can be held true come what 
may', and 'no statement is immune to revision'. Quine included logic 
within the scope of fallibilism,36 
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"Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been 
proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what 
difference is there in principle between such a shift and the shift 
whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin 
Aristotle ?" 
I will return to the first slogan presently but first I want to 
raise the question of whether there might be reason for qualifying the 
claim that no statement is immune to revision. Fallibilism, as Haack 
pOints out in her (l978a), can be predicated either of statements or of 
agents. statement fallibilism is the logical thesis that some statements 
are possibly false, whereas agent fallibilism is the epistemological 
thesis that we are liable to hold false beliefs. The importance of this 
distinction is that it shows that even if the statements of logic are 
necessary truths that fact does not entail that our logical beliefs are 
infallible,37· 
" ••• even if the laws of logic are not possibly false, this by no 
means guarantees that we are not liable to hold false logical 
beliefs. In claiming that we are fallible in our logical beliefs ••• 
I am not, of course, asserting the contradictory thesis that though 
say, 'p v _pI is necessary, we might falsely believe p v -p; 
rather, I am claiQing that, though 'p v _pI is necessary, we might 
falsely believe that -(p v -p), or else, perhaps, though 'p v _pi 
is not necessary, we falsely believe that it is." 
For that reason, even if logical laws are necessary truths this fact 
does not threaten fallibilism with respect to logic. Are the laws of 
logic necessary truths? Suppose that some law of logic, call it ~, is 
said to be necessarily true. Two attitudes that might be taken toward 
~ are either to regard it as a profound metaphysical truth or to regard 
it as an utter triviality. (This latter view was that often taken by 
the positivists). I can begin to explain my attitude by saying that 
I find neither of these attitudes is very helpful. The first attitude 
suggests, wrongly in my View, that a logical truth is a metaphysically 
general description of reality, whilst the latter view suggests that 
there is some way of dividing the trivial from the non-trivial truths. 
My attitude is this: I think it is possible that there are statements 
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which we might never have good reason for giving up. In view of the 
controversy surrounding its status the law of excluded middle is not a 
likely candidate for such a role but the law of non-contradiction might 
be. To explain my reasons for taking this view it will be helpful to 
return to the first slogan that 'any statement can be held true come 
what may.' (It may be worth noting in passing that the statement I have 
emphasized is the nearest I come in the entire thesis to needing 
necessity). 
Lewis wrote,38 
fI ••• the law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever' 
is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its 
negative. It declares our purpose to make, for every term, a 
complete dichotomy of experience, instead - as we might choose -
of classifying on the basis of a tripartite division into opposites 
(as black and white) and the middle ground between the two. Our 
rejection of such tripartite division represents only our penchant 
for simpliCity." 
One way of interpreting Lewis's view is by way of an analogy \'lith a 
filing system.39 Suppose that one has a filing system that consists of 
the three categories A, B, and the miscellaneous. One could understand 
the 'miscellaneous' in either an unrestricted or an restricted sense. In 
the former case, anything which is not an A or a B belongs to the 
miscellaneous. In the latter case, if for instance, As and Bs were two' 
kinds of screw, what would belong to the miscellaneous would be any kind 
of screw not of the A or B kind. Now both of these filing systems are 
fallible in the sense that items may be misclassified but there is also 
a sense in which both are infallible. In the unrestricted case nothing 
can exist which cannot be classified. In the restricted case no kind 
of screw can exist which cannot be classified. What has this to do with 
logic? Consider, for instance, the law of excluded middle (LEM). \'/e 
mayor may not choose to adopt a logical system which incorporates that 
principle. The analogy is this: just as adopting either the restricted 
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or unrestricted filing system may prove more or less useful, so adopting 
a logical system with or without LEM may prove better or worse, but in 
neither case can reality force us to adopt one rather the other. There 
is the suggestion that LD1 can be 'held true come what may' because 
whatever reality dishes up we needn't reject LEM because we can adjust 
our categories in such a way as to preserve it. There is also the 
suggestion that just as we needn't worry about the apparent a-priori 
claim that nothing can exist which can't be classified in a filing 
system with a 'miscellaneous' category because it prejudges nothing at 
all, so we may choose LEM or not because that choice prejudges nothing 
at all. 
I said above that there may be reason to qualify the statement 
that 'no statement is immune to revision' since we may find that there 
are some statements which we have no good reason to give up. If the 
revisability thesis is modified in this way it makes explicit the 
pragmatic reason for 60 doing. 
When first raising the question of the necessity of logical laws 
I said that I thought it a bad idea to suggest that the grounds of 
logical necessity lay in the fact that logical laws are metaphysically 
general descriptions of reality. I said that because (changing the 
example slightly) it invites the question, 'isn't it risky for someone 
to propose adopting a bivalent logical system since reality may turn 
out not to be bivalent l' Put so crudely perhaps the mistake is obvious: 
this would be the same worry that vague sentences cannot describe 
reality because reality is not vague. I can't help feeling however that 
some such thought does underlie some concern about either bivalence or 
L~1. I also suggested that we should reject the idea that logical laws 
are necessary because trivial. One possible response to that might be 
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to say, 'you are suggesting that the justification for logical laws 
would be the same as the justification for using a filing system, i.e. 
if you want to do some filing you have no choice but to use some sort 
of filing system and that claim is trivial.' I am prepared to concede 
the word 'trivial' if need be but the important point has been to 
explain (or, better perhaps, to explain away) logical necessity, without 
appeal either to the dubious category of the self-evident or the 
analytic/synthetic. Perhaps it is worth repeating that I remain a 
fallibilist with respect to logiC because even if there are statements 
presupposed by any inquiry I have no way of identifying them. (Agent 
fallibilism holds even if statement fallibilism doesn't). Perhaps I 
ought to add that I don't necessarily reject the idea that logical 
truths may just be highly general descriptions of reality depending 
upon how one understands that statement, viz. provided (at least) 
that one doesn't think a logical law could be false simpliciter because 
it 'fails to correspond to reality'. I don't believe that is true of 
~ statement, be it as 'empirical' as one will. Perhaps I also ought 
to add that I don't consider that I have argued either in tavourjlor 
against classical or deviant logics (since that would involve many more 
issues than I have considered), I have merely tried to suggest that one 
sort of reason for rejecting bivalence or LEM is a a very bad reason 
indeed. It seemed important for me to make this point since it is also 
a way of saying that I see no radical difference in kind between 
'empirical' and 'logical' truths. 
(b) Fallibilism and Truth-Conditions 
I defined the truth-conditions of a sentence 2 as those conditions 
such that if someone could discover that those conditions obtain S 
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would be true, or those conditions such that if someone could discover 
that those conditions do not obtain ~ would be false. To explain 
further how this definition is intended to work I will return to the 
sentence ~There is a table in that room' imagined to be uttered to a 
particular person on a particular occasion. Yfuat would a person have to 
know if they were to know that the sentence is true ? A part of what 
they would have to know would be what kind of experience they could 
expect under normal circumstances. They would know, for instance, that if 
there is a table in that room then they could have certain visual and 
tactile experiences although they need not know exactly what kind o~ 
experiences to expect, e.g. they might not know the colour or of what 
materials the table is made. (I have also assumed that the person 
spoken to is 'normal', e.g. not blind). I spoke of 'normal circumstances' 
since a speaker would have to know that if they were to enter the room 
blindfolded the fact that they could not have the appropriate visual 
experiences would not show that there wasn't a table in that room. 
(Perhaps I can employ that point to clarify the motivation that underlies 
my talk of 'linguistic contexts' and an holistic attitude toward 
meaning. Asked for a definition of a table I take it that it would occur 
to very few people to say that a speaker would have to know that a table 
can exist even if one is blindfolded. Is that rather something one has 
to know about the category of 'physical objects' ? But a table is a 
physical object. Dictionaries are only as successful as they are because 
of a massive amount of background information we normally take for 
granted. Taking an holistic attitude toward meaning is taking the view 
that even in principle there is no definite amount of information one 
could list which simply gives the meaning of a term or a sentence. That, 
in turn, is the reason why linguistic contexts cannot be individuated in 
any better way than that available to a competent speaker). It may or 
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may not be possible for the person in question to be able to verify 
whether the experiences they would expect to occur would occur, but in 
any case someone who understands the sentence 'There is a table in that 
room' knows that if true it entails unverifiable facts. It is essential, 
in my view, that one allows that unverifiable sentences may nevertheless 
have a determinate truth-value. That the sentence 'There is a table in 
that room' may be true or false although some of its entailments are 
unverifiable is a claim I wish to defend subject to the problems raised 
by the var~ous linguistic phenomena I mentioned above ,(i.e. incompletenes 
open-texture, vagueness, deviance, conceptual imprecision and the 
linguistic division of labour). Take open-texture. I suppose that a 
broken table may still be a table, which is to say that someone may 
enter the room, see a broken t~ble and still assent to the sentence 
'Is there a table in that room l' However, at some point a table broken 
into sufficiently many pieces ceases to be a table and there is, 
presumably, some point at which competent speakers would disagree about 
whether there is a table or not. Call the continuum from the point where 
all competent speakers would agree that there is a table, to the point 
where only one competent speaker would say that there is a table in the 
room, the range of application of the concept of a table. Call the 
experiences which give rise to universal agreement on the part of 
competent speakers of the language community the central range of 
application of a concept. 40 I can now state my central claim as follows: 
a declarative sentence has a determinate truth-value provided that the 
concepts employed fall within their central range of application. 
One important feature of my view may best be brought out by 
varying the example. In his (1959) Dummett discussed the sentence, 
. 'A city will never be built on this spot.' (Call this sentence C). 
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Suppose that that sentences is uttered by some speaker referr.ing to a 
particular place. Dummett was worried about whether f could be said to 
have a determinate truth-value now since it appears that there is 
nothing in virtue of which C is either true or false. I take it that if 
uttered on a particular occasion there may well be no way of telling 
whether Q is true or false. I want to say that Q either is true or false 
provided that we set aside worries that might arise over exactly what 
counts as a city etc. (which weren't the worries that Dummett had about 
the case). The crucial point from my point of view is that I claim that 
although in one sense the truth-conditions of Care inacessible - the 
sense in which we may not have any of telling whether Q is true or 
false, in another sense the truth-conditions of f !!! accessible. The 
truth-conditions of C are accessible in the sense that a speaker of 
English knows what would make f true, viz. a city never being built, and 
an English speaker knows what would make it false, viz. a city being 
built. I claim that provided that the concepts concerned fall within 
their central range of application Q has a determinate truth-value now. 
These claims make it look as though I am simply coming down on the 
realist's side in the recent realism vs. anti-realism debate. To explain 
why that is not the case it will be useful to consider a statement made 
by McGinn. He writes,41 
uRealism is the thesis that truth (falsity) is an epistemically 
unconstrained property of a sentence; there is nothing in the 
concept of truth (falsity) to exclude the possibility that a 
sentence be unknowably true (false). This property reflects the 
realist conviction, embodied in our customary linguistic practices, 
that the world, or a given sector of it, is determinately 
constituted quite independently of any limitations on our capacity 
to come to know truths concerning it." 
Given what I have already said it is obvious that I accept that truth 
may be an epistemically 'unconstrained property of a sentence', i.e. 
that sentences may be unknowably true or false. Where I dissent from 
many realists is in how I understand this to be possible. I dissent 
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at least from some of the implications of the second sentence of the 
quotation from McGinn. Take some sentence §. Suppose that we believe 
that the truth-conditions of 2 are satisfied and that the truth-condition 
of § ~ satisfied. On my view S is true and that is the end of the 
matter (given that one accepts the vocabulary). Strangely enough 
however other philosophers have wanted more than this. McGinn talks of 
the world being 'determinately constituted quite independently of any 
limitati~s on our capacity to come to know truths concerning it.' 
That phrase is pernicious if it leads one to say, 'yes, I know what the 
truth-conditions of S are, and I am prepared to believe that the truth-
conditions of § are satisfied, but I also want to know whether the 
truth-conditions of 2 correspond to the determinately constituted way-
the-world-is.' That last question makes no sense on my view. Perhaps I 
can put my view by saying that although I believe that truth is an 
epistemically unconstrained property of a sentence it is not a conceptua~ 
i 
unconstrained property of a sentence. Phrases which talk of the 
'determinate structure of the world' are, I believe, ambiguous, an 
ambiguity reflected in different ways of understanding what the truth-
conditions of sentences are. Consider this apparently straigtforward 
definition of truth-conditions: 
the truth-conditions of a sentence S are those conditions in which e 
is true or S is false. 
I don~t believe that that definition is incorrect since it is neutral 
between what one might call an absolute and a relative conception of 
truth-conditions. An absolute view goes something like this: the world 
is determinately constituted independently of us and our capacities to 
come to know it; we are subject to all sorts of limitations and it is 
therefore possible that the most profound truths about the world may not 
be conceptually available to us - that is to say that it is possible 
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that we may be unable to form the concepts required to discover the most 
profound truths about the world. The absolute view sees truth as a 
relation between truth-bearers and unconceptualized reality. The relative 
riposte to all this is to say that what is unconceptualized is of no 
interest so long as it remains unconceptualized. The relative view sees 
truth as a relation between the truth-conditions of sentences and their 
satisfaction - a relation which does not invoke the idea of 
'~nconceptualized reality'. On the relative view inquiry has two basic 
aims: to discover whether our conceptualizations are satisfied and to 
invent new conceptualizations which will achieve the fulfillment of our 
cognitive interests in a pragmatically better way. To say that we always 
work within our conceptual scheme is not to say that we are trapped 
within it. 
My definition of truth-conditions speaks of inquirers being able 
to discover whether certain conditions obtain. Now I see no reason for 
saying that we can ever be certain that the truth-conditions of a 
sentence ~ satisified. However, I don't wish to rest content with the 
idea that a sentence may be false because it tfails to correspond to 
reality' (whatever that may mean). Rathe~ I want to say that a sentence 
now believed true may turn out false for reasons we have never~entertained 
On my view a sentence everyone, everywhere accepts as true may yet turn 
out false, but to say that is to say that we might discover reasons 
we have never imagined for believing it false. Thus I see a relevant 
difference between saying that a sentence may turn out false for reasons 
which in fact may never be discovered (but which we would understand 
and accept if they were discovered) and saying that a sentence may be 
false for reasons we could never even understand. Moreover I claim that 
those who take the idea of 'the world determinately constituted 
independently of us r seriously must be commi~d to the idea that a 
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sentence may be false for reasons we could never even understand - that 
is so because that supposed independent structure (if it really is 
totally independent of us) may not be 'describable' by our concepts. 
To reject this concept is not, I believe, to rislt making any a-priori 
judgements about how the world may turn out - it is merely to reject an 
unintelligible concept of truth. My manoeuvre steals the realists' 
defence: if they explain how a sentence may be false they ipso facto 
make it available for this view; on the other hand, if they merely keep 
saying that a sentence may be false for reasons we cannot even comprehend 
I think we should say that of that hypothesis we have no need. 
Conceptions of truth-conditions which are neutral between absolute 
and relative versions are, I believe, to be found in Tarski's definition 
of truth and Davidson's truth-conditional semantics. That neutrality 
has led some to read an absolute version into their work (Popper on 
Tarski; Platts on Davidson). I shall return to this point in chapter 5 
where I shall also defend my claim that there is an important way of 
cutting across the recent realist vs. anti-realist debate. The essent!«l 
reliance I have placed on modal idioms will be defended in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3 
Philosophy and Ontology 
There are, I find, important and complex relationships between 
the question of what philosophy can and cannot properly aspire to achieve 
(onets overall metaphilosophy) and what role, if any, philosophy has to 
play in answering the question 'what is there l' To explain my views 
on these matters I shall distinguish my views from those of Wittgenstein, 
Quine and Goodman. (See figure 4 overleaf. In view of the illustrious 
company I have not placed my name over the column on the extreme right 
hand side which represents my views). I have found it necessary to 
distinguish five issues over which there is dispute. The most general 
and surprising feature of the relationships between these views is how 
favouring one answer to one question may radically affect the whole 
tenor of the overall view which emerges. Thus, my conception of the 
nature of philosophy starts out from a much more optimistic premise 
than would appear to be acceptable to Wittgenstein, yet by the time 
my view is processed by means of the answers I give to the other 
questions the differences seem far less radical than one might have 
expected. Convers~ly, my position as described only differs from Goodman's 
in one category but that difference is of some importance. In this area 
of philosophy I find myself as concerned and worried about the views of 
my philosophical allies as I do my philosophical enemies • 
. I should stress at the outset that although the views discussed 
are bound to have implications for the possibility of metaphysics in 
general, I have explicitly restricted myself to the question of what 
philosophy may or may not achieve with respect to the question of 
ontology. In particular, as will become apparent, the distinction I 
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Figure 4 
Some Views of the Relation between Philosophy and Ontology 
Wittgenstein Quine Goodman 
Meta- therapeutic meta meta meta philosophy : 
Aim descriptive discovery explanation explanation 
'Joint- No No Yes No No theory l' 
I 
Monist or pluralist monist pluralist pluralist pluralist ? 
Revisionary 
or non- Non Non rev. Non 
revisionary ? 
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draw between revisionary and non-revisonary ontological conclusions 
concerns a narrower issue than that raised by the distinction strawson 
drew in his (1959) between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics. I 
will explain the terms employed in figure 4 as I proceed but some 
general remarks may prove helpful. 
There are, it seems to me, important similarities and tensions 
between the philosophy of Quine and the later work of Wittgenstein. In 
chapter 2 I said that an important aspect of both philosopher's work 
was the attempt to rid us of the tendency to reify the concept of 
meaning. That both philosophers had some success in this regard is a 
formidable achievement since it is not easy to persuade others that there 
is something wrong with a view that seems obviously correct. There is 
also some sort of agreement that a certain kind of metaphysics is 
untenable and illegitimate but to say that is to immediately draw 
attention to their differences - Wittgenstein seemed to regard all 
metaphysics as illegitimate and Quine does not think that. These 
differing views of what philosophy can achieve seem to be linked to the 
issue of Rluralism. In Wittgenstein's later work there seems to be 
important connections between the idea of a 'language game' and 'forms 
of life', at least one of those connections would seem to be that 
different language games may serve different purposes. That view seems to 
find no echo in Quine's work. I find myself in tension with these 
interesting tensions: on the one hand I do believe that pluralism is 
philosophically important but, on the other hand, I have more sympathy 
with Quine's more optimistic view of what philosophy can achieve. 
Having said that however, I do find that Quine attaches an importance 
to what philosophers say about ontology that I do not. I have attempted 
to capture this difference of attitude by my distinction between 
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'discovery' and 'explanation' discussed in section 3. (Perhaps I ought 
to add that it is that distinction which motivates the need for 
question two in figure 4, i.e. I don't attach any great weight to the 
distinction between Wittgenstein's therapeutic metaphilosophy and the 
aim of philosophy as 'descriptive'. The term 'descriptive' merely fills 
a gap so to speak). 
Quine's views as found in his (195la) seemed to me to be an 
explicit rejection of 'joint theory' and were a source of 'inspiration' 
for my attempt to develop a pragmatic theory of truth. On the other 
hand, I think that a very reasonable interpretation of much of Quine's 
writings (especially, perhaps, after Word and Object) make it seem more 
like a fulfillment of 'joint theory' than a rejection of it - hence the 
two positions marked in figure 4. 
(1) A Meta-metaphilosophy 
Quine's rejection of the analytic~synthetic distinction implied 
the rejection of a metaphilosophy that had acquired some popularity 
in the 20th century - the view that philosophy was primarily conerned 
with conceptual analysis. That rejection made possible a more optimistic 
view of what philosophy might legitimately achieve since if the 
distinction between 'conceptual' and 'empirical' change was, at best, 
unclear, could not the philosopher, in prinCiple, make some positive 
contribution to the communal enterprise of inquiry ? If philosophy is not 
to be characterized as being primarily concerned with conceptual 
analysis, how should it be characterized ? A clue to an answer might be 
found where Quine speaks of thel It ••• rejection of a first philosophy, 
somehow prior to science." One way of construing this is to suggest 
that philosophy must begin by reflection upon other areas of inquiry -
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it cannot begin with a-priori reasoning about the nature of reality 
(or anything else). Philosophy the~ might be seen not as an inquiry 
superior to science (as some metaphysicians had seen it2) but as a 
meta discipline, something like the 'inquiry into inquiry'. I think that 
this conception of philosophy is fundamentally sound but one should 
note some of the difficulties in making it precise. The chararacterizatio, 
of philosophy as a second-order inquiry would not seem to provide a 
sufficient condition for the definition of philosophy since other 
disciplines may be said to work in this manne~ e.g. literary criticism. 
Here I see no alternative, and little harm, in saying that philosophy 
is the meta discipline concerned with the investigation of historically 
given questions, e.g; those concerning knowledge, truth, logic etc. 
Thus I think it is not so much the questions that have changed in recent 
times as it is the way in which those questions are tackled. The meta 
View of philosophy obviously fits well with the 'philosophy of •••• , 
schema: 'philosophy of science' etc. To say that, however, immediately 
draws attention to two central areas of philosophical inquiry that 
don't fit that schema, viz. epistemology and metaphysics.3 I don't 
think that that fact should lead us to reject the meta conception of 
philosophy - I think rather that epistemological and metaphysical 
questions should be thought of as concerning issues which are not 
specific to one diSCipline but cut across many. There is though, a more 
serious problem. On the view being suggested epistemology should be 
thought of as the attempt to explain how other areas of inquiry may 
produce knowledge. Unfortunately, however, in identifying other areas of 
inquiry one cannot rely on the fact that they may not be described as 
philosophy. Thus the so-called ontological argument for the existence 
of God may be described as a theolosical argument and yet, in my view, 
is just the kind of a-,priori reasoning that is illegitimate. (Here I 
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think that one cannot ultimately define one's me±aphilosophy without 
having taken a substantive position on some philosophical views). I 
propose to put all my question-begging eggs in one basket, so to speak, 
by saying that epistemology is the attempt to explain how legitimate 
areas of inquiry may lead to knowledge. 4 Anyone who wished to defend 
the ontological argument for the existence of God would rightly object 
that this begs the question but here, as I said above, I am more 
concerned with the views of my philosophical allies who would not, I 
think, dispute that the areas of inquiry I take to be legitimate are 
legitimate.' 
The picture so far then is this: there seems to be a reasonable 
conception of philosophy as the inquiry into inquiry. Moreover, although 
it is difficult to draw the first-order/second-order distinction clearly 
or precisely it does not seem to be a picture which could legitimize 
either wholesale armchair metaphysical systems or arguments which cannot 
in some way be based on an appeal to experience. It seems to me an 
attractive picture in that it defines a role for the philosopher in 
the community of inquirers without supposing that the philosopher is 
the final arbiter. (It could be said however,) that a less flattering 
description of this conception of philosophy is that philosophy is an 
essentially parasitic discipline. I agree that that description equally 
fits what I have said - indeed I should say that, for reasons I shall 
come to, as applied to the question of tontology' the less 
flattering description is the more appropriate). This rosy picture faces 
a tough question however: does the philosopher keen the books? That is 
to ask whether the philosopher, after studying the results of other 
areas of inquiry, e.g. physics or mathematics, then sorts out what can 
and cannot properly be said to exist. The dilemma seems to be this: 
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if one answers Ino' we might be back to the idea that philosophy can 
only be therapeutic or descriptive after all; on the other hand to 
answer 'yes' threatens to allow back illegitimate a-criori 
considerations that the first-order/second-order distinction was intended 
to disallow in the first place. Dewey wrote that,6 "Philosophy has 
assumed for its function a knowledge of reality. This fact makes it a 
rival instead of a complement to the sciences." I think that the 
feeling that philosophy ought not to be a rival to the sciences is a 
healthy one that, prima facie at least, the 'yes' answer would violate. 
An important part of the motiviation for answering 'no' is a thought 
such as this: if sCie?tists construct a theory which says that 'there 
are electrons' what possible expertise or reasons could the philosopher, 
qua philosopher, have for disputing that conclusion? The thought that 
philosophers would be engaged in an illegitimate enterprise because 
they would be stepping beyond their realm of expertise immediately 
suggests one reason for qualifying the 'no' answer however: scientists 
are entitled to question the work of other scientists, so surely 
philosophers are entitled to question the work of other philosophers. 
That sounds both reasonable and correct. Philosophers do occasionally 
posit various kinds of entities and surely philosophers are entitled to 
query whether that is the best way forward. Philosophers have been led, 
by their analysis of modal statements, to posit 'possible worlds', a 
procedure I shall challenge in chapter 4, so I do believe that that is a 
legitimate activity. 
A second reason for qualifying the 'no' answer might be this: 
philosophers who questioned the existence of electrons might not be 
stepping beyond their realm of expertize since they might not be 
questioning any of the facts that the scientist has discovered. That is 
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to admit that the philosopher, qua philosopher, could have no grounds 
for questioning scientific evidence as such and yet still have reasons 
for wanting to deny that a certain form of discourse should be thought 
of as commited to various kinds of entities. I take it an instrumentalist 
philosophy of science might be like that, i.e. without questioning 
the scientific evidence for various theories the instrumentalist might 
try to show that all of that evidence is compatible with the denial 
that there are unobservable entities. In the light of this observation 
I introduce the distinction between revisionary and non-revisionary 
conclusions. A non-revisionary conclusion would be one that cast no 
doubt on the legitimacy or the evidence of a given area of inquiry 
but claimed that compatible with that evidence there are reasons for 
asserting or denying that there are so-and-sos. A revisionary conclusion 
by contrast would be one which did cast doubt on the conclusions reached 
by the inquiry and claimed that either the evidence, methods, or results 
of the inquiry should be modified or rejected. Without saying that 
revisionary philosophical conclusions cannot ever be justified, I think 
it is reasonable to conclude that the reasons for the revisionary 
conclusion need to be compelling and their justification made apparent. 
(See below on Goodman). 
(2) Independent Existence, Internal Justification and 'Joint Theory' 
Consider the sentence, 
(1) There is a possibility that James will come. 
(1) has a prima facie commit ment to something called a 'possibility' 
and that commitment might be thought to be problematic. (I express 
myself this way to avoid question-begging). Now at least four ways of 
responding to this situation can and have been proposed. These are: 
(i) qualify 'there is', i.e. argue that if there are possibilities they 
-
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don't exist in the same way as, say, tables. (Existence vs. subsistence). 
(1i) deny that (1) really is commited to possibilities. 
(iii) accept its prima facie commitment and assert that possibilities 
are things. 
(iv) Claim that (1) may be perfectly meaningful if one can find some 
sentence equivalent to it which is not commited to the existence of 
possibilities. Perhaps tIt is not certainly false that James will come' 
is adequate. 
I think that (i) creates more difficulties than it solves, so 
without arguing that this is the case I shall set (i) aside. I think 
that there may be reasonable motivation for (ii) and I shall return to 
this below. (iii) is, I think, obscure. Since the sentence in question 
concerns possibilities my views on this will be given in chapter 4. 
(iv) is basically Quine's way and it is the way I favour also but it is 
just here that the fun begins. 
The approach to ontological questions !!! paraphrase may have 
quite different motivations for different philosophers and I wish to 
distinguish two sources of motivation: 
(A) as a way of fulfilling 'joint theory'; 
(B) as a way of clarifying the truth-conditions of sentences. 
Those who want to do (A) will also want to do (B), but those (like 
myself) who merely want to do (B) may not want to do (A). In other words 
(A) is a stronger position than (B) • 
. 'Joint theory', I said in chapter 2, is the intuitive picture of 
the world containing things and kinds of things prior to our arrival 
and the creation of our conceptual scheme. Now the paraphrase approach 
to ontology holds the promise of being a way of fulfilling that theory, 
i.e. after analy"".izing various kinds of sentences, the ontological 
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commitments of those sentences we are forced to take seriously (those 
we cannot parphrase) will provide a list of at least potential 
candidates of things that existed prior to our arrival. I objected to 
'Joint theory' on the grounds that it required the correspondence 
theory of truth which, I believe, has little prospect of success. There 
are however two other reasons for objecting to joint theory: (a) it 
requires a very strong and obscure concept of what constitutes a 
'thing' or 'entity'; (b) it requires a strong and obscure concept of 
'independent existence'. These points are not independent in that a 
likely definition of an entity is as something capable of existing 
independently of us. Moreover I believe that 'joint theoryl entails 
that certain philosophical issues must have a right or wrong answer 
where it seems to me very doubtful that they do. The essential reason 
for this is that if one thinks of there being things prior to our 
conceptual scheme then they must have been either universal or particular; 
concrete or abstract; possessed only primary qualities or both primaary 
and secondary qualit~es;I have choosen those examples since they belong 
to the metaphysic4t tradition which has attempted to separate the 
contribution of our conceptual scheme from the contribution of the world. 
It is the viability of that tradition that I attempting to bring into 
question. 
Before proceeding with the prosecution case against joint theory 
it will be as well to say something about my own view. One objection 
to what I have already said might go as follows: 'you have cast doubt 
on the concept of 'independent existence' but unless you are an idealist 
you will need that concept yourself.' Now I do feel that I have a firm 
grip on What it means to say that middle-sized objects exist independently 
of myself and others. I have already said, however, that I understand 
assertions about the existence of physical objects via the claim that 
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a set of subjunctive conditionals is true. I have also said that one 
can interpret a claim that mountains existed before hUman language by 
saying that 'There are mountains· would have been a true sentence before 
it was. Those manoeuvres, in my view, avoid the need for a correspondence: 
theory of truth and, more relevantly here, they avoid the need to decide 
either in favour or against universals/particulars; primary/secondary 
qualities; or, the categories of the concrete or the abstract. Those 
who believe that these are important philosophical issues will no 
doubt feel, as Russell put it, that my method has all the virtues of 
theft over honest toil. Vfuat I say below may go someway to pacifying 
such souls. 
A 'joint theorist' may say that our intuitions about what it means 
to say that physical objects exist independently of us implies something 
stronger than believing true a set of subjunctive conditionals. I think 
that is probably true but it does not show that those intuitions are 
justified. Moreover, I-am inclined to think that ontological questions 
have been bedeviled by those intuitions. Armed with the feeling that we 
understand what it is to say that physical objects exist there is the 
temptation to ask the question whether, say, numbers exist in that kind 
of way. Unconsciously we make an analogy between the question 'are there 
physical objects l' with such questions as 'are there numbers ?'; 'are 
there theoretical entities l' etc. when it is at least unclear whether 
or not the analogies break down at that point. 
-" Returning to the various responses to the sentence, 
(1) There is a possibility that James will come. 
I said that I saw some reason for saying that the motivation behind 
strategy (ii) had some justification. (The strategy which says that 










by Alston. When comparing (1) with, 
(2) It is not certainly false that James will come. 
Alston wrote,? 
" ••• if the translation of (1) into (2) •• is adequate, then they are 
normally used to make the same assertion. In uttering (2) we would 
be making the same assertion as we would if we uttered (1), i.e. 
the assertion that there is a possibility that James will come. 
And so we would be asserting that there is a possibility (commiting 
ourselves to the existence of a possibility) just as much by 
using (2) as by using (1)." 
From other things that Alston says I think that a part of his motivation 
for saying the above lay~~wanting to countenance the motives that 
lay behind (A). One might say this: if one is not 'hung up' about the 
concept of a 'thing' or an 'entity' one might say that the paraphrase 
of (1) by (2) shows not that possibilities don't exist but rather tells 
us what they.!!.!. It will be clear that I agree with Alston that one 
shouldn't be 'hung up' about the concept of a 'thing' or an 'entity' and 
I also agree that it is a moot point whether the paraphrase of (1) by 
(2) shows that possibilities don't exist or tells us what they are. 
(The point is as moot as the concept of 'independent existence' is moot 
and that, in my view, is pretty moot. See below.) Perhaps Alston's 
worries would be met by my proposal to describe the purpose of paraphrase 
as being that of clarifying the truth-conditions of sentences. This 
way of viewing the matter still preserves one of the reasons Quine has 
for stressing the importance of paraphrase - to prevent backsliding. 
If a philosopher tells us that he or she is a nominalist and then 
promptly proceeds to quantify over numbers, he or she would at least owe 
us an account of the truth-conditions of the statements commitEd to 
numbers in order to show their position to be consistent. Such a view 
might be consistent pending an account of what numbers are. Thus 
although I accept Quine's strategy my motivation for doing so, on some 
interpretations at least, differs from his. To explain this I turn to 
the distinction between 'discovery' and 'explanation'. 
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(3) Discovery or Explanation? 
A representation of Quine's philosophy as fulfilling the aims of 
'joint theory' would appear, prima facie, implausible. Quine has said 
many things which appear to support the theory of internal justification, 
a prime motivation of which is to avoid the need for 'joint theory' at 
all. That view is reinforced by statements such as the follOWing,8 
"The fundamental-seeming philosophical question, How much of our 
science is merely con!ibuted by language and how much is a genuine 
reflection of reality 1 is perhaps a spurious question ••• " 
However, by the time of his (1973) there would appear to be a volte ~,9i 
" ••• we ought to be able to see just to what extent science is man's 
free creation; to what extent, in Eddington's phrase, it is a put-
up job." 
Now I don't see any way of reconciling those statements but I think 
that there is a way of describing many of the things Quine has said as 
a theory which does not start out with the aim of fulfilling 'joint 
theory' but which would, if successful, represent a reasonable 
j
i 
fulfillment of that theory. To articulate this way of viewing Quine's 
work I think it is helpfUl to contrast a conception of the aim of I 
philosophy as that of discovery with a conception of the aim of PhilOSOPhyl 
as that of explanation. In his (195la) Quine said that,lO "Ontological f 
questions are on a par with natural science." It would be an instructive 
exercise to discover how many ways that statement is ambiguous but the 
discovery interpretation may represent one meaning it may have. 
In his (1976) Campbell explicitly describes and extends Quine's 
11 
ontological programme as attempting to, fI ••• provide a reasoned 
inventory of the categories [Of the things that there are] ." If 
successful that would certainly look like a completion of the 'joints' 
programme. Campbell raises the following questions,12 
1 
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"Are there any entities which are not things, or are concrete 
particulars the only items on a complete schedule of distinct 
categories of being? What about events, spaces, periods of time, 
properties, numbers, relations, or tendencies - do all these reduce 
somehow, to things ? •• In asking about categories, we are asking 
about the basic varieties of existence." 









The difference betwee.n the lists is that although they have some items 
, 
in common, some items only appear on the metaphysical list and some only I 
appear on the scientific list. That reflects the fact that the existen-ce r 
of some entities are only discussed by philosophers, e.g. universals. 
questions !!! the scientific list and only via the scientific list I 
The explanatory view suggests that we should appraach ontological 
(subject to certain qualifications that will arise when I bring the 




and the explanatory approach concerns not only what items the existence 
j 
I 
! of which are to be discussed but how and why that discussion arises. 
The discovery approach starts out, as Campbell does, with questions 
about what exists; the explanatory approach says that we should start 
out from questions of how we can explain the workings of a certain 
area of discourse or inquiry although that exploration may lead us to 
certain conclusions about what does or does not exist. This may appear 
an arbitrary distinction but I trust that its point will become clear. 
One problem that immediately arises from the metaphysical list 
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concerns the legitimacy of a-priori reasoning about what does or doesn't 
exist. An important part of the mptivation for describing the meta-
metaphilosophy was that it is not obvious that there is a legitimate 
a-priori method for philosophers to discover what there is. The thought 
that lay behind the strategy of attempting to say that philosophers 
ought to restrict their attention to disciplines other than philosophy 
(with respect to ontological questions) was that the concepts involved 
would thereby be gua~n~ed some independent legitimacy. That thought 
is related to the question of what items the existence of which are 
Worth discussing - it seems to me that it is quite possible that if one 
starts from the attempt to explain cognitive success in areas other 
than philosophy one might be able to resolve all of the problems without 
ever having to ask whether or not universals, say, exist. If that turned 
out to be the case I should feel no need to press the question. It is 
worth noting that my view does not entail that every claim and counter-
claim in the traditional nominalist-realist debate is necessarily ! 
t 
meaningless. It is likely that questions in the philosophy of language ~. 
~ 
(questions which arise because of the attempt to understand how lingUisticf 
discourse is possible) will uncover problems concerning predication 
not entirely unrelated to the nominalist-realist debate, but the 
suggestion is that this approach is more likely to ensure that there is 
a genuine problem to be solved. 
I said that the discovery approach differed from the explanatory 
approach not only in what items are discussed but how they are discussed. 
'Sets' appeared on both lists. Now it seems to me that if one begins 
by investigating how mathematicians employ the concept of a set, how 
students acquire the concept of a set and so on, one may be led to want 
to say either that there are, or that there are not, sets. To begin from 




to such questions as 'how can anything as weird as the null set exist ? 
(See chapter 7 for my views on the nature of mathematics). The difference 
in approach concerns a different ordering of priorities and leads me 
to the suggest the following meta-philosophical hypothesis: philosophical 
problems are rarely solved either by positing or denying the existence 
of various kinds of entities, but the solution of certain philosophical 
problems may have implications for whether one does or does not want to 
say that certain kinds of entities exist. Arising from that suggestion 
is the thought that the discovery approach tends to make the wrong 
kind of questions significant and the right kind of question 
insignificant. The first suggestion is, I admit, linked to my own theory 
of internal justification. Many of the questions that arise from the 
discovery approach have arisen because philosophers have wanted to be 
able to separate out what we contribute to our knowledge of the world 
from what the world contributes. That is patently what the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities was intended to achieve and, only' 
slightly less obviously, what the universal/particular debate was 
intended to achieve. I am inclined to agree with (the early) Quine that 
such a separation is not possible and hence that for that reason the 
discovery approach is overambitious. It is not the case however that the 
explanatory approach is less demanding for in certain respects it is 
more so. An example provides an illustration for my claim that the 
discovery approach makes the right questions less significant. Quine's 
view of abstract entities in mathematics can be summarized as follows: 
(i) science employs statements commi~d to abstract entities; (ii) there 
is no known way of ridding science of those commitments; therefore (iii) 
abstract entities exist. That position is perfectly reasonable in my 
view but it doesn't achieve what one would really like - it doesn't 
explain why the commitment to abstract entities in science should be 
- 97 -
useful. It is not obvious, after all, what role abstract entities 
could play in a physical process. 
The final contrast I would draw between the explanatory and 
discovery approaches is somewhat difficult to articulate and is linked 
to my admitedly cryptic remarks earlier that we should not take the 
notion of a thing too seriously. One might put the point this way: if 
joint theory were true then every claim of the form 'there are so-and-sos' 
or 'there are not so-and-sos' must have an absolutely correct or 
incorrect answer. That is because according to joint theory there are, 
prior to our conceptual scheme, 'things' and (perhaps) 'kinds of things' 
which exist independe~tly of our conceptual scheme. By definition, that 
Which exists independently of us cannot be affected by our descriptions 
and, hence, either the things we quantify over exist or they don't. The 
question of what exists must have an absolutely correct answer whether 
we can discover it or not. By contrast my attitude is that the question 
of whether to say that there are so-and-sos is always subject to 
pragmatic gerrymandering such that, whichever way it goes, can't be 
absolutely correct or not. (Early on Quine took a similar view when he 
spoke of the choice we have over which strand of the fabric of science 
to adjust). Thus, to return to the example cited earlier, I can 
sympathize with both claims when one side says that the truth of the 
sentence, 'There is a possibility that James will come' shows that there 
are possibilities; and I can sympathize with the other side when they 
say that the equivalence to the sentence 'It is not certainly false that 
James will come' shows that there aren't any possibilities. The former 
way has the thought that if it is true that there is a possibility 
that James will come the possibility exists that he will come (if it 
didn't exist, if there weren't any possibility that he would come, the 
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sentence would be false). The second way has the motivating thought that 
if we allow such ways of speaking it won't be long before some idiot 
comes along and tells us that possibilities are things, that they exist 
in a way that entails more than the truth of the second sentence. To 
avoid equivocation and confusion I think that we may have to decide (on 
occasions) which to say, but that choice, in my view, is an entirely 
pragmatic one. 
Quine once spoke of his taste for desert landscapes and I think 
that this taste is reflected in his desire to have a powerful, economic, 
neatly individuated ontol.ogy. Whilst I can empathatize with that taste 
I also appreciate the rich multiplicity of species to be found in the 
jungle. Moreover it is not just a q~estion of aesthetic taste but a 
positive mistake to suppose that parts of our conceptual scheme aren't 
more like the jungle than the desert. To show why I turn to the issue 
of pluralism. 
(4) Ontological Monism vs. Pluralism 
In chapter 2 I noted that Quine's claim that 'the unit of empirical 
significance is the whole of science' seemed to be an unwarranted 
conclusion from the correct premise that statements cannot be tested in 
isolation. Epistemologically that objection can be met by adopting a 
group or island theory but this still leaves the second question one 
should raise about that statement, viz. why did Quine talk specifically 
of science ? Prima facie at least many of the cognitive decisions we 
have to make do not concern scientific beliefs at all. It may be said 
that Quine is simply using the term 'science' in an extremely broad 
sense, i.e. that Quine identifies the cognitive with the scientific. 
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Quine, like everyone else, is entitled to adopt what definitions they 
like but the question of whether this is a good use of the term 'science' 
is of more than terminological significance. Consider Quine's &tatement 
that,13 "Epistemology is concerned with the foundations of science." 
Again one might object that epistemology concerns the cognitive status 
of claims made in many contexts apart from the scientific context. I 
can begin to jusify my claim that this objection is of more than 
terminological significance by asking the question, 'is it not the case 
that different 'groups' of beliefs may be individuated by the fact that 
they serve different purposes ?' I think that the answer to that question 
is 'yes'. Quine, from time to time, correctly observes that science has 
grown out of commonsense beliefs by 'refining' them. It does not follow 
from that, however, that every 'commonsense' belief is a crude scientific 
belief since it may not be a scientific belief at all. At this point tAe 
link with ontology begins to become apparent. Consider, for example, 
tables. It is patently obvious that tables were never positited as a 
term of a scientific theory, tables are a human artifact invented to 
serve certain purposes. However, once tables were invented people did 
come to have cognitive, true or false, beliefs about them - including 
true or false beliefs about whether a table exists in a given spatio-
temporal location. Tables, of course, are only one example of an 
hetrogeneous list, e.g. fireplaces, paintings, houses etc. It will prove 
convenient to have a label for this list - call it the 'non-scientific 
ontology of the world.' In addition to the scientific and the metaphysicaJ 








I take it that everyone would agree that there would be no point in 
attempting to complete this list, but someone involved in, say, the 
philosophy of art might find themselves asking the question, 'just what 
!! a painting ?', a form of an ontological question. Now a Quinian or 
a metaphysician (at least one like Campbell) will see no point in even 
mentioning this list. In defence of this position they can claim that, 
paintings, say, will be included in either (or both) the metaphysical 
or the scientific list. I don't wish to deny that in ~ sense that is 
true but since a painting is not just a physical object (plenty ot 
physical objects are not paintings) the question is what makes its 
characteristics as a physical object more important than its character-
istics as a special kind of physical object ? The correct answer, I 
think, is that absolutely speaking nothing at all. Paintings are 
irrelevant for science just as electrons are irrelevant for the philosophy 
I 
of art but I see no difference in their metaphysical status, i.e. 
paintings exist as surely as electrons or any other favoured item. For 
reasons I shall give in chapter 6 I believe that it is important to 
stress that the concept of a painting is not a scientific concept at all. 
If the concept of a painting were a scientific concept the scientist 
would be remiss in not including paintings on the scientific inventory. 
The only reason that I can see why the scientific inventory is taken 
more seriously is a metaphysical prejudice that the aims of science are 
more important than the aims of other areas of inquiry. Note that this 
in no way 'denigrates' the scientific ontology - it merely points out 
that there are other kinds of things. If this view is correct the 
consequence is no less than a rejection of Campbell's description of the 
purpose of ontology as that of providing a 'reasoned inventory of the 
categories of being.' At least that consequence follows if one doesn't 
rely on metaphysical predjudice and one admits that there is no point 
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in attempting to complete the non-scientific list. In fact that last 
point points up another difference between the explanatory and the 
discovery approaches: I don't think the importance of the scientific 
list resides in its length. I don't see the purpose of trying to 
co 1 t 1 · t 14 mp e e any l.S • 
(5) Revisionary Ontology: A Note on Goodman's Set Ways 
"No one shall be able to drive us from the paradise that Cantor created 
for us." Hilbert. 15. 
Goodman describes himself as a nominalist in the (somewhat 
unorthodox) sense that he refuses to countenance sets. Contrary to his 
~ . 
(1947) 'paper written with Quine it transpires that Goodman is not opposed 
to sets on ~he grounds that they are abstract,16 
"I do not look upon abstractness as either a necessary or a sufficient 
test of incomprehensibilty; and indeed the line between what is 
ordinarily called 'abstract' and what is ordinarily called 'concrete' 
seems to me vague and capricious." 
Nor does Goodman's opposition to sets concern the issue of finitism 
since he says his nominalism is' compatible with non-finitism. Rather he 
says that the nominalist denies that " ••• two different entities can be 
made up of the same entities." He illustrates this claim as follows,17 
" •• suppose •• that a nominalist and a platonist start with the same 
minimal, atomic elements for their systems; merely for comparative 
purposes take the number of these atoms as 5. The nominalist admits 
also all wholes or individual sums comprised of these, and so has 
a universe of 25_ 1, or 31 entities. He cannot concoct any more; 
for whatever individuals among the 31 are added together, the result 
is another individual among those 31. Our platonist ••• admits no sums 
of atoms but admits all classes of them. This, not counting the 
null and unit classes, gives him also 31 entities. But he further 
admits all classes of classes of atoms; and by this single step 
he we~comes into his universe 2,t 1, or over two billion, additional 
entities. And he has no thought of stopping there. He also admits 
all classes of classes of classes of atoms, and so on ad infinitum, 
climbing up through an explosively expanding universe towards a 
prodigiously teeming Platonic Heaven. He gets all these extra 
entities out of his original five by a magical process that enables 
him to make two or more distinct entities from the same entities." 
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Goodman anticipates the objection that we know from everyday experience 
that different things are often made out of the same materials by 
stressing that the different things are made at different times. It is 
not clear, howeye~ that this is always true. S.Haack points to the case 
of two recipes which use the same ingredients, in the same proportions, 
but which yield very different dishes. In this case,18 
"It's not that any particular dish of oeufs .! la tripe is made of 
the very same eggs, onions etc. as some particular dish of oeufs 
durs soubise - not even at different times. Rather the two dish 
tYPes are made (timelessly) of the very same ingredient types. 
The difference between the two dishes lies, not in the ingredients, 
which are just the same, but in the operations performed on the 
ingredients: the analogy with set theory when (ta}, b] and ta , t b13 
are constructed by different operations from the same atoms is ... 
quite close." 
It..-.is not clear, ther~fore, that the so-called 'magical process' is not 
analogous· to processes that do occur in everyday life. 
Goodman also anticipates the objection that nominalism would hamper 
the development of mathematics and other sciences by depriving them of 
methods they have used to achieve some of their most importan~ results. 
In part his reply is as follows,19 
"The nominalist does not presume to restrict the scientist. The 
scientist may use platonistic class constructions, complex numbers, 
divination by inspection of entrails, or any other claptrappery 
that he thinks may help him get the results he wants. But what he 
produces then becomes raw material for the philosopher, whose task 
is to make sense of all this: to clarify, simplify, explain, 
interpret in understandable terms. The practical scientist does the 
bus~c.s.s but the philosopher keeps the books." 
This passage calls for several comments. First, this view threatens to 
involve not only an a-priorism about the results of science but also 
an a-priorism about the methods of science. How does the philosopher 
know which methods constitute 'claptrappery' and which do not? Surely 
sciefttific method evolves in parallel with results, i.e. we make 
"-judgements about the methods of science ~ased on the results of science. 
But if the philosopher is entitled to question both the methods and the 
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results of science simultaneously how can those judgements be justified ? 
The second thing I want to say is that the way the passage is written it 
looks as though Goodman supposes that it follows from the fact that the 
purpose of the philosopher is explanatory it follows that the philospaer 
'keeps the books'. I think that claim is reasonable if the philosopher 
keeps the books in a non-revisionary way, e.g. a philosopher of 
mathematics may try to show that there are no abstract entities without 
challenging the results of any mathematical theory. But of course that is 
not what Goodman is doing - he claims that set theory produces 
unintelligible results. I don't want to argue that philosophers can 
never be justified in reaching revisionary conclusions (since it is not 
possible to anticipate what situations may arise in the future), but I 
• 
'" 
do suggest that such conclusions impose a considerable burden of proof 
on the philosopher. The burden of proof is imposed by the fact that we 
need to know h2! the philosopher can be in a better position than the 
scientist (or whoever) to know what is the case. We need to know that the 
philosopher has better reason than a-priori pre~judice for criticizing 
the results of science. It seems to me that Goodman's criticism of set 
theory simply fails to bear that burden of proof. 
Goodman, obviously, understands set theory formally but nevertheless 
professes not to know what sets are. One approach in the philosophy of 
mathematics, an approach with which I have some sympathy, would suggest 
that someone who understands set theory formally ipso facto knows what 
sets are. The way that Goodman writes about sets suggest that he would 
like to say something like 'how can things with the w~~rd properties 
sets are alleged to have possibly exist ?' Such a question, however, 
hardly makes sense in the context of Goodman's avowed irreallsm and, 
-indeed, I see no way of reconciling Goodman's intemperate dismissal of 
set theory with the rest of Goodman's temperate and reasonable philosophy_ 
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(6) Conclusion 
I -should like to attempt to draw together the effects of taking 
the particular combination of views I favour together. 20 Perhaps I may 
best do this by considering how my view relates to Wittgenstein's 
conception of philosophy. 
To speak of philosophical explanations and to argue tha~ philosophers 
may have reasonable grounds for asserting or denying that there are 
things of various kinds would seem to run completely counter to 
Wittgenstein's view that 'philosophy leaves everything as it is.' The 
contrast is not as stark as it appears however. I have suggested that 
legitimate philosophical assertions or denials about what exists should 
,- . 
at least normally be compatible with the first-order inquiry. In one 
sense that!! to 'leave everything as it is.' I have not said that 
philosophy may not be revisionary in the sense that it may not change 
'normal' ways of thinking. (Indeed if it could not legitimately do that 
I think it would be pointless). An instrumentalist philosophy'of science 
might change the way scientists'thought about science. It is npt clear 
though that something is not equally true of Wittgenstein's work: a 
mathematician who thought of mathematics in a Platonistic way would 
surely view it differently it they became convinced of a Wittgensteiaa 
view of mathematics. Nor is it clear how much weight to place on the 
idea of 'explanation'. There is some structural similarity between the 
meta-metaphilosophy and Wittgenstein's injunction to look at the uses of 
language. Moreover, isn't an account of mathematics which emerges from 
following that injunction at least an embrwYonic explanation ? It is 
true, I think, that I have fewer qualms about philosophers introducing 
whatever technical apparatus that may fu~ther the aim of explanation. 
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Wittg~tein, however, at least employs quasi-technical terms,e.g. 
'language-game', 'criteria'. 
An interesting suggestion as to how my view differs substantially 
from Wittgenstein's might go as follows: on my view philosophers may 
examine the claims made in the context of many areas of inquiry~ As a 
result of that examination philosophers may, for various reasons, decide 
that it is reasonable to conclude that there are physical objects but 
that there are not abstract entities or non-physical objects of any kind. 
(In fact the conclusions I shall reach are not very different from that 
position). Now that looks very un-Wittgensteian since it is to envisage 
the success of the sUbstantial metaphysical programme of materialism. 
~--
I think,'however, that there would be a very considerable difference 
in attitude. between myself and those wno have attempted to fulfill the 
materialist programme. I can hint at the difference by saying that 
whereas they would view that as an exciting metaphysical result I would 
not. I think that the thought that makes materialism appear as an 
exciting programme is the thought that if one could filter out any 
contribution that we make to knowledge of the world what would remain 
would be the physical processes and entities that constitute the 
structure of the world. My view, however, to put the point vaguely and 
intuitively, is that we can't separate our contribution from that of the 
world. (Compare what I said about paintings above). Thus the 'success' 
of materialism on my view would be too easy a victory for the 
traditionally minded materialist. On my view there cannot be a more 
successful version of materialism than that provided by physics. In 
short, it is reductionism which gives philosophical materialism its 





At various points in previous chapters I have appealed to 
subjunctive conditionals when explaining my views. In chapter 2 I said 
that statements asserting the existence of objects ought to be construed 
as the claim that a set of subjunctive conditionals j, true. In this 
chapter I undertake two tasks: (i) to show that this appeal is consistent 
with the rest of my views and that in particular one can simultaneously 
hold the view that modal statements may be true or false without our··· 
knowing which, and the view that only actual things exist; (ii) to 
criticize. many of the current approaches to modality. This latter task 
would be worthwhile even if those views were not (as they seem to be) 
in confli.ct with the general views for which I am arguing. Since they 
are in conflict this task acquires some urgency. 
I may best explain the structure of this chapter by reference to 
figure 5 overleaf. The view which I favour falls under the heading of 
redescriptionism which will be the subject of part II. Before explicating 
that view however, part I will outline my reasons for not favouring 
several other approaches to modality. There are three major questions 
I raise here: (1) why attempts to avoid taking modal statements 
seriously (in various senses of 'seriously') are not successful; (2) 
why some versions of actualism are unsuccessful; (3) why modal realism 
is unacceptable. As figure 5 shows, I believe that whether actualism 
is the correct approach to modality is an independent question from 
whether possible worlds ought to be postulated. I do not claim that 
the positions indicated in figure 5 exhaust either the possible or even 
the extant views on modality. I do believe, however, that the views 
" . ..,. 
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Figure 5 
Some Views of Modality 
Should we take modal statements seriously? 
Yes 
Does this equire the 



















discussed raise the relevant questions for the purpose of this theis. 
I will explain terminology as I proceed. 
Part I: Some Current Approches to Modality 
In part I I examine a number of approaches to modality which haye 
found favour in recent philosophical discussion. First I will examine 
three distinct ways of refusing to take (some) modal statements 
seriously (the 'eliminability thesis') and argue that none of these views 
is satisfactory. Second I will examine two kinds of actualism - the view 
that only actual things exist. I shall conclude by consideri.ng Lewis's· 
argument for modal realism. 
(1) The Ei1m1nability Thesis 
One general comment which should be made concerning all three 
versions of the eliminability thesis (the E-thesis) is that they only 
concern the analysis of dispositional statements. This in itself seems 
a cause for suspicion. For vari9us reasons (some of which will be 
mentioned below) dispositional statements seem to provide the simplest 
case of modality. For this reason, if the views discussed cannot (as I 
shall argue) provide an adequate analysis of dispositional statements 
then, ~ fortiori, they cannot provi.de an adequate analysis of modality 
in general. 
(a) Reductionism 
In Word and Object Quine gave an analysis of dispositions as follows:~ 
one defines a relative term !:1 as meaning 'alike in molecular structure' 
which enables one to paraphrase 'x is soluble' and 'x is fragile' as, 
(3y)(Mxy and y dissolves) 
(3y)(Mxy and y breaks) • 
.. , 
- 109 -
Mellor proposed a counter-example to this analysis based on the fact 
that the analysis always requires that there be some occasion when the 
dispositional predicate is manifest. 2 The counter-example was that of a 
nuclear power station - the safety precautions involved in the design 
of the power station are intended to prevent its disposition to explode 
from being manifested. In this case there is (or was) no manifestation 
of the dispositional predicate (no cases of nuclear power stations 
exploding) for ~ to be similar to. Mellor concluded that,3 
"It is absurd to suppose that these precautions have no basis unless 
they are somewhere and sometimes unsuccessful." 
Quine's analysis amounts to the claim that all we need to know in 
order to be able to apply dispositional predicates truly is that the 
object in-question has a particular microstructure. Quine writes,4 
"What we have seen dissolve in water •• has a structure suited to 
dissolving; and when we now speak of some new dry lump of sugar as 
soluble, we may be considered merely to be saying that it, whether 
destined for water or not, is similarly structured." 
But this claim is false; in saying that tpe new sugar lump is soluble 
\ ' 
we are not 'merely' saying that it has a certain structure, but also 
that that structure would be (partly) responsible for it dissolving if 
it were immersed in water. The point here is not that the appeal to 
.... 
microstructure is necessarily wrong but that that appeal cannot eliminate 
modality. It may sometimes be the case that when dispositional 
statements are truly applied to objects, what makes the dispositional 
statement true may be th.e fact that the object in question has a 
structure such that, in the appropriate circumstances, that structure 
would be a causal factor in the thing ~-ing. It is apparent that this 
view does not eliminate modality.., 
•... 
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I said that it may sometimes be the case that dispositional 
statements are true in virtue of a certain structure that a given object 
possesses. Does it not make a mystery Of dispositions if, however, one 
allows that a dispositional statement may be true without it being the 
case that it is true in virtue of microstructure ? When Quine and others 
identify microstructure with solubuility they are claiming, I take it, 
that a given kind of microstructure is identical with the dispositional 
property. I believe that one may certainly question this claim for 
reasons closely analogous to those that Davidson has offered in support 
of the view he calls tanomalous monism,.5 Consider the dispositional 
term 'irritable' as applied to people. It may be the case that whenever 
the dispositional predicate ' ••• is irritable' is truly applied, some 
-
causal story could be told in, say, neurophysiological terms. However, 
, 
even if some such story can always be told, it does not follow that the 
neurophysiological states invoked in the explanation form a ~. I shall 
elaborate upon this view in part II where I shall sugg~st that the 
appeal to microstructure becomes wildly implausible when applied to more 
complex modal idioms. 
Mellor's counter-example was, I believe, telling, but Mellor drew 
from it a stronger conclusion than I would endorse. In his paper 'In 
Defence of Dispositions' Mellor said that dispositions were 'real' 
properties and added that nominalists who did not like his terminology 
could rephrase this as the claim that the intelligible application of 
dispositional predicates does not require them to be coextensive with 
non-dispositional predictes. My view is that we cannot know when a 
dispositional predicate is truly applied without knowing the truth of 
an intensional description of the object in question. However, when we 
have, say, a true theory of the solubility of sugar which describes the 
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microstructure which is, or would be, responsible for it dissolving, 
the categorical property (the microstructure) is coextensive with the 
property we call its solubility. Quine's mistake, as I see it, consisted 
in concluding that because dispositional properties are coextensive with 
categorical properties, the truth-conditions of the statements describing 
the objects in question can be given in an extensional language. To 
clarify: we know the truth of dispositional statements iff we know the 
truth-conditions of statements employing intensional idioms. Mellor's .~ 
mistake lies in concluding that because we cannot describe dispositional 
properties without employing intensionai idioms the properties in 
question must be somehow peculiar. 
(b) The Dismissive Attitude 
If the reductionist approach to dispositional statements is not 
successful, does the 'dismissive' approach fare any better? In The 
Roots of Reference Quine writes,6 
" ••• if I were trying to devise an ideal language for a finished 
theory of reality, or any part of it, I would make no place in it 
tor the general dispositional idiom. In developing a theory, on the 
other hand, the idiom is indispensible. Just as in writing an essay 
one commonly~sketches in ulterior paragraphs before completing the 
front ones, so in developing a theory one sketches in a few key 
traits of what is meant ultimately to emerge as a satisfactory 
explanatory mechanism. And since science is always developing, the 
idiom is here to stay." 
This is really an odd statement; what he gives with the one hand takes 
with the other. Feeling sympathetic to many aspects of Quine's philosophy 
I had concluded that there was little room for 'ideal languages' and 
still less tor finished theories of reality. Indeed, having started 
talking of such he then agrees that the dispositional idiom is here to 
stay. I find it hard to see anything here but a large piece of 
., 
.., 
question-begging for Quine's general thesis that an extensional language 
1s adequate for the whole of science. Still, this is !4 hominen • 
..... 
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In saying that dispositional idioms are dispensible two things 
could be meant, either (i) that dispositional idioms are not required 
in scientific theory itself, or, (i1) that a philosophy of science 
(Quine's naturalized epistemology) need not employ ,them. The first claim 
is surely implausible. It is an important part of our theory that the 
nuclear power station has the disposition to explode. What goes for 
nuclear power stations must surely go for many of the other things we 
theorize about. The second claim is equally implausible however and the 
argument that was rehearsed in the first section reapplies here. What 
scientists know when they posit various mechanisms cannot be represented 
. --
within an extensional language. Given that fact, a philosophy of science 
which attempts to explain how scientific knowledge is possible, whilst 
I 
at the same time spurning intensional descriptions of what scientists 
know, is bound to be inadequate. 
(c) The Suppositional Account 
In his (1973) Mackie offered a 'suppositional' account of 
dispositional idioms. On this view, to say 'x is soluble' is not to make 
a true or false statement but, rather, to licence the inference from 
the premise 'x is soluble and x is placed in water' which one supposes 
to be the case, to the conclusion 'x dissolves'. Campbell endorses this 
analysis as a way of upholding Quine's claim that cannonical notation 
is adequate for the whole of science without adopting his 'draconian 
programme' of reducing subjunctives. Explicating Mackie Campbell writes,7 
"If the liquid is acid, then the litmus paper will turn red 
is analyzed as: 
Suppose the liquid is acid. Using this as a premise, more or less 
formal reasoning processes lead us to conclude that the litmus 
paper will turn red." 
.. 
What does the 'more or less' mean here ?~No formal reasoning will take 
" 
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us from the premise 'the liquid is acid' to 'the litmus paper turns 
red' without some supplementary premise - but isn't the supplementary 
premise the very subjunctive conditional that was supposed to be 
redundant ? If the claim is that we can know that a subjunctive 
conditional is true simply by knowing the truth of descriptions 
expressible in an extensional language (which is what Quine needed) then 
this claim is false. If this is not the claim being made then it is not 
clear what the point of the analysiS is supposed to be. It may be that 
Mackie, contra Mellor, was concerned to make the point that we may 
understand dispositional statements without positing 'real properties'. 
'., 
That seems to me true, but it does not follow that we can therefore 
dispense with intensional descriptions in describing what we know when 
< 
we know a·subjunctive conditional to be true. If Mackie only wanted to 
defend some'version of actualism (see below) all well and good, but I 
do believe that even a successful version of actualism cannot dispense 
with modal idioms. 
For the reasons outlined a~ove, I do not believe that any of the 
attempts to eliminate modality are successful. If those attempts 
cannot succeed with the simplest modal idiom - dispositions - then ~ 
fortiori they are not likely to succeed for more complex idioms. One 
reason for wanting to eliminate modal idioms is (an understandable) 
reluctance to posit non-actual entities. I hope to show that modal 
idioms may be taken seriously without any such commitment, but before 
offering my own account I want to discuss two attempts to do this 
which are not, I think, successful. 
(2) Two Kinds of Actualism 
, 
Actualism is the view that there neither are nor could be any non-
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existent objects, i.e. that the only possible entities are actual 
entities. 
(a) Combinatorialism 
Combinatorialism (the C-thesis) is the kind of actualism which says 
that modal statements, if true, are true in virtue of describing 
possible rearrangements of actual entities. One way of describing this 
view is as follows: 8 Suppose that there are metaphysically basic 
elements out of which our universe is composed. Call them 'atoms'. The 
actual world consists of these atoms being arranged in a highly complex 
manner. The actual arrangement of atoms could be taken to be, or 
represented by, a vas~ly complex set built up of nothing more than atoms 
,-
and sets of atoms as members. Now one may construe the phrase 'other 
possible worlds' as referH, to other arrangements of atoms than the 
actual arrangement. In his paper 'Propositional Objects' Quine suggested 
that space-time points be taken to be the atoms. 9 
A standard objection to this view is that it rules out what 
intuitively seem to be ~ ~ possibilities. It rules out, for instance 
the possibility that there should have been more atoms (whatever kind 
ot thing they are supposed to be) than there actually are. Claims and 
counter-claims about what is possible are always possible, but the C-
thesis seems to rule out possibilities for the wrong reasons. Goodman 
sometimes appears to be a combinatorialist so it will be useful to 
consider one at his examples. 
In Fact, Fiction and Forecast Goodman mentions what may be described 
as a 'possible automobile,.lO ~he idea is that there is a chassis on one 
side of the street and a body on the oth~i. This possible automobile 
misses being an actual automobile because it lacks a certain relationship 
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among its parts but, obviously, those parts are actual. Suppose that one 
generalizes from this example to ask the question, 'how many possible 
automobiles are there in the world at the time 1 l' Imagine that we 
could discover exactly how many cars there are in world at t. Call this 
number a. F~rther suppose that we could also discover how many parts 
there are in existence. Call this number !. These parts could be assembl.ed 
in various ways to produce different numbers of possible cars. The 
combinatorialist will probably want to allow every possible arrang~ent 
of parts as constituting a possible car. The number', a function of El' 
which would result from adding together the numbers of possible cars 
produced by all of the various arrangements of parts, I denote by f(m) • 
• 
. t 
The'C-theorist seems to be commi~d to the view that at time t 
there are only a + f(m) possible cars. But this just seems wrong - the 
claim that there could have been another car at 1 simply does not seem 
to depend upon how many cars and how many parts there are at 1. (This 
was what I meant when I said that the C-thesis seems to rule out 
possibilities for the wrong reasons~l 
I said that the C-theorist 'seems' c:; commilrd to the claim that 
there are only ~ + f(m) possible cars; 'seems' because a possible 
response at this point would be to say that there are more than ! number 
of parts, for there are not only the actual parts of automobiles but 
also possible parts which could be made from other kinds of actual 
things. This response not only increases the number of possible 
automobiles but seems to intro~~c~ what is, arguably, the right kind of 
indeterminacy into the equation .. - who can say how many parts could be 
made from everything which exists 1 Nevertheless there is something 
very odd in taking this line. What, one must ask, has happened to the 
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actuality of the automobile since, given this response, even the parts 
are no longer actual ? Indeed one should raise this question about 
Goodman's possible automobile. If the only possible entities are actual 
(which is the claim of actualism) then there is not a possible car 
because the possible car is not actual. According to the C-thesis 
'possible arrangements of the actual metaphysical atoms' may not be 
actual, so I do not see how the possibilities that are allowed, have been 
explained as only being actual. So, although I do believe that the 
standard objection to the C-thesis, which says that it is inadequate 
because it rules out genuine possibilities, does have some force, it 
is not, I think, the fundamental objection. The fundamental objection is 
that the C-thesis is ~ot actualist enough: it violates its own 
assumptions. If the fundamental objection were that it rules out 
possibilities it would be difficult to argue against Quine's view in 
his (1965) since it is hard to imagine any meaningful way of calculating 
the total number of space-time pOints in existence. What I believe is 
wrong with the C-thesis is that it has the wrong kind of commitment to 
the actual, viz. the view ou~ht to be not,that any true mod~l statement 
must be about some kind of entity but, more simply, that there is some 
way of construing it to be about the actual. That, at least, is the view 
I will attempt to develop in part II. 
(b) Constructivism 
In his (1975) Rescher has provided an account of modality that may 
suggestively be called constructivist. Rescher provides a useful summary 
of this approach in his (1973). He writes,12 
"Unrealized possibilities do not exist as such. What exist are minds 
and their capabilities, and consequ~ritly languages and their rules. 
Unrealized possibilities are generated by minds, and so they can be 
said to 'exist' only in a secondary and dependent sense, as actual 
or potential objects of thought. Such possibilities are the products 
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of an intellectual construction. The ontological status of the 
possible is thus fundamentally mind-dependent, the domain of the 
possible being a mental construct." 
The trouble with this approach,·.I believe, is that it is entirely 
Unilluminating. Rescher quotes Quine where he expresses his doubts about 
a 'possible man'. QUine writes,13 
"'l'ake ••• the possible fat man in that doorway; and, again, the 
possible bald man in that doorway. Are they the same possible men, 
or two possible men ? How do we decide ? How many possible men are 
there in that doorway ? Are there more possible thin ones than fat 
ones ? How many of them are alike? Or would their being alike 
make them one ? Are no two possible things alike ? Is this the same 
as saying that it is impossible for two things to be alike? Or, 
finally, is the concept of identity simply inapplicable to 
unactualized possibles ? But what sense can be found in talking of 
entities which cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with 
themselves and distinct from one another ?" 
In response Rescher writes,14 
• 
"Quine is seeking for a principle of individuation ••• for nonexistent, 
yet possible, items. But - his inclination to the contrary 
notWithstanding - this problem does not in fact pose any insuperable 
obstacles. Presumably a nonexistent possible is to be identified 
by means Of a defining description. And on this, the classical 
approach to the matter. the problems •• posed by Quine encounter no 
decisive theoretical difficulties. How many possible objects are 
there ? Clearly as many as can be described distinctly - presumably 
an infinite number. When are two possible objects identical ? When 
their defining descriptions are 'logically identical', that is, 
equivalent. The doctrine of possible objects entails no major 
logical anomalies. With\nonexistents' everything save existence 
alone (and its implications) remains precisely the same as it does 
with objects that 'really' exist ••• " 
Rescher equates possibility with 'conceivability' when he is dealing 
with what he calls 'hard-core, totally unactualized possibility'. It 
seems to me that Rescher has to impose SOme restrictions on what is 
conceivable. It simply cannot be said that there is an unactualized 
possible for every description since one can supply descriptions of 
impossibles, e.g. the round-square. The trouble now is that it is hard 
to see what restrictions Rescher can impose that will be illuminating. 
If we are told that the description must be of a logical possibility 
.. ., 
the analysis only amounts to saying that that which is conceivable is 
logically possible. What this shows, I think, is that although actualism 
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maybe a necessary condition for a coherent and informative account of 
modality, it is not a sufficient condition. A coherent and informative 
account must, I believe, do two things, (i) avoid commitment to non-
actual objects; (ii) indicate how modal statements are related to our 
theoretical beliefs about the world. Even if Rescher succeeds with respect 
to point (i), he says nothing helpful with respect to point (ii). In 
part II I hope to show how one can do better. 
. ... 
(3) Modal Realism 
In Counterfactuals Lewis offers the following argument,l5 
"I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we 
" happen to inhabit. If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is 
uncontroversially true that things might be otherwise than they are. 
I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in 
countless ways. But what does this mean? Ordinary language permits 
the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been besides 
the way they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence is an 
existential quantification. It says that there exist many entities 
of a certain descriptidn, to wit 'ways things could have been'. 
r believe that things could have been different in countless ways; 
r believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; taking the 
paraphrase at face value, I therefore believe in the existence of 
entities that might be called 'ways things could have been.' I 
prefer to call them possible worlds .,1 
\ 
This is a strd~ argument in many respects. First, it seems to me that 
it is Ba! uncontroversially true that things might be otherwise than 
they are. Far from being uncontroversially true this seems to me false; 
what might be uncontroversially true is. that things might have been 
otherwise than they are. I accept the next claim that 'things could have 
been different in countless ways.' Lewis then paraphrases this as} 
'There are many ways things might have been besides the way they actually 
are.' A good question to ask here is what work the word 'actually' is 
doing. Although I have had to use the word 'actual' frequently one must 
bear in mind its pernicious tendency to presuppose that there are (by 
contrast) non-actual ways that things are. 
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Having noted the dangers of the word 'actual', the next major 
thing to note about the argument is that it is symmetrical between 
what mi,ht~called the inflationary and the deflationary interpretations. 
These interpretations differ according to what one takes as premise and 
what as conclusion. Lewis starts from the premise that things might be 
otherwise than they are. This is then paraphrased as 'there are many 
ways things could have been otherwise than they are', from which the 
conclusion is drawn that there are possible worlds. However, if one 
starts from the premise that 'there are many ways things could have been 
different from what they are t , since this permits the paraphrase, 
I things could have been different in countless ways', one could claim" 
that this shows that we do need to posit possible worlds. Those who 
keep Occam's razor to hand might wonder what justification there is for 
the inflationary rather than the deflationary reading. 
The issue between actualism and modal realism may be expressed 
by the question, is it better to have modal predications of actual ' 
objects, or non-modal predictions of modal objects ? It is tempting to 
give the short answer to this question that if we do the latter we will 
not know what we are talking about. I fear that this would beg the 
question however. I do believe, though, that there is an argument in 
favour of the former course. 
Modal intuitions are notoriously variable; mine, as it happens, 
are fairly weak. Still, for everyone, they shade off: we are sure that 
some modal statements are true, whilst there are other modal statements 
such that we have little idea of what they mean. Take a mind-boggling 
counterfactual such as, 'if Julias Caesar were prime minister today 
he would have an incomes policy'. I am i~clined to think that the 
Bupposition that the historical figure of Jul1as Caesar could be alive 
- 120 -
today does not make much sense. Take a less controversial counterfactual 
that does not involve problems of personal identity: 'if Regan had 
been in power at the time the American hostages were taken, he would 
have got them out quickly.' I do not know (and I don't think that anyone 
else does) whether that counter factual is true. It might be true, or 
there might have been a war, or •••• Why are we unsure in cases like 
these? Actualism has an answer to this question: since modal statements 
are about the actual world, how sure or unsure we are about them is 
bound to vary with the strength of our theories about the world. Our 
theories about psychological, sociological and political matters, say, 
are notoriously weak, therefore modal statements that involve these 
kinds of theory are problematic. 
.. . 
How does modal realism fare when faced with the same question? 
Here I think the glibness of the answer reveals the bankruptcy of its 
explanatory power. For example, we can answer the counter factual about 
Julias Caesar as follows: it is true iff there is a possible world in 
which Julias Caesar is prime minister today, he has an incomes policy, 
and that possible world is as similar to this one as is compatible with 
those 41fferences. I contend that this gets us nowhere. Nor is it 
obvious what a modal realist like ~ewis can say about this problem. 
It is true that within his system Lewis employs the metaphor of 
'distance': those possible worlds about which we know little are those 
that are 'remote' from our own. But what do 'distance' and 'remote' 
mean here ? It is true that from some of the things Lewis says one 
might almost expect a physical measure; the greater the distance would 
correspond to the greater number of light-years clo~~ up when 
travelling from one possible world to another. Few, I trust, will want 
to swallow that. The serious point here 1s that talk of distance seems 
more to repeat the question than to answer it. By outlining the view 
.... 
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which I favour I hope to underline this criticism. 
Part II: Redescriptivism 
" ••• despite all the scare stories, possibility is all right. But 
contrary to the glowing prospectuses of unreal estate salesmen, 
possibility is very much rooted in this world." 16 
Redescriptivism is a species of actualism; according to this view 
we can make sense of modal statements without being commited to oon-
actual objects. Indeed, according to redescriptivism there are no special 
ontological problems concerned with modal statements. l7 In this respect 
redescriptivism contrasts not only with modal realism but also with 
those other forms of actualism discussed above which attempt to explain 
I 
.way our commitment to non-actual objects; on this view there is no 
such commitment and, therefore, nothing to be explained away. That is 
to say, there is no need to find respectable surrogates for non-actual 
objects (combinatorialism's 'atoms'), nor to ahow that references to 
the non-actual are respectable because mind-dependent (Rescher's 
constructivism). Recent philosophical discussion of modality has, I 
believe, misconceived the problem as ontological, whereas I take the 
real difficulties to be epistemic. Acceptance of redescriptivism allows 
one to understand how our modal intuitions shade off in proportion to 
the amount of confidence we have in our theories of the world. I hope 
to provide justification for the claim made by Hacking (quoted above). 
I will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss various kinds of 
of possibility and Hacking's proposals for distinguishing them. I will 
then employ a (modified) version of this proposal in discussing three 
kinds of modal statements viewed from the redescriptivist perspective. 
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Finally, having shown that modality holds no ontological terrors, I 
will employ subjunctive conditionals in outlining how the concept 
of relative truth-conditions defined in chapter 2 may be further 
explicated. 
(1) Kinds of Possibility 
In his (1975) Hacking has proposed a way of distinguishing distinct 
kinds of possibility by syntactic means. He distinguishes two forms of 
sentence as fOllows,18 
M : It is possible that p. 
M* : It is possible for A to x. 
I Substitutions for 'p' are sentences in the indicative mood only. 
.... 
Substitutions for 'A' may include the names of agents, inanimate objects, 
mass nouns, and seneral terms. These substitutions may be illustrated in 
turn by the follwing sentences: 
'It is possible for Rachel to hold her breathe for a whole minute.' 
'It is possible for the kettle to boil dry in five minutes.' 
'It is possible for sand to wear down the'mountain.' 
'It is possible for any python to swallow some monkey.' 
Substitutions for 'x' include Dot only descriptions of actions but also 
states, for example, 
'It is possible for him to be a woodsman.' 
Hacking points out that M and M* are not identical since M* does not 
entail M,19 tilt may be possible for the judge to give the woman a 
suspended sentence, but it is not possible that he will; he is notoriously 
mean and will certainly send her to jail." Moreover, 'possible' in M 
may be replaced by such adjectives as, '.Jlrobable', 'certain', 'true', 
'doubtful', 'believable', 'alleged', and 'plausible',_ none of which 
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fit M*. Adjectives which may replace 'possible' in M* include 
'permissible', 'obligatory', 'essential', 'unheard of'. There are 
others (including 'possible' itself) which can not take the place of 
the blank in 'It is •••• of A to x' , but others which may take that place 
and the place of 'possible' in the M construction, for example, 'unwise', 
'delightful', 'insulting'. 
The importance of the distinction between M and M* sentences may 
b 20 e illustrated by an example Hacking gave in his earlier (1967) paper. 
The sentences, 
(1) It is possible that I shall go. 
(2) It is possible for me to go. 
are apparently about the same thing - namely, my departure - but (2) 
may be true when (1) is false. As this example and the list of adjectives 
suggest, Hacking contends that when not modified by 'logically' M 
21 represents epistemic possibility, "To say that it is possible that 
so-and-so, is to say that so-and-so is consistent with all we can know 
or readily tind out to the contrary." Technical, human, economic, 
metaphysical possibility and so forth are represented by the M* 
construction. 
_a 
I have onlYLreal quarrel with Hacking's grammatical device. As noted, 
substitutions for 'pi must be in the indicative mood only. This entails 
that possibilities expressed by subjunctives cannot, by fiat, be 
epistemic. It seems to me however that many subjunctives are naturally 
construed as expressing epistemic possibilities. (I shall provide 
illustration of this claim below). In employing Hacking's device I will 
therefore drop the restriction that substitutions for 'p' must be 




to make. This 
one further modification of Hacking's device that I wish 
to is~xtend the M and M* forms in order to be able to 
encompass modal statements in the past tense. This I shall do by adopting 
the following convention: 
Mp It was possible that p. 
Mp It was possible for A to x. 
These modifications will be employed in the discussion of 'might' and 
counterfactual sentences below. First, though, I will say something .~ 
about dispositions. 
(2) Three Kinds of Modal statements 
(a) Dispositions 
Dispositional idioms seem to provide the simplest case of modality. 
Contrast the term 'dissolves' with the term 'soluble'. 'Dissolves' is 
true of things that actually do dissolve when immersed in water, 
'soluble' to things that would dissolve if immersed in water. Although it 
need not be doubted that things are soluble in virtue of some physical 
I 
\ property, even in this simplest case, there are difficulties in 
straightforwardly identifying the property of. solubility with a particular 
microstructure. It may be, for instance, that what we take to be one 
natural kind - sugar say - may consist of two types, so that sugar of 
type ~ is soluble in virtue of microstructure !, whilst sugar of type £ 
is soluble in virtue of microstructure I. (In this case whether we want 
to say that there is one natural kind with two different microstructures, 
or that there are really two natural kinds, surely just depends upon 
whether we wish to identify natural kinds by their macro or micro 
properties). It also seems possible that i~ the world had been different 
then sugar might be soluble in virtue of a different microstructure 
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from the one which, in the world, does make it soluble. In that 
eventuality it might be said that 'solubility is still solubility' and 
this claim prevents straightforward identification of solubility with 
a particular kind of microstructure. 
The ~c~tion with analyses of disposition terms has been to claim 
that all disposition terms true of objects are true in virtue of a 
particular kind of microstructure m. Even ignoring the difficulties 
- -
raised above this seems too strong a claim. Consider the term 'irritable' 
and the set of people S of whom this term is true. Now I see no reason 
to deny (as Mellor does) that for each of the members of S, there is a 
categorical property: P with which the dispositional property is 
,. 
coextensive. It does not follow from this, however, that it must be the 
same kind of property for each of the members of S. There is a strong 
I h ith th i d 11 1 . 22 Th' i ana ogy ere w e v ew Davi son ca s anoma ous mon~sm. ~s s 
the view that although every mental event is identical with some 
physical state, the predicates which pick out kinds of mental events 
need not be coextensive with p~edicates which pick out kinds of physical 
events. This view makes compatible two plausible claims that appear 
inconsistent: (i) that every mental event is identical with some physical 
state; (ii) that even given complete knowledge of all the initial 
conditions (described in a physical vocabulary) for all physical 
theories T, and knowledge of all the covering laws governing all of 
the events described by the set of theories, it would not follow that 
one could predict any mental event so described. 
My view allows for what seems a reasonable position - that it 
ought to be an empirical question whether a dispositional predicate 
"-
is coextensive with a kind of microstructure. This view of dispositional 
statements becomes even more compelling, it seems to me, when applied 
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to more complex modal idioms. I turn to the idiom of 'might'. 
(b) 'Might' 
Consider the statement, 
(3) Derby County Football Club might win the F.A. cup in 1984. 
Employing the M and M* constructions nicely disambiguates different 
grounds that one might have for believing (3) true. Compare, .~ 
(3a) M: It is possible that Derby County will win the F.A. cup in 1984. 
(3b) M*: It is possible for Derby County to win the F.A. cup in 1984. 
(3b) asserts something weaker than (3a). (3b) is very likely to be true 
since Derby County will be eligible to win the F.A. cup; they will be 
... 
one of the teams in the competition. Of course this fact is not certain -
the club may become bankrupt before 1984 and cease to exist. However, 
even it (3b) is true (3a) may be false - it is not possible that they 
will win the F.A. cup since'·they are not a good enough football team. 
It may be useful here to adopt a device employed by Reichenbach 
when discussing tensed sente~ces. He represents, for instan~e, the 
future perfect tense of 'I shall have seen John' as,23 
s 
The arrow represents the direction of time; 'E' represents the 'point of 
event'; 'R' represents the 'point of reference'; and 'S' represents the 
'point of speech.' 
I suggest that one may represent (3a) as follows, 
SEE E E E EkE t 
The F.A. cup competion consists of a series of events (football matches 
etc.); placing 'R' at the time of the last event represents the 
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fact that one is referring to the outcome of the competition. The events 
in question are not yet actual but this poses no problem for actualismj 
(3a) is true or false at S in virtue of the relative skills of the 
sides in the competition. That this is so is shown by the fact that the 
probability of (3a) being true could change over the period of time 
before the competition begins - the team might acquire more skilful 
players for example. The difficulties in determining the truth-value of 
.... 
sentences such as (3a) have to do with knowing which facts in the world 
will determine the outcome. If (3b) is true then it is true in virtue 
of such facts as the eligibility of the team for the competition. 
It is worth conSidering (3a) more closely. Although there are, as 
noted, difficulties in identifying microstructure as that in virtue of 
which dispositional statements are true, 'might' statements are more 
complex in that the facts which make them true rarely form a kind. 
Compare (3a) with, 
(3a') It is possible for Liverpool football club to win the F.A. cup in 
1984. 
, 
Assessment of the facts upon Which one would assign differen't probabilitie, 
to (3a) and (3a') might require reference to different kinds of facts 
in the two cases. For example, in the case of (3a) one might consider 
the motivation and psychological effects caused by being considered 
unlikely winners of the competition - facts which would not enter into 
the assignment of probability to (3~'). Following Morton and Mondadori 
one may speak ot modal properties.24 They suggest that a predicate such 
as • ••• might win the F.A~ cup in 19~4' expresses a modal property and 
that the same property may be possessed by the teams in question in 
virtue of different facts about the world. When one describes the 
-.. 
., 
causal grounds of, for example, Derby County possibly winning the F.A. 
- 128 -
cup, one should not say 'that in virtue of which the F.A. cup might 
be wont but 'that by virtue of which Derby County might win the F.A. cup.' 
In the case of epistemic possibilities it is sometimes possible 
to give substantive reasons for believing or disbelieving a modal 
statement. 'Substantive' indicates that our theories about the world may 
be involved. This seems to me just the sort of connection between 
the SUbject-matter of modal statements and our 'theories' that can 
partially explain why our modal intuitions may be stronger or weaker. 
It is also just the sort of connection that not only modal realism, but 
possible world semantics in general, seems to leave aside. Note, 
however, that I do not claim that for every modal statement it is 
• always possible to make some appeal which gives epistemic justification. 
(See the discussion below of Dummett's example). 
In the above example it is not difficult to find facts about the 
world which lend support (or lead one to doubt) the claim that Derby 
County might win the F.A. cup. What should one say though about those 
cases where the apparent subject of the modal statement does not exist ? 
It is time to reconsider the case of the possible automobile. What are 
we to say of the claim that at time t there could have been more than 
n + f(m) cars ~ If actualism is true then this cannot be construed as 
a claim about a particular car or, indeed, about any car. This does not 
entail however that the claim is not about the actual world. The claim 
may be construed as a claim about the causal history of the world up to 
the time 1. One could represent, 'It was possible that there could have 




Here the 'event' is an (indefinite) part of the history of the world. 
One is saying of the history of the world up to the time t that it 
could have been such as to produce a different outcome at the time t. 
More cars might have been produced, for example, if a factory had gone 
on overtime before t. Similarly, to say that there might have been 
another coffee cup on a particular table, can be taken to be the claim 
that the causal history of the world could have been such to have 
produced this outcome. It is true, I think, that this talk of the 
'causal history of the world' makes it clear how epistemically complex 
mOdal idioms are; but the other approaches to modality not only do not 
fare better, they seem to give more intractable problems, for example, 
the problem of identifying an object from one possible world to 
~- . 
another •. Certainly no epistemic advantages are likely to be forthcoming 
.... 
from the view that modal statements are ~ about the actual ! I shall 
say more about the contrast between redescriptivism and other approaches 
--
to modality below, but first I will say something about counterfactuals. 
(c) Counterfactuals 
Consider counterfactuals of the form 'if ~ had occured then f would 
have occured' where 'e' and 'f' are descriptions of events. Using the 
Mp construction, consider, 
(4) It was possible that if Ian Botham had played for Middlesex then 
Middlesex would have won the County Championship in 1983. 
One could represent this thus: 
s 
There are two points worth noting about this example. First, it seems 
to ma a good example of a substitution in'the M construction which is 
.., 
naturally seen as epistemic, Not only can 'probable', 'likely' etc. 
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replace 'possible' in (4), this seems to be the natural interpretation 
of such a counterfactual. The truth of (4) requires that if Ian Botham 
had played then it would have been more likely that Middlesex would 
have won the county championship. Neither the county championship 
mat'~~s. (now), nor Ian Botham's possibly having played in those matches 
are actual. The former was actual, the latter was not. Nevertheless, at 
the time of the event, there could have been actual facts which would 
.0-
later justify the assertion of (4). Such a fact might have been Ian 
Botham's superior cricketing skills~ative to his replacement. 
I said above that it may be the case that for some statements there 
4r« not any facts at the time of utterance which would justify asserting 
,- . 
it. It is worth reconsidering here Dumm.et t' s example discussed in 
chapter 2, namely, 
(5) A city will never be built on this spot. 
This statement is analogous··to some counterfactuals in that at the time 
of utterance there may be no actual facts which would justify one 
either in asserting or denying its truth. This can lead one, if one 
I 
accepts the realist conviction that there must E! so~ething'in virtue 
of which a sentence is true, to the conclusion that such statements 
cannot be true or false. I believe that this conclusion is unnecessary 
and unhelpful. (That it is unhelpful will be one of the burdens of the 
next chapter to show). It seems to me that what one ought to say about 
(5) is that it is true or false in virtue of a fact about the world, 
albeit one that can only be described by employing modal idioms. Thus, 
(5) is false if there will be a city built on that spot or true if a 
city will not be built on that spot. To repeat: (5) is 
either true or false according to whether.(5) or its negation describes 
the actual world. Let me put this by saying that either (5) or its 
.. , 
- 131 -
negation describes a modal fact about the world. Now one can imagine a 
realist objection to this along the lines that there is something 
objectionable about modal facts since, on the view just stated, one may 
describe a modal fact without there being anything which exists that 
makes it a fact. But this misses the point: if it is true that a city 
will never be built on that spot then it is true in virtue of a state of 
affairs that will always exist in the world. Conversely, suppose that 
(5) is false, then the city is not actual (now) but-it is something 
which will be actual. So, one can either say that the negation of (5) 
is true now in virtue of describing a modal fact about the world, or 
that it is true in virtue of describing an entity which will be actual'. 
Two pOints about this discussion seem to me worth emphasizing. (i) That 
the fact that in the case ot (5) there may be no facts which justify 
asserting it or 'its negation only signals an epistemic and not an 
ontological distinction. (ii) The discussion of (5) makes it clear that 
redescriptivism does not eliminate the need for modal idioms. I will now 
consider the objection that this view is objectionably circular. 
(3) Is Redescriptivism Objectionably Circular? 
Ought one to be able to provide an analysis of modal idioms in non-
modal terms ? Morton and Mondadori, ,whose analysis of modality is very 
similar to that endorsed here, claim, rightly I believe, that this demand 
is unreasonable. If one adopts this analysis one finds that one can't 
describe in non-modal terms the properties which account for different 
objects satisfying the same modal predicate. On the other hand, a more 
orthodox modal realist account cannot give any clear sense to the 
technical terms of the theory, e.g. 'possible world', 'accessible from', 
except by explaining them in terms of possibility and necessity. Morton 
and Mondadori analyse the source of the demand for a non-modal 
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paraphrase of modal statements as fOllows,25 
"The feeling that paraphrase is necessary may come from a subtle 
confusion. It is natural to suppose that real facts about the world 
are given by the physical data about the location, motions, and so 
on of the objects in it. These can be described in non-modal termsj 
one might therefore suppose that anything that cannot be so 
described is somehow ungrounded in the facts. But we have seen the 
mistake in this. Each particular modal prediction - for example, 
each '~ might ~, - is indeed grounded in non-modal fact, but the 
grounding is tied to a particular a and ~. We may not be able to 
find a specification general enough to apply when a is different, 
let alone when p is different. To say in one breath what properties 
make an operator like 'might' apply one would have to do both." 
As noted above, possible world semantics do ~ provide a non-modal 
paraphrase of modal idioms; only the views discussed in part I, section 1, 
can lay any claim to doing that, but for the reasons discussed such 
views are not satisfactory. 
(4) Redescriptivism and Truth-Conditions 
When discussing dispositional statements I did not make explicit 
appeal to subjunctive conditionals although I might well have done so. 
To say that some sugar lump which is never destined for water'that it is 
soluble, is to say that if it !!!! to be placed in water it would 
dissolve. I hope that I may have said enough to snow that the fact the 
truth-conditions cannot be reduced does not entail that either that such 
statements are not independently true or false, nor that one needs to 
posit peculiar modal objects. If my discussion of modal facts is 
convincing, then one may employ modal idioms with a clear conscience. 
Not only do I believe that the position I call redescriptivism is 
consistent with a relativist approach to truth and ontology, I am now 
in a position to employ redescriptivism to further explicate the 
relativist conception of truth-conditions defined in chapter 2. 
Consider the claim, 
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(6) Mountains existed before human language was created. 
I think that good sense can be made of this claim but not in the way 
absolutists nor, for that matter, commonsense might be said to justify. 
Let me explain my way first. Consider the sentence, 
(7) Mountains exist. 
Since sentences are a human creation (7) is not timelessly true. How, 
then, can one make sense of (6) ? My answer is that we can understand 
(6) by understanding an appropriate set of subjunctive conditionals. 
Call the time epoch during which mountains existed, and human language 
did not, T. (6), I believe, makes good sense if one understands it as 
the claim that, 
(7!) 'Mountains exist' would have been a true sentence during T if 
there had- been an English-speaking language community which uttered or 
could have uttered it. The counterfactual reference to the language 
community is necessary since an accidental inscription resembling (7) 
would not have been a sentence. 
Why go to such lengths to ,explain our understanding of such a 
simple English sentence ? My reason for taking this approach is that only 
by doing so can we give a coherent account of truth and ontology. 
Undoubtedly absolutists (and probably many ~peakers of English) interpret 
claims about the independent existence of things in a stronger manner. 
That is, absolutists and commonsense would have one believe that there is 
something ~ to metaphysical independence claims than the truth o~ 
subjunctive conditionals. I think however that the supposition that 
there is something more creates insuperable philosophical problems 
which are quite~nnecessary. Given, as I hope to have shown, that modal 
statements may be true or false independently of our knowing which, 
I think that this allows a relativistic approach to truth and ontology 
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If one does not know the colour of the table one cannot specify exactly 
what visual experiences one would have etc. Suppose, however, that 
sQmeone correctly points out that according to one part of the language 
community one ought to be able to have such-and-such an experience, but 
that according to another part of the language community, that experience 
is not required~ Is there really a table? That, I should say, is the 
wrong question. If the situation is as described it shows nothing wrong 
with my interpretation of 'independent existence' but only points to 
the open~texture of the predicate ' ••• is a table.' 
I should Cl~size that there is no reductionist phenomenalism in·· 
prospect here - I see no reason for saying that the experiences of 
which I speak are experiences of sense-data. I believe that they would 
be what they purport to be - experiences of the table. The point at 
issue is not phenomenalism but pragmatism; not whether every justified 
claim about the independent existence of things can be translated into 
phenomenal terms, but whether we can understand independent existence 
claims in some sense that is not relative to human cognition. 
I have not provided a full analysis of any modal idioms but I hope 
to have indicated the lines along which analysis should proceed, and that 
this approach is consistent both with the claim that modal statements 
may be true or false without our knowing which, and with the claim that 
only actual objects exist. To end on a placatory note let me say that 
I do not necessarily believe that possible world semantics have served 
no useful service. I am, though, inclined to think that they have done 
us a disservice, not even primarily because they have bloated our 
ontology, but because they have directed attention and analysis of modal 
. , 
statements away from where it belongs - in the real world. 
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which avoids idealism. 
I can explain my views further by discussing a different example. 
Consider the claim, 
(8) A table exists in that room. 
Only idealists or verificationists will want to deny that if (8) is 
true then it is true although no one may be in a position to verity it, 
and that the table is an enduring spatio-temporal object whose continued 
existence does not depend upon human presence. Now this last claim. 
cannot be verified although there seems no good reason to doubt it. 
In the light of these beliefs we say that the 'table exists independently 
of us.' I believe that it does but all I mean by saying that is that 
some set -of subjunctive conditionals is true. These conditionals are 
difficult to specify without describing a particular situation in detail. 
Still, the drift is clear enough. To say that the table exists in that 
room is to hold true some set of conditionals as: l..G 
(9) If I were in that room under such-and-such conditions, I would be 
able to have such-and-such experiences, for example, 
/ 
\ 
- visual: from certain positions, under such-and-such lighting 
conditions I would be able to see such-and-such colours, shapes etc. 
- tactile: I would be able to experience resistence when applying 
pressure to particular areas of the room. 
- acoustic: I would hear certain sounds if I were to hit out in 
particular directions. 
N.ow it seems fairly clear that this list cannot be completed - there 
are an indefinite number of experiences which could be imagined as 
cons~quences of my interaction with the table. There are also difficulties 
about allowing that a broken table may still be a table, e.g. how many 
pieces maya 'table' be broken into and still be said to be a table? 
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Chapter 5 
Realism, Anti-Realism & Truth-Conditions 
I shall argue that once one understands truth-conditions properly, 
one realizes that truth-conditional theories of meaning have fewer 
philosophical consequences than either their critics or their champions 
commonly suppose. Part I will be concerned to show that realism does oW 
not have the difficulties that Dummett, in a number of places, has 
alleged that it does. l Section 1 states Dummett's distinction between 
realist and anti-realist theories and identifies what I take to be the 
central misconception underlying Dummettts arguments for anti-realism • 
.,. 
Section 2. applies this diagnosis to Dummett's conclusions with respect 
to the reality of the past. Finally, section 3 delivers the coup ~ 
grace by showing that so far from being, as Dummett suposes, necessary 
for language-learning, anti~realism requires assumptions that would 
show it to be impossible. Part II turns to the task of showing that 
neither Tarski's theory of truth, nor Davidson's truth-conditional 
I , 
semantics which employs Tarski's theory, vindicate an absolute metaphysics 
The central point is that acceptance of verification transcendence 
does not require, nor vindicate, an absolute conception ot truth-
conditions. 
Part I: Dummett's Anti-Realism 
(1) The Argument 
,My first task in this section is to outline Dummett's presentation 
of the realist/anti-realist debate. Dummett does not suppose that 
everyone will want to be realist with respect to ever~ kind of statement, 
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or anti-realist with respect to every class of statement. Someone might 
want to be anti-realist about mathematical statements, say, but realist 
with respect to statements about the past. But what makes someone a 
realist or anti-realist with respect to some kind of statement ? A key 
passage in Dummett's (1963) reads as fOllows,2 
"The realist and the anti-realist may agree that it is an objective 
matter, whether, in the case of any given statement of the class, 
the criteria we use for judging such a statement to be true are 
satisfied: the difference between them lies in the fact that, for 
the anti-realist, the truth of the statement can only consist in 
the satisfaction of these criteria, whereas for the realist, the 
statement can be true even though we have no means of recognizing 
it as true." 
The burden of my argument will be that that passage lumps together 
positions which ought to be distinguished and, moreover, that what 
r ' 
cements the positions together is a mistaken view of modality. First, I 
need to unpack some of the connections made in the above passage. 
Anti-realism with respect to a given kind of statement really 
consists for Dummett in two things: (i) that the truth of a statement 
can only consist in the satisfaction of the criteria we use in judging 
it true; (ii) that the satisfaction of criteria is to be identified with 
knowing that the criteria are satisfied. From Dummett's point of view 
(i) and (ii) are not. independent, but from my point of view they are 
independent. The difference between Dummett and myself really resides 
in a difference about modality, as I hope to show. 
Dummett says that the realist and the anti-realist both agree that 
it is an objective matter whether or not the criteria we use for 
judging a statement to be true!£! satisfied. My difference f~. Dummett's 
anti-realism is that I would say that the truth of a statement consists 
in whether or not the criteria we use in ~udging a statement to be 
., 
true!!! satisified, !!!! be satisfied, or would h!!! ~ satisfied. 
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My position allows that a statement may be true or false although we 
have no way of knowing which it is but this does ~ make me a 
straightforward realist in Dummett's terms. To show this, and to clarify 
"that already said, I turn to an example Dummett discusses. 
In his (1959) Dummett envisaged a dispute over the statement, 
'Either Jones was brave or Jones was not brave', where Jones is imagined 
to be dead and never to have encountered danger during his life. (Call 
the disjunction about Jones 'PI). Now the fully-fledged realist as 
Dummett presents him wants to maintain both that P is true and that for 
any statement there must ~ something in virtue of which it is true. "," 
As Dummett presents matters this fully-fledged realist is commifed to 
" . 
the unattractive view that the truth or falsity of one of the disjuncts 
of P must have consisted in the presence or abscence of some inner 
quality or mechanism of Jones that never became manifest during Jones' 
life. Are there, then, any reasonable grounds for saying that P is true 
without adopting Dummett's fully-fledged realism? Well, coul~ we not 
say that 'Jones was brave' is true if Jones would have acted bravely 
if he had encouiered danger ? Dummett has claimed that we cannot s~ 
that because the truth of a counterfactual must depend upon the truth 
of a categorical. He writes,3 " ••• a counterfactual could not be simply 
true: if it is true, it must be true in virtue of the truth of some 
categorical statement." The problem for a statement such as P, on 
Dummett's view, is that there is no plausible candidate for an 
appropriate categorical statement. Unfortunately, and surprisingly 
perhaps, Dummett has never, to my knowledge, provided an analysis of 
modality to support his claim although he speaks of it as being 
'intuitively plausible.' It is hard to ex~ggerate the importance of this 
", difference of opinion concerning modality - directly or indirectly all 
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of DUmmett's presentations of realism and anti-realism seem to depend 
upon his modal principle. It occurs indirectly, for example, when 
Dummett says that we all accept that for a statement to be true there 
must be something in virtue of which it is true. On Dummett's view 
that means that there must be something which can be described in non-
modal terms and I do not accept that view. According to the view for 
which I argued in chapter 4, Dummett's principle is false - it is not 
the case that every true modal statement can be 'reduced' to, or expreese. 
by, some true non-modal statement. Ironically, then, I believe that 
Dummett's inclination toward anti-realism stems from a misguided and 
overly strong realist principle. I believe that one obtains an 
attractive realism by rejecting the view of modality Dummett accepts • 
• 
S2) Anti-Realism: The Reality of the Past 
In his (1969) Dummett ,says ,4 
"Statements about the past form a class the application to which 
of an argument of the anti-realist type seems to be called for. 
That it has not often been so applied is doubtless due to certain 
obvious difficulties from applying it: namely, that an anti-realist 
interpretation of past-~ense statem~ts appears incompatible with 
acknowledging the existence of a systematic link between the 
truth-values of differently tensed statements uttered at different 
times. This difficulty is central to the whole issue. The realist 
has, after all, to meet the anti-realist's challenge to explain 
how we come by a notion of truth, as applied to statements about 
the past, considered as applying to such statements independently of 
our means of recognizing these statements as true. His answer is 
that this conception is attained precisely via. our coming to grasp 
the existence of the truth-value link. If I now (2.45 pm. 12 
February 1969) say, 'I am in my College room', I make a present-
tense statement which is, as I say it, true: let us call this 
statement A. Suppose now that exactly one year later someone makes 
the statement (call it B) 'A year ago Dummett was in his College 
room'. Then it is a consequence of the truth-value link that, as 
~emplified in such a case, we derive a grasp of what it is for 
a statement in the past tense, whenever made, for example one made 
now, to be true." 
Dummett believes that the anti-realist cannot afford to give up the 
., 
truth-value link, but must. show that his view is consistent with it. 
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Dummett SayS,5 
" ••• the anti-realist will be unable to avoid inconsistency in 
recognizing the existence of the truth-value link if he formulates 
his contention as being that a past-tense statement, made at any 
given time, is true at that time only if there is at that time a 
situation justifying that statement." 
He describes what the anti-realist ought to say as fOllows,6 
" ••• he must state his general thesis by saying that a statement in 
the past-tense is (or was, or will be) true just in case there are 
no~ islor will subsequently be a situation whose existence we can 
now acknowledge as justifying the ascription to that statement of.~ 
the value true. Thus a statement in the past tense, made a year 
hence, will be true just in case either there now is a situation 
which we can recognise as obtaining and which we now regard as 
justifying the statement that the past tense statement will be true 
when uttered a year hence; or else there will be, at some future 
time, a situation which we can then recognise as obtaining, and 
whose occurence at that future time we now regard as entailing the 
correctness of th£ statement that the past tense statement will be 
true when uttere~ a year hence ••• The thesis thus relates the truth 
or falsity of past-tense statements, whenever made, not to the 
evidence available for them at the time of utterence, but to the 
evidence that is now, or may latter become, available for ascribing 
to those statements the property of being true when they are 
uttered." 
(My emphasis). Given this response to the claim that the anti-realist 
violates the truth-value link I cannot see that the anti-realist has 
any good reason for regarding the past and future as asymmetric. 
I 
Consider that part of the quo~ation which 1s emphasized. In 'this case the 
-anti-realist accepts that a statement may be true now even though we do 
not (now) have epistemological access to the situation which wi~ make 
it true. The statement is said to be true (now) if there!!!! be a 
situation which we could sometime recognize. as justifying it. But if 
the anti-realist is prepared to accept that, why should he not accept 
that a past tensed sentence is true now if there ~ a situation which 
would have justified someone in asserting it, and to which we do not 
have access ? It cannot be because he claims that any sentence can only 
be true if we have evidence for it at the ~ime of utterance since this 
.,. 
does not obtain in the case of the future tensed sentence. It is true 
' .. 
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that for future tensed sentences we can perhaps wait and see whether 
or not a particular sentence will turn out to be true or false but I 
don't believe that this provides a good reson for believing that !h! 
meaning of statements about the past are asymmetric to statements about 
the future. As far as I can see the anti-realist either ought to give 
up the truth-value link altogether (which, Dummett says, is a7 It •• 
fundamental feature of our understanding of tensed statements •• It ), or 
admit that his position is ill-motivated. 
(3) The Acquisition Argument 
A major problem for realism, as Dummett sees it, is how it can8 
" •• -.account for our acquisition of that grasp of conditions for a 
transcendent tr~th-value which [the realist] ascribes to us, and to 
make plausible that ascription." Why should the realist have any 
difficulty in providing suc~ an account? Dummett writes,9 
.~ 
"The general form of the argument employed by the anti-realist is 
a very strong one. He maintains that the process by which we come 
to grasp the sense of statements of the disputed class, and the use 
which is subsequently made of these statements, are such that we 
could not derive from it any notion bf what it would be for such 
a statement to be true independently of the sort of thing we have 
learned to recognize as establishing the truth of such statements. 
What we learn to do is to accept the truth of certain statements ••• 
which we have been trained to recognize, as conclusively justifying 
the assertion of a given statement of the disputed class, and the 
truth of certain other statements, or the occurence of certain 
other conditions, as conclusively justifying its denial. In the 
very nature of the case, we could not possibly have come to 
understand what it could ~ Jor the statement to be true independently 
of that which we have learned to treat as establishing its truth: 
there simply was no means by which we could be shown this." 
One way of describing what appears to be Dummett's argument has been 
expressed as fOllows,lO 
"An :anti-realist insists that linguistic competence cannot involve a 
conception of circumstances other than those which a language learner 
.., 
had available to his consciousness in learning -the language." 
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And 11 , 
"All that can be imparted, by the training which results in competence 
with a language, is an ability to suit one's linguistic behaviour to 
circumstances which impinge on one's consciousness." 
These statements are somewhat obscure but perhaps they can be expressed 
as follows: the meaning of a statement cannot be given by circumstances 
which we cannot perceive to obtain. 'Perceive' occurs in this statement 
of the view as one way of representing what may be meant by .... 
'circumstances av.tlable to consciousness'. I believe that a number of 
problems are raised by the question of what we can or cannot be said 
to perceive but I do not intend to discuss them. I will, rather, 
concentrate on the problem of how we should understand 'circumstances'. 
I believe. that concentrating on this problem will prove sufficient to 
undermine Dummett's anti-realism. 
I can now explain the strategy of my argument. The main burden of 
the argument will be to establish that linguistic competence ~ 
involve a conception of circumstances not presently available to 
consciousness. (Call this co~clusion C). IIf established thi,s shows that 
Dummett can afford neither to accept .Q. nor to reject Q.. He cannot 
afford to accept it because it shows that there is nothing amiss with 
realism. On'the other hand, Dummett cannot afford to reject C since its 
rejection would make the task of explaining language acquisiton 
impossible. 
In order to present the argument for C I want to discuss a 
traditional picture ot how we are supposed to learn the meaning of a 
present tensed observation sentence. (My argument does not depend upon 
taking this picture to be correct). Suppose that the sentence is, 'It 
is raining'. The learner is exposed to rain events on occasions Tl T 
. , 2' 
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••• Tn , and eventually, by interrogating his teacher, learns the meaning 
of the sentence. But how can anyone acquire this capacity if the anti-
realist view is correct, since all that has ever been present to the 




who had learnt the meaning of 'It is raining' would know that that 
sentence could be truly asserted when it is raining at the time Tn 
+ 1 
which is a circumstance that has not previously been available to his 
consciousness. One can interpret the phrase 'circumstances which impinge 
on one's consciousness' either in a strong or in a weak manner. On the 
strong interpretation, every experience one has is unique, e.g. the 
experience of a rain event at time Tl • In referring to the strong 
interpretation I will speak of the experience of event tokens. On the 
weak interpretation of the phrase 'circumstances which impinge on one's 
consciousness' one may experience the same circumstances on different 
occasions, e.g. one may experience rain events at the times Tl , T2 , ••• Tn • 
In referring to the weak interpretation I will speak of the experience 
of event types. I believe that a dilemma now faces the anti-realist: 
either he is taking 'circumstances' to be event tokens or he is taking 
, 
, 
them to be event types. If he takes the former view then there is a 
problem not just about explaining linguistic competence with past tensed 
sentences, but linguistic competence with present tensed sentences. 
That interpretation gives rise to too many problems about explain\n\ 
linguistic competence - it leads to a momentary solipism; since all 
anyone can ever experience are circumstances at a given time one can 
never experience the same thing twice. It seems clear that this view 
makes the task of explaining linguistic competence impossible. On the 
other hand, if the anti-realist takes 'circumstances' to be event types, 
there seems to be no more difficulty about explaining linguistic 
competence with respect to past tensed sentences than there is in 
' .. 
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explaining it with respect to present tensed sen~ences. Someone who 
has learnt the meaning of a present tensed sentence such as 'It is 
raining' ~ obtained a conception of circumstances not available to 
consciousness, viz. they have learnt what would make that sentence true. 
Now, however, one must ask what is supposed to be the difficulty in 
learning the meaning of the sentence 'It was raining'. It is said that 
no one has ever observed the circumstance that it ~ raining. Since 
any explanation of linguistic competence must acknowledge the fact that 
we have the ability to recognize event types, and not just event tokens, 
one must ask what this supposed to show. To have the ability to 
recognize event types is to have the ability to recognize circumstances 
which ~e not now (bu~ may have been or become) available to 
consciousness. If we have that ability why should we not be able to 
know what circumstances would have obtained if a a past tensed sentence 
were true, even though the circumstances are not now, and even never 
have been, available to consciousness ? 
I can summarize as follows: either the anti-realist takes 
circumstances to be event tokens or he takes them to be event types. 
Only if the anti-realist takes the former course can anti-realism be 
justified; but the argument for conclusion ~ shows that this would make 
languaged~uis1t1on impossible. Note that I am not offering an 
explanation of linguistic competence (a task which ought, in part at 
least,to be a task for psychology). The point is that any theory of 
language learning must make room for the fact that we can recognize 
event types. Once one has done that however one has allowed room for 
conceptions of circumstances not available to consciousness. There seems 
to be a lesson in the philosophy of language that has constantly to be 
., 
relearnt: there is always more to learning the meaning of any sentence 
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than meets the eye. The conclusion, devastating to the anti-realist's 
case, is that far from it being the case that 'liguistic competence 
cannot involve a conception of circumstances not available to 
consciousness', that conception is essential to linguistic competence. 
Part II: Realism and Truth-Conditions 
The central point I wish to establish in this section is that a 
Davidson style truth-conditional theory does not require, nor vindicate, 
an absolute conception of truth-conditions. I shall argue that Davidson's 
truth-conditional semantics is neutral between the relative conception 
of truth-conditions which I favour, and the absolute conception of 
truth-conditions favoured by some Davidsonians (e.g. Platts) rather than 
by Davidson himself. 
I wish to begin by discussing Popper's claim that Tarski's theory 
of truth vindicates a correspondence theory of truth. I believe that 
Popper's claims about Tarski's theory are inaccurate. Davidson's 
employment of Tarsk!' s theory in. attempting to develop a; truth-conditional 
semantics for natural language has also been mistakenly supposed to 
vindicate absolutism. Having explored those points, I conclude by 
discussing Davidson's own views which seem to me to differ significantly 
from those of some of his followers. 
In his (1960) Popper writes,12 "Tarski's theory ••• rehabilitated 
the correspondence theory of absolute or objective truth." And,13 
"Thanks to Tarski's work, the idea of objective or absolute truth -
that is, truth as correspondence to the facts - appears to be accepted 
today with confidence by all who understand it." It is notable, however, 
i-. 
..,. 
that Tarski did not regard his theory as a vindication of a correspondence 
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theory of truth. Tarski responded to the claim that his theory commited 
one to an 'uncritical realism' because a sentence like 'Snow is white' 
is taken to be true if snow is in fact white by saying he would drop 
the words 'in fact'. Tarski also said,14 
U ••• we may accept the semantic conception of truth without giving 
up any epistemological attitude we may have had; we may remain 
naive realists, critical realists or idealists, empiricists or 
metaphysicians - whatever we were before. The semantic conception 
is completely neutral toward all these issues." 
Whatever else Popper means by an 'absolute' or 'correspondence' theory 
of truth he certainly intends it to be inconsistent with, say, idealism. 
I don't wish to suggest that Tarski's own assessment of his theory must 
be correct because it is his theory; but there are, I think, good 
reasons for thinking that Tarski's vlew is a good deal more accurate than 
Popper's. 
The first question to ask is why Popper believes that Tarski's 
theory represents an 'absolute' or 'correspondence' theory of truth. 
Popper's reasons seem to be more concerned with Tarski's proposed 
material adequacy condition for theories of truth rather than with the 
\ 
definition of truth proper. Popper gives the following formulations of 
under what conditions an assertion corresponds to the facts,15 
"(1) The statement, or the assertion, 'Snow is white' corresponds 
to the facts if, and only if, snow is, indeed, white. 
(2) The statement, or the assertlon,'Grass is red' corresponds to 
the facts if, and only lf, grass is, indeed, red." 
Popper then went on to say, 16 
And, 
"The decisive polnt is Tarski's discovery that, in order to speak 
of correspondence to the facts, as do (1) and (2), we must use a 
metalanguage in whi·ch we can speak about two things: statements; 
and the facts to which they refer." 





However, the (T) schema is only intended to provide a means of 
discriminating adequate from inadequate definitions of truth, a definiti~ 
being adequate if all instances of the (T) schema follow from it. It 
was not Tarski's intention that the material adequacy condition permit 
only his definition, and it is clear that rival definitions are also 
compatible with the material adequacy condition. Indeed, even bizarre 
theories of truth may be compatible with the (T) schema. Haack poin.ts 
out in her (1976a) that if one defines '''p'' is true' as '''p'' is asserted 
by the Pope !! cathedra',l7 
" ••• a serious proponent of this definition would •• accept all 
instances of (T) such as: 
'Snow is white' is asserted by the Pope ex cathedra iff snow is white 
For if he takes his own definition seriously, he will accept/reject 
the left-hand sipe just in case he also accepts/rejects the right-
hand side. 1I 
Tarski's employment of the material adequacy condition would therefore 
seem to be an inadequate reason for taking Tarski's theory to be a 
'correspondence' or 'absolute' theory of truth. 
Since I do ~ot believe that the kind of theory of truth Popper 
desires can be justified by Tarski's theorY it is necessary to speculate 
about what it is Popper desires. Popper speaks of the theory of truth 
he favours as being 'objective', 'absolute' and a 'correspondence' theory. 
Now a part of what Popper means by 'objective' is indicated by the 
statement that,18 
"The theory of objective truth ••• allows us to make assertions such 
as the following: a theory may be true even though nobody believes 
it, and even though we have no reason to think that it is true; 
and another theory may be false even though we have comparatively 
good reasons for accepting it." 
As convenient shorthand, I will call the view that sentences may be true 
or false independently of our beliefs as to which truth-value they have, 
verification transcendence. Verification,i~anscendence is one of the 
elements Popper desires his· theory of truth to have. The other element 
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Popper desires can, I think, be described as a theory independent 
notion of facts. Now I hope to show both that one can, and that it is 
desirable to, accept verification transcendence without accepting a 
theory independent notion of facts. Before I attempt to show that it is 
worth indicating the similarity between Popper's ambitions and those of 
other realists. Consider first this statement by MCGinn,19 
"Realism is the thesis that truth (falsity) is an epistemically 
unconstrained property of a sentence; there is nothing in the 
concept of truth (falsity) to exclude the possibility that a sentence 
be unknowably true (false). This property of truth reflects the 
realist conviction, embodied in our cust~mary linguistic practices, 
that the world, or a given sector of it, is determinately 
comstituted, quite independently of any limitations on our capacity 
to come to know truths concerning it." 
Then consider this statement by Platts,20 
• 
"Perhaps ••• we can improve our capacities to understand ••• the 
world, to know that our characterizations of it are true. If we 
succeed in'so doing, we do not bring that world into being, we 
merely discover what was there all along. But that reality will 
always exceed our capacities: we can struggle to achieve aporoxi-
matelytrne. beliefs about that reality, approximately true beliefs 
about the entities and their characteristics which, independently of 
us, make up that reality. But we have to rest with the approximate 
belief, and resign ourselves to (non-complacent) ignoran~e: for 
the world, austerely characterized by our language, will always 
outrun our recognitional capacities." 
Clearly both Platts and McGinn are commited to verification transcendence; 
less clearly, but I believe implicitly, Platts and McGinn also accept 
the idea of theory independent facts. Both McGinn's talk of the world 
being 'determinately consituted' and Platts' emphasis on discovery 
. 21 
suggest that this is the case. In any event, I certainly believe that 
my way of understanding truth-conditions gives a very different emphasis 
from theirs. 
My dissent from· Popper, Platts and McGinn does not concern the 
notion of verification transcendence, which I accept, but the question of 
whether there are theory independent fac.ts. Moreover, although the 
view I favour is a relational theory of truth it is not a correspondence 
'j. 
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theory of truth. 
What the correspOA4cnce theorist wants to defend is a picture like 
this: 
truth- correspondence 
bearers ~.--------------- 1 re ation -----------------------.~facts 
What is important about this picture is that there are e.ssentially three 
independent elements and that the correspon~ence theorist believes that 
'facts' are individuated independently of our theories. That the facts 
are individuated independently of our theories is what the correspondence 
theorist believes accounts for the recalcitrance we face in attempting 
to describe the world truly. 
~. The above picture may appear innocuous because inevitable - it might 
appear that any?ne who supports a relational theory of truth must adopt 
something like the above view. Hy suggestion is that one can adopt 
something like the following picture however: 
truth-
bearers 
~ satisfaction ----------------------------~ relation 
That is, true sentences will be'sentences whose truth-conditions are 
satisfied. Now it may be said that this picture only differs in the labels 
used; a different label for the relation (lsatisfaction' rather than 
'correspondence') and an implied different label for one of the other 
terms C'satisfiers' rather than 'factsl). But the big difference between 
these pictures is that the latter picture does not require the idea that 
the 'satisfiers' are individuated independently of the individuation of 
the truth-conditions of sentences. The phrase emphasized is crucial and 
perhaps I can unpack it this way: one can think of truth-conditions as 
either the truth-conditions of truth-bearers, or one can think of truth-
conditions as something like 'states of ~~ world'. Now the latter 
notion has, I think, a trivial and 
' .. 
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innocuous interpretation, but it also has a non-trivial and pernicious 
interpretation. The latter notion is involved when one thinks: there 
are facts ('states of the world') and there are the descriptions of 
possible states of the world provided by truth-bearers - 'truth' is 
discovered when one is matched with the other. The innocuous 
interpretation is involved when one thinks that a true statement is a 
statement whose truth-conditions are satisfied, for this way of putting 
the matter does not require that the 'states of the world' are 
individuated independently of our conceptual scheme. One other way of 
expressing the difference between these views is that the correspondence 
theorist is inclined to think of 'facts' as though they had ontological 
import. Popper writes~22 
" ••• a false statement P is false not because it corresponds to 
some odd entity like a-non-fact, bUt simply because it does E2! 
correspond to any fact: it does not stand in the peculiar relation 
of correspondence to a fact to anything real, though it stands in 
a relation like 'describes' to the spurious state of affairs that 
f· " 
On my view however, a ~ statement does not stand in some relation 
to a dubious entity like a !!£1. Popper also wrote,23 
"I am a realist in holding that the question whether our man-made 
theories are true or false depends upon real facts; real facts 
which are, with very few exceptions, emphatically not man-made." 
Like Popper I believe that truth is not man-made in the sense that one 
can't ~ many statements true, but there is a sense in which I 
believe that truth is man-made in a way that Popper does not; on my 
view the truth-conditions of all statements are individuated by us 
(although this does not make them true), but Popper believes that true 
statements are those which describe 'facts' which are, so to speak, 
individuated by the 'way the world is.' 
". 
If one believes in verification tra~scendence, what makes the 
correspondence picture appear inevitable is that it looks as though 
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what makes statements true or false must be individuated independently 
of our ,conceptual scheme. But I believe that is not the case: when 
communities define the truth-conditions of sentences they don't create 
truth but only the necessary conditions for truth - to define the 
truth-conditions for a sentence is not to say whether it is true, for tk~ 
conditions mayor may not obtain (be satisfied); it is to say what 
would have to be the case for the sentence to be true. Insofar as we 
define what would have to be the case for the statement to be true then 
one can account for the epistemic independence of truth !!Q.1 by 
postulating an independently given set of 'facts' which we have to 
match, but by saying that the conditions (the -facts' in scare quotes) 
are individuated by us (we h!!! defined what would have to be the case 
for the sentence to be true) but that, of course, does not guarantee 
that those conditions do obtain. 
Where do Davidson's views stand in relation to the above? The 
first important point is that Davidson is well aware that his<theory 
does not explain the notion of ,'facts' - indeed Davidson refers to the 
" ••• failure of correspondence theories based on the notion of fact •• ,,24 
(My emphasis). Davidson also says, surely correctly, that a theory of 
the kind he favours does not tI •• really illuminate the relation of 
satisfaction. When the theory comes to characterize satisfaction for the 
predicate 'x flies', for example, it merely tells us that an entity 
satisfies 'x flies' if and only if that entity flies. If we ask for a 
25 
further explanation or analysis of the relation, we will be disappointed." 
That point is crucial since Platts writes as though a Davidson style 
truth-conditional theory does illuminate that relationship; Platts 
implies that the theory has vificated the'idea of 'merely discovering 
,., 
what was there all along.' I think that a truth-conditional theory 
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" 
like Davidson's is neutral in the sense that one might want to add 
to it in the hope of explaining the basic relation of satisfaction 
that Davidson (like Tarski) treats purely en_umeratively. It is quite 
wrong, however, to suppose that Davidson's theory as it stands justifies 
the kind of realism that Platts and McGinn favour. There is an irony 
in the fact that Platts seems to believe that he is expressing 
Davidson's own views since Davidson himself, in his (1977), makes it 
c.lear that h.e does not believe that one can say very much to elucidate 
the basic relation of satisfaction beyond giving the kind of theory 
he himself provides. In that belief I believe that Davidson is wrong, 
--for I believe that I have explicated the relation between language and 
the world in a way that does clarify an intuitive notion of satisfaction 
• 
that is consistent with Tarski's technical definition. My way of 
. 
explicating that relationship, however, far from vindicating the 
absolutism Platts and McGinn desire, provides reason for thinking 




Realism and Science 
If absolutism is taken to be the view that, in principle, there 
is ! way of knowing the world which is entirely ~on-anthropocentric, 
a way that ~s ent~rely ~ndependent of our parochial interests, purposes, 
(etc), could not science plausibly be sa~d to be a vindication of that.~ 
view ? I think that that claim is indeed plausible but, when examined 
closely, turns out to be highly problematic. The claim that science is 
a vindication of absolutism gains credibility by adopting a broad 
historical perspective; I think it is true to say that modern science 
.~. It 
has been.~ore successful because less anthropocentric - perhaps the 
best, and simplest, example being the change from a Ptolemaic to a 
Copernican world view. There is, however, a large difference between 
the claim that science has been more successful because less 
anthropocentric and the claim that science can be entirely non-
anthropocentric. Against an absolutist view of science I would urge 
I 
two arguments: (i) an argument from pluralism - there is not ~ way 
of gaining knowledge about the world (the scientific way) but many 
ways of gaining knowledge about the world. I think that it is a mistake 
to view commonsense beliefs about the world, for example, as crude 
proto-scientific beliefs. I present the argument from pluralism in 
part II. (ii) Even ignoring the issue of pluralism, I believe that a 
consideration of the issues surrounding the question of realism in 
science supports a modest realism rather than the stonger version 
required by absolutism. My argument for this conclusion will occupy 
part I. 
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Part I: Realism vs. Instrumentalism 
(1) Two Analogies 
Analogy 1: Imagine a watch and suppose that for some reason we are 
unable to open the back to examine the mechanism. Supposing that we 
knew it to be in working order - we could observe the second hand 
moving around the face - we would have no doubt that there is a mechanism 
inside which caused the watch to work. We might speculate about what 
kind of mechanism was responsible for the observable behaviour of the 
.... 
watch. Suppose that we postulated that the mechanism was clock-work but 
that later we became aware of other possible kinds of mechanisms, e.g. 
that a system based on a quartz crystal could be responsible for the 
movement of the hands. The latter hypothesis might gain support by the 
Observed accuracy of the watch over a long period. The important point 
of this analogy is that whatever kind of mechanism one postulates there 
is a fact of the matter as to which hypothesis is the correct one. One 
'realist' view of science suggests that the watch analogy is appropriate. 
Analogy 2: The second analogy is based upon an impressive visual illusion~ 
The central feature of the set up which creates the illusion is a 
board which has two shapes 'impressed' upon it. One of the shapes is 
convex and the other shape is concave (relative to the rest of the flat 
surface of the board). Both of these shapes are such that , they resemble 
the human face. The visual illusion is that even if one knows that one 
of the shapes is concave it appears, from a wide variety of angles, to 
be conve~. It is only at the most extreme angles that the concave nature 
of one of the shapes becomes apparent. A plausible explanation of this 
"-phenomenon might exploit the fact that w~ are so used to seeing the 
hUman face which is convex that it is very difficult to see that shape 
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as concave. One other feature is relevant before drawing the analogy 
with science. The board with the two shapes is mounted in a shallow box 
and to the observer the box appears to become distorted as it is tilted 
one way or the other. 
The analogy with science can be brought out as follows: imagine 
an observer who has no independent way of knowing that one of the shapes 
is concave. Purely on the basis of that observer's observations it 
.~ 
would be entirely natural for him to postulate a mechanism within the 
r box which caused it to become distD~ed as it was tilted. One can imagine 
two observers arguing about the best kind of mechanism that would 
account for the experience. But of course they would both be wrong -
there is no 'hidden mechanism' and, in that sense, nothing to be right 
or wrong about although they would both be misguided in supposing there 
to be a mechanism at all. Whereas the first analogy was intended to 
suggest a realist view of science, the second analogy is intended to 
suggest an instrumentalist view of science. 
The presentation of two extreme pictures should sound warning bells 
I 
\ 
and that indeed was one of my purposes in presenting both analogies. 
One good question is whether we have any real reason for supposing tha.t 
one of the analogies must be appropriate for the whole of science. 
Might it not be that the watch analogy fits fairly well with some parts 
of science and that the visual illusion analogy fits better with 
other parts of science ? Realism and instrumentalism have generally 
been presented as mutually exclusive views but that may not be reasonable. 
A second good question is whether or not ~ pictures might be 
misleading. One issue is the difference between metaphorical and literal 
• 
truth. The instrumentalist picture suggests that literally speaking 
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there are no unobservable entities, the realist picture suggests that 
literally speaking there are unobservable entities, but could both be 
wrong? For instance, because of our macro experience of waves and 
particles we can't see how both a wave theory of light and a particle 
theory of light could be compatible, and the realist suggestion is 
either one is correct or the other is correct (or some third as yet 
undiscovered theory), but if the talk of 'waves' and 'particles' is 
.~ 
really metaphorical, if the talk is really just based on loose analogy 
with macroscopic experience, both theories may be 'true'. The absolutist 
cannot accept the suggestion that even scientific truth might be 
metaphorical for to say that it is metaphorical might be to admit its 
relativity to our experience. That is, if we cannot rid science of its 
simile and metaphor, we would merely be saying how the world appears 
from our pOint of view, why some aspects of reality seem to us to be 
like others - but the absolutist cannot rest content with this. An 
absolutist would consider it infra dig to suggest that scientific truth 
might, to some degree, be metaphorical; but I for one do not see how to 
draw the literal/metaphorical'distinction, clearly. I can explain that 
\ 
pOint in relation to a watch. Presumably talk of the 'hands' of a watch 
grew from a metaphor about human hands, as did the iaea of the hands 
'pointing' to the figures on the 'face' of the clock. I do not see much 
sense in forcing the question 'do the hands of the clock literally 
point to the figures on the clock-face l' I admit, however, that the 
considerations so far adduced are but dark musings - time to be more 
specific. I shall be more specific by working through the positions 
marked in figure 6 overleaf. I shall work from the left-hand side to 
the right-hand side. 
., 
Semantic motivation for instrumentalism arises from the conjunction 
of two epistemological theses: (i) that terms employed meaningfully in 
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Figure 6 
Some Views of the Status of Theoretical Terms in Science 
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some empirical discourse must have a direct relationship to observable 
experience; (ii) that there is a sharp theoretical/observational 
dichotomy. Since, by definition, theoretical terms do not have a direct 
relationship to observable experience the instumentalist concludes that 
they should not be thought of as referential at all. Point (i) is a 
variant of the verification principle, against which I have already 
said much in earlier chapters. In this context I would urge the view 
that pOints ti) and (ii) stand or fall together - if there is not a .... 
sharp distinction between theoretical terms and observational terms, 
point (i) cannot be justified. (Certainly the logical positivists would 
hardly, self-defeatingly, have wanted to deny that relatively observable 
terms were meaningful). One of the few major points of agreement of 
;" . 
much recent philosophy of science has, h.owever, been that no such sharp 
distinction can be drawn - at best there are degrees to which a term 
may be said to be more or less theoretical. Two criteria suggest 
themselves for drawing the distinction between observational terms ('0' 
terms) and theoretical terms ('T' terms); (i) that '0' terms may be 
taught ostensively; (ii) the ease and de9ree of confidence ,that we can 
have in the application of '0' terms. With respect to the first 
criterion there does seem to be a prima facie difference between 'T' 
terms such as 'electron', 'quark', whose meaning can only be learnt by 
learning a scientific theory, and terms such as 'warm' and 'red' which 
caa be learnt directly. Two things make this a question of degree 
however. First, 'ostension' is a more indirect process than might 
appear - there is more to seeing than meets the eye. 2 The distinction 
between 'seems red' and 'is red' would seem to be theoretical in that 
it cannot, presumably, be learnt by pure ostension (if there is such a 
( .. beast). Second, some putative 'T' terms,e~g. 'force' can, it would seem, 
be taught as directly as other putative '0' terms. One might explain the 
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concept of force by referring to the experience of feeling the pressure 
of wind on one's body. The second criterion, proposed by carnap,3 would 
seem to make the OIT distinction explicitly one of degree unless the 
idea of incorrigible sense experience is taken on board (an idea which 
attracts few supporters today given the problems of phenomenalism). 
For these reasons and others it seems better to admit frankly that the 
distinction between observable terms and theoretical terms is one of 
degree. Newton-Smith's proposed scale seems sensible enough,4 .-
1. The more observational a term is, the easier it is to decide 
with confidence whether or not it applies. 
2. The more observational a term is, the less will be the reliance 
on instruments in determining its application. 
3. The more observational a term is, the easier it is to grasp its 
meaning without having to understand a scientific theory. 
This view of observational and theoretical terms seems to me to 
undermine a.major rationale for instrumentalism: given that the 
difference between 'T' terms and '0' terms is one of degree one would 
not expect a radical difference in their semantic function and, hence, 
no reasonable reason for denying that 'T' terms may refer. 
Turning to the second PQsition under' 'instrumentalism' ,in figure 6, 
it would seem that in certain parts of scientific discourse a prima 
facie case can be made for saying that the theoretical concepts employed 
in the theory do not refer or that the theories in question should not 
be thought of as literally true. Two kinds of case suggest this view: 
(i) the use of 'ideal' concepts; (ii) cases where different theories 
dealing with the same range of phenomena are apparently incompatible. 
Examples of (i) might in·clude concepts of 'instan.taneous velocity', 
'perfect vacum', 'perfect elasticity' and so on. In the case of some 
concepts it seems impossible that, understood literally, they could 
> .• 
apply to any existing thing. As Nagel puts it,.5 
'. 
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" ••• we can attribute a velocity to a physical body only if the 
body moves through a finite, nonvanishing distance during a finite 
nonvanishing interval of time. But instantaneous velocity is ' 
defined as the limit of the ratios of the distance and time as the 
time interval diminishes toward zero. In consequence, it is 
difficult to see how the numerical value of this limit could 
possibly be the measure of any actual velocity." 
Cases of (ii) might include theories which analyse gas as an aggregation 
of discrete particles and theories which represent the gas as a 
continuous medium; wave vs. particle theories of light. I shall discuss 
the problems raised by (ii) in the following section. 
In his (1960) Nagel reached the following conclusion concerning 
the debate between instrumentalists and realists,6 
"It is ••• difficult to escape the conclUsion that when the two 
apparently confl~cting views [instrumentalism and realism1 on the 
cognitive status of theories are stated with some circumspection, 
each-can assimilate into its formulations not only the facts 
concerning-the primary subject matter explored by experimental 
inquiry but also all the relevant facts concerning the logic and 
procedure of science. In brief, the opposition between these views 
is a conflict over prefered modes of speech." 
There is, I think, something importantly correct about Nagel's view 
with respect to some versions of instrumentalism and, some versions of 
realism and I hope in what follows to bripg this out. One response to 
\ 
the problem of 'ideal' or 'limiting' concepts is to make a move towards 
holism. One might argue as follows: we may not, for example, be able to 
ascertain by overt measurement the value of an instanteneous velocity 
of the magnitude of some length whose theoretical value is stipulated 
to be equal to the square root of 2. But unless accessibility to overt 
measurement is made the criterion of physical existence this does not 
show that bodies cannot ,have instantaneous velocities or lengths with 
real number magnitudes. On the contrary, if a theory postulating such 
valu'es is supported by evidence, then there is good reason to maintain 
>, 
that these limiting concepts do designate certain phases of things and 
processes. Since in testing'a theory we test the totality of assumptions 
.... 
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it makes, if a theory is regarded as well established on the available 
evidence, then all its component assumptions must also be regarded as 
well established. Accordingly, unless we introduce arbitrary distinctions j 
we cannot pick and choose between the component assumptions, counting 
some and not others as descriptions of what exists. Much depends upon 
how we understand the idea of reference. Nagel discusses a number of 
things that may be meant by talking of the physical reality to which 
theoretical concepts may refer. The second criterion he discusses is 
similar in many respects to the holistic view just mentioned,7 
" ••• every nonlogical term of an assumed law (whether experimental 
or theoretical) designates something physically real, provided 
that the law is well supported by empirical evidence and is 
generally accepted by the scientific community as likely to be 
true." 
I take it-that by 'likely to be true' Nagel intends something equally 
.... 
epistemic, e.g. likely to recieve further confirmation as the result of 
further investigation. This criterion could be made more restrictive 
along the lines of Nagel's third criterion,8 
" ••• a term designating anything physically real must enter into 
more than one experimental law, with the proviso that the laws 
are logically independent of each other and that none of them is 
logically equivalent to\a set of two' or more laws." 
Now I take it that criteria for the physical existence of 
theoretical entities along the lines mentioned above are liberal and 
epistemic. Indeed, they are liberal because they are epistemic - no 
metaphysical constraints enter the picture. For that very reason these 
criteria would be considered too weak to satisfy many realists (some 
of whom we shall meet below). However, the kind of realist I call the 
'modest realist' may not be far apart from the instrumentalist. As 
Nage'l says, 9 
". 
" ••• if the third of the •• criteria is adopted for specifying the 
sense of 'physically real', it is quite patent that the instrument-
alist view is compatible with the claim that atoms, say, are 
indeed physically real." 
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Or, as he also nicely puts the pOint,lO 
" ••• there are at least some senses of the expressions 'physically 
real' and 'physically exists' in which an ironically minded 
instrumentalist can acknowledge the physical reality or eXistence 
of many theoretical entities," 
(I think that I may be described as an ironically minded realist !) 
Hence Nagel's pOint that the debate between instrumentalists and 
realists may largely concern a prefered way of speaking. (That is what 
the dots in figure 6 represent). Nevertheless, even against the 
ironically minded instrumentalist there are, I think, good reasons for 
prefering the reAlist way of speaking. One reason that I have is to 
reject the implication that because the evidence for theoretical 
.-
terms is holistic this is not the case with non-theoretical entities, i.e. 
tho-se macro sized objects that we can observe in a more direct manner. 
Since I believe. that the relationship between experience and the terms 
employed ineveryday discourse, and experience and the terms employed in 
scientific discourse, is fundamentally similar in both cases, I find no 
good reason for saying that theoretical entities don't exist and non-
theoretical entities do exist. To develop this view further I will 
discuss the underdeterminatian of theory by data in the next section 
and then contrast my views with those ot the convergent realists in the 
final section. 
(2) Realism and the Underdetermination of Theory 
The question of the underdetermination of theories concerns the 
question of whether there could be two empirically equivalent theories 
which were logically incompatible. In his (1970b) Quine expressed the 
11 problem thus, 
"Consider all the observation sentences of the language: all the 
occasion sentences that are suited for use in reporting observable 
events in the external .world. Apply dates and positions to them 
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in all combinations, without regard to whether observers were at 
the time and place. Some of these placed-timed sentences will be 
true and others false, by virtue simply of the observable though 
unobserved past and future events in the world. Now my point about 
physical theory is that physical theory is underdetermined even 
by all these truths. Theory can still vary though all possible 
observations be fixed. Physical theories can be at odds with each 
other and yet compatible with all possible data even in the broadest 
sense. In a word, they can be logically incompatible and empirically 
equivalent. This is a point on which I expect wide agreement, if 
only because the observational criteria of theoretical terms are 
commonly so flexible and fragmentary." 
Quine's expectation of 'wide agreement' suggested that he thought the 
thesis uncontentious but the major problem the thesis faces can be 
expressed by asking why we should count as distinct, theories which 
agree on all possible observations, i.e. can't we say that here we 
merely have a case of equivocation over the meaning of theoretical 
terms ?12 Quine's con~idence concerning the thesis was much less in 
evidence when he returned to the problem in his (1975b) where he 
comments that, "The doctrine is plausible insofar as it is intelligible, 
but it is less readily intelligible than it may seem." 
Now the main problem I want to consider (because I believe that it 
is the major problem) is that ot equivocation; but first I want to 
mention two points without exploring them. The first point is that if 
one accepts that there is no really sharp theoretical/observational 
dichotomy the thesis will have to be relativized to some particular 
way of drawing the distinction. Second, as Quine notes, the notions of 
implication, logical consequence and logical equivalence are It •• clear 
so long as the theory formulations and their consequences are couched 
in our regimented scientific language, with its explicit logical 
notation.,,14 I will follow Quine in supposing that we are talking only 
of theories formulated " •• in our language with the help of our own 
regimented logical notation." Taking these- points for granted I turn to 
the problem of equivocation. 
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As an illustration of the problem of equivocation Quine imagined 
the following: take some theory formulation and select two of its 
terms, say 'electron' and 'molecule'. (Suppose that these do not occur 
in any observation sentences). Transform the theory formulation merely 
by switching these terms throughout. This new theory formulation will 
be logically incompatible with the old; it will affirm things about 
so-called electrons that the other denies. Yet, as Quine has the 'man 
in the street· say, their only dif.ference is terminological; the one 
theory formulation uses the technical terms 'molecule' and 'electron l 
to name what the other formulation calls lelectron' and 'molecule'. 
Clearly the two formulations are empirically equivalent - they imply 
exactly the same observation sentences. Quine agrees with the man in 
~. 
the street however: we should individuate theories in such a way that 
we regard these formulations as formulations of the same theory. Quine 
proposes that we count formulations as identical if besides being 
empirically equivalent the two formulations can be rendered identical 
by switching predicates in one of them. Quine then broadens this 
proposal to allow for more complex cases Fhan the one mentioned. Three 
\ 
.... 
ways of broadening the proposal are mentioned: (i) we should not require 
that a switching of terms render formulations identical, only logically 
equivalent; (ii) we should not limit the permutation to a switching of 
two predicates - we should allow the switching of many; (iii) we should 
not require the transformation to carry predicates always into simple 
one word predicates. With this broadening Quine states his criteria 
for the individuation of theories thus,1.5 " ••• two formulations express 
the same theory if they are empirically equivalent and there is a 
reconstrual of predicates that transforms the one theory into a logical 
k 
equivalent of the other." After discussiij,g some of the implications 
and complications that arise, Quine finally arrives at the fOllOwing,16 
- 165 -
" ••• a last ditch version of the thesis of underdetermination would 
assert merely that our system of the world is bound to have 
empirically equivalent alternatives which, if we were to discover 
them, we would see no way of reconciling by reconstrual of 
predicates." 
Having said something about the thesis of underdetermination I 
want to discuss Newton-Smith's claim that it presents a dilemma for 
realism. Newton-Smith identifies two major ingredients in realism: 
(i) the ontological ingredient, " ••• scientific theories are true or 
.... 
false and which a given theory is it is in virtue of how the world is.,,17 
(ii) the epistemological ingredient, " ••• we can have warranted beliefs 
(at least in principle) concerning the truth-values of our theories. II1B 
,- Newton-Smith bel~eves that there may be underdetermination and, 
given that, thinks that one must weaken either the ontological ingredient 
or the epistemological ingredient. Weakening the ontological ingredient 
Newton-Smith calls the ignorance response: there may be empirically 
equivalent theories between which we cannot have empirical reasons for 
chOOSing but nevertheless one may be true and the other false although 
we may never know which. Weakening the ep~stemological ingredient 
\ ' 
Newton-Smith calls the arrogance response: if there are theories between 
which we cannot have empirical evidence then there is no fact of the 
matter as to which is true. In Newton-Smith's view the ignorance response 
has the consequence of having to embrace the notion of inaccessible 
facts, whilst the arrogance response has the consequence of having to 
abandon the law of excluded-middle: empirically undecidable propositions 
are neither true nor false. Surprisingly, perhaps, Newton-Smith opts 
for the arrogance response not wishing to adopt the notion of 
inaccessible facts. 19 My response is to reject the dilemma as posed by 
Newton-Smith and my reasons may begin to'emerge by considering this 
notion of inaccessible facts. 
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I believe that the notion of inaccessible facts is ambiguous in 
just the way that talk of 'truth-conditions' is ambiguous. When one 
speaks of truth-conditions one may mean the truth-conditions of a 
sentence or one may mean the conditions which obtain in the world itself. 
Now there is an important sense in which we always have access to the 
truth-conditions of any sentence we find meaningful. For instance, I 
find the sentence, 'A city will never be built on this spot.' perfectly 
meaningful - I do have access to the truth-conditions of that sentence'~ 
in the sense that I know what would have to be the case for the sentence 
to be true. I do not, however, have access to the truth-conditions in 
the sense that I do not know (and have no way of knowing) whether those 
truth-conditions are patisfied. If by 'inaccessible facts' one means 
that there are sentences which have truth-conditions which we cannot 
discover if they obtain or not then I do believe that there are 
'inaccessible facts'. What I believe Newton-Smith had in mind, however, 
is more like the use of 'truth-conditions' where one thinks of them 
as 'states of affairs'. 'States of affairs' in this sense can sometimes 
be thought of as physical states of the world. Consider this notion 
\ ' 
of inaccessible facts in relation to the sentence 'A city will never be 
built on that spot.' Suppose that that sentence is uttered at time !. 
Now, whatever else may be meant by 'inaccessible facts' in this sense, 
it entails that every state of affairs after time i is inaccessible. 
Newton-Smith rejects this notion of 'inaccessible facts' and, I think, 
with very good reason for it is very hard to say much about them which 
is intelligible. Unlike Newton-Smith however, I do not believe that 
this should lead one to adopt the arrogance response. On my view there 
is inaccessibility at time! but it is not the inaccessibility of some 
~ 
mysterious future stat~ of affairs but the epistemic 
inability to know what will or will not happen. Not knowing what will 
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or will not happen after time i is not the same as not knowing what 
would or would not have to happen for the sentence to be true. I claim, 
indeed, that we do know the latter but not the former. 
It seems to me vital to reject the premises that led Newton-Smith 
to pose the realist dilemma. It is crucially important to our 
conceptual scheme in general and our science in particular that we retai~ 
the notion of epistemic inaccessibilty. In fact, as Quine presents the 
thesis of underdetermination, epistemic inaccessibility is taken for 
granted since he talks of all possible evidence and explicitly talks 
of observation sentences being 'pegged to inaccessible time-places.,20 
As I have argued in chapter 5, the demand for epistemic access 
threatens to make a mystery of all language learning. 
Quine anticipated a dilemma similar to that raised by Newton-Smith 
21 and responded in much the way I favour, 
.~ 
"Perhaps there are two best theories that imply all the true 
observational conditionals and no false ones. The two are equally 
simple, let us suppose, and logically incompatible. Suppose further 
••• that they are not reconcilable by reconstrual of predicates 
however devious. Can we say that one, perhaps, is true, and the 
other therefore false, hut that it is impossible in principle to 
know which? Or, taking a more positivistic line, should we say 
that truth reaches only to the observational conditionals at most •• ? 
I incline to neither line. Whatever we affirm, after all, we affirm 
as a statement within our aggregate theory of nature as we now 
see it; and to call a statement true is just to reaffirm it. 
Perhaps it is not true, and perhaps we shall find that out; but in 
any event there is no extra-theoretic truth, no higher truth than 
the truth we are claiming or aspiring to as we continue to tinker 
with our system Of the world from within." 
In other words, Quine rejects the ignorance response because truth is 
internal to our theory of the world and, that being the case, we have 
equally good reason for saying that both theories are true. Saying that 
both theories are true is, however, equally a way of rejecting the 
arrogance response since that involves saying that (parts of) both 
theories are neither true nor talse. What, then, of 'incompatibiltity' ? 
-. 
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As we saw, in Quinets account this amounts to merely saying that we 
have no way of reconciling one theory in terms of the other. As far as 
I can see this really amounts to denying an intuitively appealing 
but misleading picture of scientific discovery. One kind of scientific 
realism suggests that there must be one scientific theory of the world 
to describe the structure of the world. Quine's view really amounts to 
the suggestion that there may be more than theory.to describe the 
structures (plural) of the world. If someone claims that unless we 
can discover ~ to describe ~ structure of the world this shows that 
we cannot discover the truth about the world, Quine's response, ana it 
is mine also, is to say that this is a misunderstanding of the concept 
of truth; insofar as the concept of truth is employed meaningfully we 
• 
must be talking about truth within our theories. Certainly we can talk 
about sentences being true or false when we cannot discover which, but 
the imagined realist must want more than that since we are imagintna 
the truth-values of all sentences settled. Just what more the realist 
is just that which defies explication. The ultimate outcome of the view 
for which I am arguing is that metaphysics (or, rather, good metaphysics) 
I , 
and epistemology meet. That is to say that we can't ultimately 
separate 'what there is' from our reasons for believing in what there 
1s. (Not, however, 1n the way ver1ficationism drew this relationship). 
This form of relativism rejects both the idea of an 'extra-theoretic 
truth', and a theory-independent notion of 'objects' (a point I shall 
expand upon in the next section). Just because our notion of relatively 
unobservable entities is theory-dependent we have no way of knowing 
when there is £!!! or merely apparent conflict between theories. For 
example, some experimental evidence seems best explained by thinking 
of light as though it were wave-like, ot4er experimental evidence seems 
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best explained by thinking of it as though it were constituted by 
particles. Insofar as we now have good reason for accepting both 
theories we also, I claim, have good reason for saying that talk of 
'waves' and 'particles' is only analogous and that the conflict is more 
apparent than real. Perhaps we should think of a continuum with the 
watch analogy at one end and the visual illusion analogy at the other. 
Insofar as two theories are equally good at explaining the evidence, 
and insofar as these theories are in apparent conflict, there is good 
reason for thinking of those theories as being nearer to the 'illusion' 
end of the spectrum rather than the 'watch' end of the spectrum. If 
some day a unified theory of light were developed which accounts for 
all the experimental ~vidence without apparent conflict that would, 
perhaps, i! post facto, be reason for saying that the conflict was, 
after all, more real than apparent. The reason however would not be 
that we had discovered a non-theoretic truth, but that we had found a 
better theory-dependent truth. I shall continue this theme in the n,ext 
section. 
(3) Convergent Realism 
ttThe positive argument for realism is that it is the only 
philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle." 
. Putnam.22. 
In the sense of 'realism' that Putnam had in mind in the above 
quotation, I believe that his claim is false. That conception of realism 
has been labeled 'convergent realism' and in addition to Putnam has 
been advocated by Newton-Smith and BOyd.23 I believe that a modest 
realism can achieve what is wanted without incurring the difficulties 





Any advocate of realism with respect to theoretical entities in 
science will require a distinction between terms which genuinely refer 
and those which merely purport to refer. This distinction is needed 
because of such terms as 'aether' and 'ph-logiston' which we now believe 
do not refer. With this distinction the central thesis of convergent 
realism may be stated as follows: theoretical terms refer if they 
describe the underlying structure of the world; that is, theoretical 
terms genuinely refer if there are sUbstances or things in the world 
that correspond to the on~ology of the scientific theory in question. 
The criterion for saying that terms do genuinely refer is epistemic 
success; the more successful a theory the more reason for supposing that 
it-does genuinely refer. Moreover, and this is an important claim for 
the convergent realists, it is said that the supposition that the terms 
of successful theories do genuinely refer explains their success. 
Science faces a recalcitrant world and attempts to describe its 
underlying structure. The progress of science (measured by epistemic 
success) is evidence that its theories are getting nearer to a true 
description of the structure. Moreover, it is claimed, any philosophy 
that does not take this view would be at a total loss to explain why 
on earth science should be successful. (Convergent realists have to 
speak of successive approximation to the structure of reality since no 
one wants to be saddled with the view that today's science, and the 
ontological commitments of today's science, will be the final one. I 
think, however, that there are grounds for saying that convergent 
t , 
realists are too commi~d to todays science. I will return to this point.) 
Before I tackle the central claims of this thesis a word on 
'.pistemic success' is called for. To my knowledge convergent realists 
have not been very specific about what epistemic success amounts to -
'.' 
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they seem to be operating with a largely pragmatic notion: we would say 
i· 
that a theory is successful if it makes substantially correct ! 
I 
predictions; passes a battery of tests; leads to efficacious interventioJ:i 
f.· 
'f: in the natural order. As Laudan notes, the criteria for success cannot 
i;~ 
be made too stringent since otherwise the very phenomena to be explained ~ 
~: 
(the success of science) would disappear. 24 However 'success' is to be 
spelled out exactly I don't wish to question the claim that science 
has been successful - hence I shall treat the claim about the success 
of science as common ground. I also won't question some of the theses 
that convergent realists are commi~d to that I do believe to be 
problematic, e.g. the claim that earlier theories are always limiting" 
cases of later theories. 
My central objection to convergent realism is that it requires a 
theory-independent notion of ontology which, as a relativist, I do not 
believe makes sense. What I see as a weakness in the view of convergent 
realists has, I think, been claimed by them to be a strength. Underlying 
Putnam's claim that (convergent) realism is the only view that does not 
, 
make the success of science a miracle, has been an implicit argument 
that only a theory which embraces the idea of a theory-independent 
ontology can give a plausible explanation of why one theory should be 
better than any other. My first task is to show why I do not believe this 
to be the case. 
To explain the difference between convergent and modest realism I 
shall use the word joints (no scare quotes) to represent the convergent 
realist's notion of a theory-independent ontology; I shall use the word 
'joints' (with scare quotes) to represent my notion of a theory-
dependent ontology. With that distinction; I think it is helpful to 






Tl T2 T3 
" 
.. • joints 
.. time 
Where: T3 is an epistemically superior theory to T2 and T2 is an 
epistemically superior theory to Tle 
Modest Realism 
r r [3 
, joints' 'joints' , joints' 
• time 
(I use separate arrows to take on board Kuhn's point that scientific 
theories sometimes progress by the adoption of a radically new theory). 
The essential difference between these 'pictures' is that whereas 
the convergent realist has a' theory-independent notion of ontology 
(upon which more successful theories are supposedly 'converging'), 
modest realism only requires a theory-dependent notion of ontology. 
This essential difference can also be represented by saying that whereas 
conv.ergent realism can be defined as a relationship between three 
elements, modest realism only requires !!2 elements:-
Convergent Realism 
(i) theory independent notion of objects (joints); 
(ii) theory . dependent notion of truth-conditions; 
,-
(iii) a correspondence relation between {i) and (ii). 
l 
~ ~ ;y 
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Modest Realism 
(i) a theory-dependent notion of truth-conditions ('joints'); 
(ii) the satisfaction (or not) of the truth-conditions mentioned in (i). 
Perhaps the first thing I ought to say concerning these alternative 
views concerns the idea of theory-dependent truth-conditions. Above I 
noted that sometimes truth-conditions are spoken of as 'states of t~e 
world' rather than as a predicate of sentences. The convergent realist 
needs the concept of the truth-conditions of truth-bearers no less than 
the modest realist. The convergent realist hopes to capture what is 
meant by the idea of truth-conditions as states of the world by the 
notion a theory independent ontology. Both the convergent realist and the 
-,"' , 
mOdestre~list agree that the truth-conditions of sentences ~ theory 
dependent - they are defined by us. Both the convergent realist and the 
modest realist also 'agree that merely defini~truth-conditions does not 
create truth; but the difference between them concerns what further 
conditions have to obtain for a sentence to be true: the conv~rgent 
realist requires a correspondence between the 'independent way the 
world is' and the truth-conditions of sentences; the modest realist 
only requires that the truth-conditions of sentences be satisfied. 
Now it seems to me that the supposed strength of convergent realism -
its ability to explain why some theories should be epistemically 
superior to others - can equally well be claimed for modest realism. 
That is to say, convergent realists are fond of saying that a good 
explanation of why one theory should be better than another is that the 
better theory represents a better approximation to the independently 
give~ way the world is. I believe, however, that modest realists can 
'-
equally explain why one theory m~ght be better than another without 
invoking the need for an independently given way the world is. The modest 
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realist may do this by saying that one reason why a theory may be 
better than another is that the truth-conditions of the better theory 
are satisfied and that the truth-conditions of the other theory are not 
satisfied. Thus suppose that Tl is a theory accepted at time !, Tl is 
commited to the existence of ~; T2 is a theory accepted at a time later 
than 1, T2 is not commited to the existence of ~ but to the existence 
of Z2, and that T is more epistemically successful than Tl • (I am also 2 .~ 
supposing that Tl and T2 are attempts to explain the same range of 
phenomena). In these circumstances the convergent realist claims that 
a good explanation of why T2 should be better than Tl is that it is a 
better approximation to the theory-independent ontology of the world. 
What the modest realist can say however is that one explanation of why 
T2 may be better than Tl is that although at time t people believed that 
the truth-conditions of Tl were satisfied, (which would of course 
include the assertion that ~here are !!), the greater epistemic success 
of T2 is reasonable evidence for supposing that the truth-conditions 
of Tl were not satisfied and that the truth-conditions of T2 are 
satisfied, and that therefore there are l! and not ~. Sofar as the 
explanation of success goes these theories are equivalent. Note further 
that modest realists have no need to compromise their fallibilism: the 
convergent realist will say that in principle even the best theory 
accepted now may be false because its ontological commitments may not 
correspond to the independently give~ ontology of the world, but the 
modest realist will take that claim to be equivalent to saying that at 
some time in the future we might arrive at a better theory. 
The argument that convergent realism and modest realism are 
.. 
equivalent with respect to the problem ~f expI~t~3 the success of 
science might suggest that this is another case which falls under Nagel's 
" 
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dictum that disputes over realism concern a 'prefered way of speaking'. 
I beli~ve that modest realism is philosphically preferable to convergent 
realism since it does not require the highly problematic notions of 
a theory-independent ontology and 'correspondence'. 
My definition of realism frankly makes it relative to the current 
state of scientific theory. I do not believe that this is objectionable 
since I do not believe that we have any better theory to work with. 
It implies that our judgements of the kinds of things there are vary 
with epistemic progress. I hardly think that is controversial. My view 
does not imply that what there is varies with theory in the sense that 
what exists is a function of theory production. Should we later wi~draw 
our present belief that a term employed in current science is genuinely 
referring we will naturally conclude that formerly we held a false 
belief. Convergent realism, on the other hand, seems to make the mistake 
of treating our current beliefs as sacrosanct. Suppose that in the future 
science undergoes a radical conceptual change in such a manner that a 
good many of the terms we now r~gard as referring we would then regard 
as merely purporting to refer.(And who will gainsay that possibility?) 
I see no difficulty with this prospect for my modest realism but 
convergent realists would be embarrassed - at least convergent realists 
should be embarressed since they would be the terms they were telling 
us it would be a miracle if they did not refer. One might add that if 
the argument for convergent realism is good argument ~, wouldn't it 
have been a good argument at any time in the history of science. If it 






Part II: Physics and Commonsense 
Before discussing the specific topic of how scientific and 
commonsense beliefs are related it is worth raising the question of 
whether commonsense beliefs can properly be said to constitute a 'theory' 
in any sense at all. In one way it would seem at best to be an 
exaggeration to describe our interrelated system of commonsense beliefs 
(about people, houses, etc.) as constituting a 'theory', not only 
because it strains the word 'theory', but because the primary function 
of such beliefs seems to be practical rather than cognitive. There does 
S~~M 
to be an important difference in purpose served by the ontology of 
a scientific theory (explaining the events and the nature of the world 
~, 
around'us) and the 'ontology' of everyday beliefs. Our primary interests 
in tables and chairs, homes and gardens, even mountains and lakes, is 
not basically or usually theoretical. That said, however, it is surely 
also true that those interests do give rise to claims that may be true 
or false, and if that is the case why should one put the word, 'ontology' 
as it occurs in the phrase, 'on~ology of our everyday beliefs', in 
scare quotes ? My reason is the one given - an actm-ision that the 
reasons we (as a community) have arrived at such an ontology are 
primarily practical. That said, I see no good metaphysical reason for 
being patronizing about the objects familiar to us all. If we are 
interested in the question of what there is, the only reason I can see 
for ignoring the question of the existence of such objects is the 
normative judgement that it is our theoretical interests that are 
important. Without questioning that value judgement I would claim that 
this does nothing to belittle the metaphysical status of tables, chairs, 
etc.; they exist as surely (in fact surely more surely!) than the 
glamorous and exotic world of atoms, quarks, etc. How~ver, for someone 
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who wants to adopt the view that there are tables etc. ~ there are 
the part~&s posited by modern physics, the question arises as to the 
relationship between these entities. 
A colourful statement of the problem was made by Eddington,25 
"I have settled down to the task of writing these lectures and 
have drawn up my chairs to my two tables. Two tables ! Yes; there 
are duplicates of every object about me - two tables, two chairs, 
two pens ••• One of them has been familiar to me from earliest years. 
It is a commonplace object of the envirOl\fI'Iettot that I call the world ••• 
It has extensioll; it is comparatively permanent; it is coloured; 
above all it is substantial ••• Table no.2 is my scientific table ••• 
it is mostly emptiness. Sparsely scattered in that emptiness are 
numerous electric charges rushing about with great speed; but their 
combined bulk amounts to less than a billionth of the bulk of the 
table itself ••• when I lay my paper on it the little electriC .. 
partkies with their headlong speed keep on hitting the underside, 
so that the paper is maintained in shuttlecock fashion at a nearly 
steady level." 
In her (i937) Stebbing did much to dissolve the many confusions to be 
, 
found in Eddington's work. (It doesn't, for instance, make much sense 
to talk of the partkles hitting the underside of the paper). 
Nevertheless Stebbing's reply does not seem entirely satisfactory, for 
two reasons. First, although Stebbing rightly rejects Eddingt'on's talk 
of !!2 tables, of which the sci'entific is the 'duplicate' of the 
ordinary, she talks of 'counterparts,26 and the only hint of what a 
counterpart is is that the counterpart of colour is said to be its 
'scientific equivalent electromagnetic wavelength'. Aside. from vagueness 
I feel that this choice of term is likely to concede too much to the 
Eddington view. Second, Stebbing's view of science appears to be an 
instrumentalist one and therefore won't appeal to those who want to say 
that there are atoms etc. 
Philosophers who have taken the view that the physical objects of 
everyday life do not exist include Feyerapend, Maxwell, and Sellars.27 
,., 
Basically the thought which seems to motivate their view may be put 
like this: call the language most adequate for scientific purposes ~ 
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(ignoring for the moment the fact that there is not one such language), 
and the ontology to which it is commited 0 • Call the things ranged 
over by the variables of L 'basic things'. Then it may be said that 
other things such as tables do not really exist since they are merely 
suitably arranged collections of basic things. Mellor calls this the 
'super realist's ontological principle' and asks what reason there could 
be for thinking it true. 28 Mellor says that the view only seems to 
entail that all statements about tables etc. can. be translated into 
statements about basic things but not conversely, and he objects that 
this begs the question since,29 
" ••• it is admitted that such translations are not made, and as a 
matter of fact cannot be made with our present mathematical ~ 
expertize. If it-is insisted that such translations could be carried I 
out in principle, we observe that the possibility of translation ,. 
~ the principle that is supposed to establish the unique adequacy 
of ~. If this possibility is itself only established by assuming 
the unique adequacy of L, the argument is viciously circular. u i 
I Whilst this objection seems to me correct I do not think that it goes far enough. Mellor goes on to say,30 
"The point of the claim seems to be that a statement about everyday 
things is either equivalent to some theor.Mof physical theory or 
is false. No doubt, if current physical theory is true, this is 
true. But this is just what we don't know in any sense strong 
enough to support the argument." 
In making that statement I believe that Mellor concedes too much to the 
opposition: even if current theoretical physics is true I believe that 
all it would provide would be necessary conditions for the truth of 
statements about non-basic things. To explain why I believe this it will 
be convenient to examine an argument by Unger which is also alleged to 
show that tables do not exist. Unger aPllies the sorites paradox to 
tables. He writes,3l 
"(1) There exists at least one table. 
But, from our scientific perspective,' we may add this second 
premise: ' 
(2) For anything there may be, if it is a table, .then it consists 










"(3) For anything there may be, if it is a table (which consists 
of many atoms, but a finite number), then the net removal of one 
atom, or only a few, in a way which is most innocuous and favorable 
will not mean the difference as to whether there 1s a table in the ' 
situation. 
These three premisses, I take it, are inconsistent. The assessment 
of this inconsistency, I submit, leads one to reject, and to deny, 
the first premise, whatever one may subsequently think of the 
remaining two propositions." 
Formally, the easiest way of dealing with this argument would seem to be 
that suggested by Ayer - deny that the relationship of 'being the same 
~ with one less element than on the previous count' is transitive.32 
Although formally adequate this leaves me dissatisfied; I think a more. 
radical approach is called for. Quine claims that the case of the table 
differs from that of the old paradox of the heap by " ••• not lending 
itself to 'any s~ipulation, however arbitrary, that we can formulate.,,33 
Because of this Quine thinks that the table case presents a threat to 
bivalence but I think this mention of bivalence should cause one to 
rethink. For the moment I wish to forget about atoms and simp~y consider 
the statement, 'Either there is a table in that room or there is not a 
table in that room.' Now, simply judging by our normal criteria for 
what counts as a table, subject to open-texture (etc), there seeDlS to 
be no difficulty in taking that statement to be true. It should also 
be noted that if there is a table then it will consist of atoms but 
that is the only kind of implication that science has concerning tables. 
The incompatibility between our everyday and scientific beliefs only 
arises when the fact that science does tell us - that tables are composed 
ot atoms - is then used as a basis for asking the question, 'is there a 
table or not ?' But that seems to me illegitimate and the point where 
pluralism comes to the rescue. Using ordin~ry criteria for what counts 
" as a table there is no difficulty either in saying that 'Either a table 
exists in room or a table does not exist in that room' is true, or in 
'" 
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saying that, 'There is table in that room' must have one of the truth-
values true or false. It is not surprising, however, if we cannot 
answer the question, 'is a table with an atom removed still a table ?' 
since there is no scientific theory of tables. Tables either exist or 
not according to the criteria appropriate to them (one point of view), 
and our scientific theory of the world is irrelevant except for telling 
us one necessary condition for the truth of a statement asserting that 
there is a table. The scientific point of view cannot always be used .~ 
as a basis for questioning our everyday beliefs. The supposition that 
ultimately there is only ~ point of view is a supposition of 
absolutism but this, as we have seen, leads to paradox. 
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Chapter 7 
Mathematics: Epistemology & Metaphysics 
tI ••• because of the multiplicity of possible 'interpretations' or 
'models', it came to be recognized that the 'nature' of mathematical 
objects is ultimately of secondary importance, and that it matters 
little, for example, whether a result is presented as a theorem of 
'pure' geometry or as a theorem of algebra via analytical 
geometry." Bourbaki. 1. 
. ... 
Within the philosophy of mathematics there are three major kinds 
of questions: (i) metaphysical - do such things as numbers, sets, etc. 
exist ~ Are numbers, sets, etc. abstract entities? What is an abstract 
entity ? (ii) epistemological - is mathematical knowledge certain? How 
• 
do we acquire mathematical concepts? (iii) applicability - why should 
mathematics. prove useful in our dealings with the world, either in 
physics or in our everday calculations ? Roughly I shall take these 
.. 
three kinds of question in the order listed and corresponding to the 
three sections of this chapter. Only roughly, because in practice it is 
not always possible to sharply separate these issues. 
I 
The view of mathematics for which I shall be arguing is 
structuralism. This view of mathematics has been adopted both by some 
mathematicians (e.g. Bourbaki, Gandy2), and some philosophers (e.g. 
Benacerraf,3 Resnik,4). My version of structuralism inevitably gives a 
different emphasis from that of others and my reasons for adopting this 
view are not only that I think it gives a good account of mathematics 
but also that it is a view consistent with the philosophical views for 
which I have argued in the rest of the thesis. Given the large nature of 
the topic I must admit that this chapter can only provide a sketch of 
'., 
., 
the nature of mathematics but I am confident that structuralism provides 
an interesting and important account of mathematics. 
" 
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el) Structures and Structuralism 
Reasons for taking a structuralist view of mathematics have been 
given by Benacerraf in his (1965). Benacerraf begins his paper by 
imagining the mathematical education of two children named Ernie and 
Johnny. Unlike most of us Ernie and Johnny began their mathematical 
education by being taught set theory. Having mastered set theory they 
were then told how aspects of what they learnt related to what ordinary 
people called 'numbers'. The point of Benacerraf's story is to present 
a dilemma: it appears that Ernie and Johnny have been taught all that is 
necessary for them both to be said to have the concept of number and yet 
what each of them has learnt may conflict with what the other has learnt. 
The sOUrce of the conflict is that for Ernie,5 
And,6 
" ••• the successor under R of a number x was the set consisting of 
x and .all 'the members of-x, while for Johnny the successor of x 
was simply x , the unit-set of x - the set whose only member-is ~. 
Since for each of them 1 was the unit set of the null set, their 
respective progressions were, 
(i) C.«SJ, Co, [JSll, c¢,t,d],C.«S,C,6JJJ, ••• for Ernie, 
and 
(ii) C.«SJ, [to)), [Cr'(sJJJ, ••• for Johnny. 
\ 
" ••• Ernie had been able to prove that a set had ~ members iff it 
could be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the set of number~ .: 
less than or equal to n. Johnny concurred. But they disagreed when 
Ernie claimed further that a set had n members iff it could be put 
into a one-to-one correspondence with-the number ~ itself. For 
Johnny, every number is single-membered. In short, their cardinality 
relations were different. For Ernie, 17 had 17 members, while for 
Johnny it had only one." 
The problem is that here are two accounts of the meanings of certain 
words ('number', 'one' etc.) each of which satisfies what appear to be 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a correct account. Benacerraf 
concludes that this leaves us with two alternatives,7 
"(A) Both are right in their contentions: each account contained 
conditions each of which was necessary and which were jointly 
sufficient. Therefore 3 = [tt.«SJJJ, and 3 = (¢,[.0J, [P,[.«SlJJ. 
L 
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(B) It is not the case that both accounts were correct; that is, 
at least one contained conditions which were not necessary and 
possibily failed to contain further conditions which, taken 
together with those remaining, would make a set of sufficient 
conditions." 
Benacerraf comments that (A) is absurd and goes on to discuss (B). The 
trouble is, however, that few expect that we will discover conditions 
which show that one version of set theory is the correct one. 8 Relevant 
here is the fact that Quine does not have this expectation (relevant 
since Quine believes that there are numbers). Quine writes,9 .... 
" ••• any progression will serve as a version of number so long and 
only so long as we stick to one and the same progression. Arithmetic 
is, in this sense, all there is to number: there is no saying 
what the numbers are; there is only artt1l..metic." 
In a footnote Quine notes that Benacerraf's conclusions " ••• differ in 
some ways from those!: shall come to." The point at issue between Quine 
and Benacerraf is what lesson one ought to draw from the view, shared by 
both, that there is no fact of the matter as to which of the distinct 
definitions of number offere.d by various set theories is the correct 
one. The lesson that Benacerraf draws is clear and, I believe, 
substantially correct,lO 
" ••• any system of objec~s, whether sets or not, that forms a 
recursive progression must be adequate [to characterize the numbers]. 
" ••• that any recursive sequence whatever would do suggests that 
what is important is not the individuality Of each element but the 
structure which they jointly exhibit." 
"'Objects' do not do the job of numbers singly; the whole system 
performs the job or nothing does." 
Benacerraf's view, then, is that numbers are not objects at all because 
in defining their necessary and sufficient conditions one merely 
characterizes an abstract structure,ll 
. "That a system of objects exhibits the strucure of the inte~4 rs 
implies that the elements of that system have some properties not 
dependent on structure. It must be possible to individuate those 
i objects independently of the role they play in the structure. 
But this 1s precisely what cannot be done with the numbers. To be 
the number 3 is no more and no less than to be preceded by 2, 1, 
and possibly 0, and to be followed 8y 4, 5, ••• Any object can ~ 
the role of 3; that is, any object can be the third element in 
some progression. What is peculiar to 3 is that it defines that 
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role - not by being a pardigm of any object which plays it, but 
by representing the relation that any third member of a progression 
bears to the rest of the progression." 
Arithmetic, therefore, is seen as the science which elaborates the 
abstract structure that all progressions have in common merely in virtue 
of being progressions. It is not a science concerned with particular 
objects - numbers. 
I would now like to place the central idea of structuralism in a 
broader context by considering Resnik's advocacy of similar ideas in 
his (1975). In the section of his paper where Resnik advocates a 
structuralist view of mathematics he begins by noting the various things 
that could be said about a sequence of dots: 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Of that sequence of dots one could say such things as the following: 
(1) No dot has more than one immediate successor. 
(2) If one dot succeeds another then the latter does not succeed the 
former. 
(3) There is a dot which succeeds no dot and every dot but it succeeds 
a dot. 
(4) There is no dot between a dot and its successor. 
(5) If one dot comes before a second and the second before a third then 
the first comes before the third. 
(6) If one dot comes before another then the second does not come before 
the first. 
(7) Given two distinct dots one comes before the other. 
(8) Given any subsequence of dots there will be one in the subsequence 
which comes before the others. 
(1) to (8) would continue to hold even if the talk of dots were 
to be replaced by a sequence of squares, stars, houses etc. and this is 
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Benacerraf's point - what is important does not concern the nature of 
the individual 'objects'. 
One question that arises at this point is this: Benacerraf's 
comments about supposedly individual objects are nominalist, i.e. 
Benacerraf denies that there are individual mathematical 'objects' such 
as numbers, but Benacerraf does talk, as he more or less obliged to 
talk, of abstract structures - SO is this view not merely Platonism at 
.~ 
one remove so to speak, Platonism with respect to 'structures' rather 
than 'entities' ? There is some justice in that suggestion and, indeed, 
Resnik describes structuralism as being a variant of Platonism. However, 
the attractiveness of structuralism as an account of mathematics seems 
tome to stem from considerations which are far from those traditionally 
associated with Platonism. structuralism, as I envisage it, may be 
, 
described as a quasi-empiricist view of mathematics and any form of 
empiricism seems at odds with Platonism as traditionally conceived. 
(Alternatively, a structuralist view may be described as being quasi-
formalist and formalism seems equally at odds with the Platonist 
picture). Essentially I beli~ve that this/is so in two ways: (i) in 
the epistemological approach encapsulated by structuralism; (ii) in the 
metaphysical presuppositions of structuralism - in particular 
structuralism does not presuppose that there is, or can be, a sharp 
distinction between the 'concrete' and the 'abstract'. These points are 
closely related and the explication of them will form the sUbstance of 
the rest of this chapter. 
As a first way of suggesting the close relationship between the 
two points just mentioned, and of the gulf between structuralism and 
Platonism, it may be instructive to consider the question of infinity. 
~ 
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Consider, again, the pattern of dots. Resnik says,12 " ••• by imagining 
a finite dot pattern as extending indefinitely to the right, we obtain 
a sequence of dots of order type w •• " That simple statement raises SODle 
questions and contrasts between structuralism and Platonism. The 
contrast with Platonism can in part be drawn by pointing to the 
difficulties Platonism faces in providing an account of how we acquire 
mathematical concepts, whereas structuralism claims that we obtain 
mathematical concepts by abstraction from empirically based observations 
(the begining of the pattern of dots is empirically inscribed. Compare 
-
the argument over the issue of truth-bearers - sentence tokens are 
inscribed, propositiions are abstract). From a structuralist point of 
view, empirical inscriptions'are not theoretically dispensible. (This 
, is what gives structuralism its affinity with formalism - a point I 
shall return to). But are we justified in imagining the sequence of 
dots continued indefinitely to the righ~and taking the step intuitonists' 
would disallow, as treating infinity as completed rather than merely 
potential, as when Cantor decreed that the cardinal number of the natural 
numbers is>J 0 ? A-priori there is no way of telling but h.av~a taken 
that step one can then investigate to what extent infinite patterns 
emerge as a natural and coherent extension of finite patterns. 
I said that the epistemological and metaphysical views of 
structuralism were closely related. To show why I define a structure to 
be the overall pattern of relationships between a set of elements. I 
now want to indicate reasons for thinking that neither the relations, 
nor the elements, with which mathematics are concerned can be classified 
as either purely abstract or as purely concrete. I believe that the 
issue between Platonism and nominalism has been widely misconceived. 
I examine relations first. 
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A discussion of the nature of 'abstract entities' faces the 
difficulty that no adequate characterization of what an abstract entity 
might be is readily available. The only general point of agreement as 
to what an abstract entity might be if one existed is negative _ 
something that does not exist in space and time. It hardly seems likely 
that this characterization can be completely adequate however - I take 
it that unicorns don't exist in time or space but it is very unclear it 
should be considered as 'entities' - surely they simply don't exist. 
(Even if they were said to 'exist' this view would still still have to 
face the problem of 'impossible objects', e.g. the round-square). 
Leaving this problem to one side I want to see what one might say about 
. \ 
relations. To simplify the discussion I want to begin with a simple case. 
Imagine two wooden sticks in some piece of ground in a particular 
relationship - imagine that they are six feet apart. This case simplifies 
the discussion in that in the circumstances envisaged we would have no 
doubt that the 'elements', the sticks, exist. Clearly the existence of 
the sticks is not a sufficient condition for the 'existence' of the 
relationship - the sticks can exist without being in that relationship. 
What else is necessary? The obvious answer is the position in which 
the sticks are placed. 'Position' is itself a relational concept ot 
course but note that dependln~ upon how the two positions are described 
they can be characterized without reference to the relation ot being 
six feet apart. Thus if one stick is in a position we call A, and the 
other stick is in a position we call ~, A and ~ can be characterized 
by reference to their relationship to other features in the world beside 
the other stick. Suppose then, for the sake of argument, we say that 
the existence of the sticks in positions A and B provides both necessary 
- -
and sufficient conditions for the existence of the relation E. Now, it 
seems to me it would be a mistake to force the question, 'is E concrete 
.. , 
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or abstract l' The reason I think this is that the question does not 
make much sense with respect to the concept of position. When the two 
sticks are in the ground the relationship seems physical; the 'state ot 
affairs' which consists of the two sticks being in the ground could 
certainly have effects on future events, e.g. a vehicle either could or 
could not pass between the sticks without disturbing them. Can E be 
destroyed then? Well, one could certainly destroy the sticks, but 
wouldn't the relation still exist between the positions! and ~ ? Well, 
can we destroy the positions! and ~ ? One could dig a hole ! But 
imagine the farm hand who has been instructed to place posts in positions 
! and ~ (to support some fencing) returning to the farmer and saying that 
positions! and ~ do not exist in that field ! This in itself suggests 
an interesting analogy; Platonists are inclined to say such things as 
'numbers cannot be created or destroyed' but there may be reason here 
for saying that positions can't be created or destroyed either; but the 
conclusion that therefore positions are abstract entities seems 
unwarranted to say the least. I should not like to be misunders~ood -
I believe that there is only a problem for someone in the grip of a 
naive philosophical presupposition. That philosophical presupposition may 
be described by saying that every true statement about the world can be 
reduced to either a true statement about a physical entity or to a true 
statement about an abstract entity. That presupposition may be shared 
by Platonist and nominalist alike - the latter claiming that true 
relational statements reduce to statements about. the elements, the former 
claiming that because such statements do not so reduce, relations must 
be abstract entities. Those not in the grip of this presupposition will, 
I hope, agree with me that even the simplest case of a relation that I 
have discussed does not fit happily ~nto either category. 
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Before I press on to discuss 'elements' there is a nice point to 
be made about the perception of relations - that is to say that we can 
~ them even though they are not happily thought or as 'things'. 
Imagine someone moving into a new house and measuring a room to make 
sure that some furniture will fit. Even knowing that the furniture 
will fit they might well want to place the furniture in the room to see 
what the arrangement looks like. Here the people concerned don't want 
to examine the pieces of furniture (the 'elements'), they want to look 
at the relationships between them. Ir it were the pieces of furniture 
they wanted to look at they could do that without moving the furniture 
into the room. 
I now want to discuss the question of the nature of the 'elements' 
in mathematical theories by taking as a paradigm case the relationship 
between numerals and numbers. It is widely agreed that there must be 
some distinction between numerals and numbers since if there were not 
it would seem that '2 + 2 = 4' must be false; considered as numerals, 
what appears on the left hand side of the identity sign is not identical 
with what appears on the right hand side. However I think it is crucial 
to notice two things that do not follow from this fact: (i) it does not. 
follow from this fact alone that the relationship between numeral and 
number is that of name to object; (ii) it does not show that numerals 
are theoretically dispensible in the mathematical enterprise. 
To assert point (i) is to invite the question, 'how else can 
numeral and number be related ?' The answer, I think, is this: a numeral 
is a number iff the numeral is understood to mark a place in a numbering 
system; distinct numerals or number words 'represent' .the same number 
if they mark the same place in a numbering system. Thus, '2', 'two', 
'deux', represent the same number since they all represent the same place 
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in the series of natural numbers 0, 1,2,3,4, ••• Essentially, distinct 
numerals represent the same number if they are functionally eguivalent. 
On this view, then, a physical insc~p~oft of some kind is not a 
sufficient condition for a numeral to be a number for it also must be 
understood by a language community to playa particular role in a 
numbering system. This does not mean there may not be numbers which ~; .. 
one can talk about without being able to give their notation. If, for 
instance, there is a largest prime number we do not currently know 
what its notation is but it seems reasonable to suppose that there is 
such a number iff it could be represented in one of our notations. (The 
possible difficulty of not having enough time or paper to write the 
I 
number out can be overcome by our adoption of abbreviations). 
Point (li) above, that numerals are not dispensib1e, is worth some 
attention. K5rner writes,13 
"The strokes on paper and the operations upon them are just as 
little the subject-matter of metamathematics as figures and 
constructions on paper are the subject-matter of Euclidian geometry. 
Both types of marks and constructions are diagrammatic; and diagrams 
however useful and practically indispensible, are 'representations' 
which are neither identical nor isomorphic with what they are used 
to represent." 
There is a sense in which I concur with the sentiment expressed by the. 
first sentence but here I wish to register at least some qualifications 
with respect to the sentiment expressed by the second sentence. Even 
to express qualifications concerning that sentiment entails that my 
view is a minority one within the philosophy of mathematics; P1atonists, 
intuitionists and logicists (certainly Frege) all believe numerals to 
be theoretically, if not practically, dispensible. My views may best be 
developed by examining KSrner's views in more detail. 
Korner defends the thesis that logic and (pure) mathematics form 
two separate, a-priori sciences. Korner also defends the view that 
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whereas pure mathematics is a-priori, applied mathematics is empirical. 
Central to his account is the distinction he draws between 'exact' and 
'inexact' concepts. This distinction is most easily explained by 
referring to the point in his book where Korner distinguishes 'Natural 
number' (capital 'N') from 'natural number' (lower-case'n'). The former 
concept is applicable to groups of perceptual objects as when someone 
says 'There are two apples', but the latter concept, K~rner claims, may 
a21 be applicable to groups of perceptual objects. He writes,14 
" ••• the Natural numbers •• are empirical concepts, characteristics 
of perceptual patterns, such as groups of strokes or of temporally 
separated experiences. They and their relations to each other are 
found, not postulated • 
••• the Natural numbers 1,2,etc. are inexact in the sense that they 
admit of border-line cases, i.e. patterns to which they can with 
equal correctness be assigned or refused. They share this inexactneE 
with other empirical concepts. The natural numbers 1, 2, etc. on 
the other hand are exact." 
K5rner's distinction between exact and inexact concepts is interesting 
but does not, I think, provide an entirely satisfactory account of the 
relation between pure and applied mathematics. K~rner notes, I think 
rightly, that mathematical concepts are frequently idealizations based 
on empirical experience. It seems reasonable to suppose that the concept 
of number evolved from repeated experiments in counting sheep etc. 
There may have been a time when collections of particular kinds of 
objects were given names before the full concept of number, naming 
collections as cOllection~emerged,15 Korner also notes, again rightly 
I think, that in applying mathematical concepts to the world it is 
not only number concepts which have to given an empirical interpretation 
but also operations such as addition. Here a difference between rdrner's 
view and mine begins to emerge however, a difference I may summarize 
by saying that the idealization from empirical concepts to mathematical 
concepts also operates in the other direction. Consider addition for 
example. 'Addition' as used in informal, everyday contexts has no 
- 192 -
precise definition but I ca~ illustrate my view as follows. If someone 
wanted to count a pile of wooden blocks an appropriate way of proceeding 
would be as follows: take a block from the pile, place it in a separate 
location and count '1'; take another block from the pile, place it on 
top of the other block and count 'two' etc. When completed the last 
numeral cited will tell one the number of blocks in the pile. If, 
however, one places one drop of mercury on top of another drop of 
mercury, one ends up not with two drops of mercury, but with one larger 
drop of mercury. Now of course we don't regard this as a 'counter-
example' to '1 + 1 = 2' - this is my point. Rather, we would say that 
this does not constitut.e a proper method of addition. What, then, 
distinguishes a proper from an improper method of addition ? The correct 
answer appears to me to be that those methods of addition are correct 
which confirm the truth of '1 + 1 = 2' ! On this View, what accounts 
for the apparent certainty of elementary arithmetic as applied to the 
world is not only our familiarity with the basic physical way the world 
operates but also the interpretations we give to mathematical 
operations to ensure that there are no 'counterexamples'. In fact the 
mercury example is not all that unusual: there is non-commutativity in 
'adding' to one's feet shoes + socks rather than socks + shoes; and non-
associativity in the 'sums' baking powder + (milk and other ingredients) 
and (baking powder + milk) and other ingredients. 
I am not suggesting, of course, that we are wrong in ignoring such 
'counterexamples' but rather that our central concept of addition is 
privileged because it is the most useful. If noncommutative relations 
were more important in our lives than commutative ones, we would consider 
noncommutative 'arithmetic' normal and commutative arithmetic deviant. 
Against K~rner I am urging that there are not two kinds of mathematical 
concepts, '1 + 1 = 2' as a pure, exact, certain a-priori truth and 
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'1 + 1 = 2' as an applied, inexact, empirical and fallible truth. I 
suggest that we arrived at '1 + 1 = 2' on empirical grounds (as Korner 
admits) and that we then 'read back' from that statement when it comes 
to applying that statement to the world. It seems to me that Korner is 
wrong when he claims that exact and inexact concepts bear no 
relationship to one another. 
K~rner, as I have already said, takes the view that numerals are in 
principle dispensible. It seems to me that there are objections to that 
view which are similar to those I urged against the view that 
propositions are truth-bearers. If, as K~rner urges, numerals are 
dispensible there are difficulties in attempting to understana how 
intersubjective agreement in 'the use of mathematical concepts is possible 
, and difficulties in understanding the relationship between numerals 
and numbers. On the former point, as with sentence tokens, the public 
nature of physical inscriptions provides at least a hopeful basis from 
which one can attempt to understand how individuals acquire mathematical 
concepts. The second point really goes to the heart of the central 
objection to a Platonistic or Fregean conception of mathematics, viz. 
simply saying that numbers are abstract entities which numeral ~ 
does not explain anything - it merely leaves us with an unexplained 
relationship. Frege's jibes against Mill's pebble arithmetic are 
wonderful rhetoric but should not be allowed to obscure the difficulties 
in Frege's own view. 16 
As a final comment on Korner·s views that will lead into the next 
section, I would add that his views lead one to expect certainty in 
mathematical knowledge in the wrong place. I should argue that even if 
there is certain knowledge in mathematics, K5rner's view misloctes it -
I feel much more inclined to say that 'one apple + one apple = two 
apples' is certain than that '1 + 1 = 2' is an a-priori truth. It is, 
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however, to the issue of certainty that I now turn. 
(2) The Loss of Certaintyl? 
(a) Background: The Failure of the 'Foundations' 
"Just think: in mathematics, this paragon of reliability and truth, 
the very notions and inferences, as everyone learns, teaches, and 
uses them, lead to absurdities. And where else would reliability 
and truth be found if even mathematical thinking fails ?" 18 
The three major philosophies of mathematics which were developed 
during the later part of the 19th. century and the earlier part of the 
20th. century - logicism, intuitionism and formalism - all attempted, in 
differing ways, to provide firm, certain foundations for mathematics. 
; By way or providing background to a discussion of the epistemological 
status of mathematics I will briefly discuss the reasons for that failure 
Logicism, historically the first of the three major views, had its 
classical exposition in the work of Frege. Frege believed that the lack 
of a clear foundation for mathematics was a scandal which he hoped to 
rectify by showin« how mathematics could be derived from self-evide~t 
logical principles. In carrying out this programme, however, Frege made 
an assumption which Russell showed led to a contradiction. Of the 
assumption in question, 'law V' of the Grundgesetze, Frege had said that 
it was a principle " •• which logicians perhaps have not yet expressly 
enuciated" but concluded the preface to his work by saying,l9 
"It is prima facie improbable that such a structure could be erected 
on a base that was uncertain or defective ••• As a refutation of this 
I can only recognize someone's actuallY demonstrating either that 
a better, or more durable edifice can be erected upon other 
fundamental convictions, or else that my principles lead to manifest, 
false conclusions. But no one will be able to do that." 
Sadly for Frege he was proved wrong. Russell (and Poincare) believed 
that the source of the paradox which could be derived from Frege's work 
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lay in the use of impredicative definitions, that is when a set ~, and 
particular object m, are so defined that m is a member of M and the 
- - -
definition of ~ depends on ~. Now the Frege-Russell definition of number 
went something like this: 20 Frege and Russell identified the cardinal 
number M of a set M with the set of sets equivalent to M. Then a finite 
cardinal number can be defined as a cardinal number which posssess the 
property ~ such that: (1) 0 has the property P, and (2) n + 1 has the 
property f whenever n has the property. In brief, a natural number is 
defined as a cardinal number for which mathematical induction holds. 
This definition of a natural number is impredicative because the property 
of being a natural number belongs to the totality of properties of 
natural numbers, which is presupposed in the definition. 
To adopt logicism to the situation arising out of the paradoxes, 
Russell excluded. impredicative definitions by his ramified theory of 
types. Roughly this may be described as follows: the primary objects or 
individuals are assigned to one type (say type 0), properties of 
individuals to type 1, properties of p~operties of individuals to type 
2 etc., and no properties are admitted which do not fall into one of 
these logical types. (A fuller description would describe the order types 
for relations and classes). Then, to exclude impredicative definitions 
within a type, the types above type 0 are further separated into orders. 
Thus for type 1, properties defined without mentioning any totality 
belong to order 0, and properties defined using the totality of propertie5 
of a given order belong to the next higher order. However, this 
separation into orders makes it impossible to implement the definition 
of natural number which contains impredicative definitions. To escape 
this outcome Russell postulated his axiom of reducibility, which asserts 
that to any property belonging to an order above the lowest there is a 
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coextensive property of order O. But what is the justification for this 
axiom? In the second edition of Principia Mathematica Russell and 
Whitehead said,21 "This axiom has a purely pragmatic justification: it 
leads to the desired results and no others. But clearly it is not the 
sort of axiom with which we can rest content." Weyl said that in the 
system of Principia Mathematica, "Mathematics is no longer founded on 
logic, but on a sort of logician's paradise ••• ,,2~ Aside from the ~ hoc 
nature of the axiom of reducibility it.is not clear that impredicative 
.... 
definitions really are always objectionable. Ramsey stated that he could 
see nothing wrong with referring to the man with the highest batting 
average in a team. (Note that that description may be all one can say 
about some individual. if, for instance, one gave that description in 
-
response to the general question, 'how should one choose the opening 
, 
batsman ?') Although today it is generally agreed that mathematics can 
be expressed in terms of logic plus some version of set theory this 
'Victory' is an empty one with respect to the initial optimistic 
epistemological ambitions of the original programme. 
I 
Intuitionism differed fdndamentally in ~ from both logicism and 
formalism; whereas logicists and formalists were concerned to search 
for firm foundations for classical mathematics, especially when prompted 
by the discovery of the paradoxes, intuitionists viewed the discovery 
of the paradoxes as indicative of something wrong with classical 
mathematics itself. Far, therefore, from feeling obliged to 'save' the 
results established by previous mathematicians, they were openly 
sceptical about many of those results. Intuitionism gave rise to a new 
kind of mathematics. I need to make it clear from the outset that I 
-
bave no criticism to offer of intuitionist mathematics but I do wish to 
criticize intuitionism as a philosophy of mathematics. Intuitionist 
'" 
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mathematics is interesting and important independently of its 
philosophical presuppositions. 
According to the intuitionists (intuitionist) mathematics is 
absolutely certain because it rests on direct awareness of mental 
constructions. Brouwer writes,23 
"The first act of intuitionism completely separates mathematics 
from mathematical language, in particular from the phenomena of 
language which are described by theoretical logic, and recognizes 
that intuitionist mathematics is an essentially languageless .~ 
activity of the mind having its origin in the perception of a move 
~ ~, i.e. of the falling apart of a life moment into two ----
distinct things, one of which gives way to the other, but is 
retained by memory. If the two-ity thus born is divested of all 
quality, there remains the empty form of the common sUbstratum 
of all two-ities. It is this common substratum, this empty form, 
which is the basic intuition of mathematics. " 
-
• I have a~ready argued in section 1 that there are reasons for not 
supposing that physical inscriptions are theoretically dispensible from 
the point / of view of explal\'''~ how ma thema tical knowledge is possible. 
The obscurity of Brouwer's passage hardly encourages me to alter this 
view; what is a 'move of time' 1, what are the 'two things' refered to ?, 
what is the !empty form of the common substratum of all two-ities l ? 
I My failure to understand this passage is so great that rather than press 
this point I will turn to the other philosophical presupposition of 
intuitionism - that it provides self-evident truths. 
The essential problem with 'self-evidence' is this: many things 
that people have claimed to be selt-evident have been incompatible, 
therefore either people may sometimes mistakenly claim that something 
is self-evident when it is not, or something may be self-evident 
without being true. Whichever option one takes one has no way of knowing 
when something really is self-evident. In fact the intuitionists did 
not even agree amongst themselves as to ~hat truths were self-evident. 
'" 
- 198 -
Brouwer accepted as self-evident the claim that a square-circle cannot 
exist but Griss (another intuitionist) thought that we cannot have a 
clear idea of objects which do not exist. 24 It is true to say that my 
criticism of intuitionism is purely 'philosophical' but it does seem to 
me that the notion of the self-evident clearly is discredited, and that 
the intuitionist~s account of how mathematics ought to be conducted is 
so obscure, that the rejection of their philosophy of mathematics is 
entirely reasonable. 
Hilbert wanted to justify the results of classical mathematics 
(including Cantor's set theory) by finite methods. In the light of the 
paradoxes of set theory this involved (at least) proving that a formal 
system adequate for the mathematics in question was consistent. Prior to 
Hilbert, the me~hod used in proving the consistency of an axiomatic 
theory was to give a model for that theory, i~e. to provide a system of 
objects, chosen from some other theory, which satisfy the axioms. That 
is, to each object or primitive term of the axiomatic theory, an object 
or term is correlated in such a way that the axioms become theorems of 
the other theory. If this ot~er theory ,is/consistent than the axiomatic 
theory must be consistent. This kind of proof of consistency is, 
however, only relative, it only shows that the one theory is consistent 
if the other theory is consistent. One possible thought is this: if 
one can provide an interpretation of a theory in terms of the physical 
world, one's theory must be consistent since the physical world must be 
consistent. However, when it comes to the idea of completed infinities 
it is by no means obvious that this is possible. Hilbert and Bernays 
argued against the possibility of doing this by considering Zeno's 
paradox that a runner cannot run a course in a finite time since in so 
.. 
doing he must pass through the infinite series of distances t + t + i ... 
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Instead of accepting the usual solution (observing that the infinite 
series ot intervals required to run the successive segments converges) 
they said that,25 
And, 
tI •• there is •• a much more radical solution of the paradox. This 
consists in the consideration that we are by no means obliged to 
believe that the mathematical space-time representation of motion 
is physically significant for arbitrarily small space and time 
intervals; but rather have every basis to suppose that that 
mathematical model extrapolates the facts of a certain realm of 
experience ••• " 
"Closer examination then shows that an infinity is actually not 
given to us at all, but is first interpolated or extrapolated 
through an intellectual process." . 
.... 
Therefore if consistency is to be proved for those parts of mathematics 
which deal with completed infinities it must be by a different method. 
~. . 
Hilbert's contribution was to conceive of a method of proving absolute 
I 
consistency by showing that no 199ical contradiction can be derived from 
the theory in question by proving a proposition about the theory itself, 
i.e~ specifically about all of the possible proofs of the theorems in 
the theory. The mathematical theory whose consistency it is hoped to 
prove then itself becomes the object of study and this procedure 
, I 
Hilbert called metamathematics or 'proof theory'. 
Hilbert drew a distinction between 'real' and 'ideal' statements in 
classical mathematics. The ~ statements are those used with intuitive 
meaning, the ideal statements are those which are not so used. The 
statements which correspond to the treatment of the infinite as actual 
are ideal. Above Hilbert and Bernays were quoted as saying that 'infinity 
is •• not given to us but is extrapolated' and that idea can be expressed 
in terms of real and ideal statements: one hopes to show how, starting 
; 
from real statements, using methods which are unobjectionable (finitary), 
one can derive the ideal statements. As~n example of this one might 
start with the natural numbers, then adjoin the negative numbers, then 
'. 
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the fractions, then the irrationals, then the imaginary numbers etc. 
Taking the concept of the metamathematical point of view, together 
with the distinction between real and ideal statements, one can 
describe Hilbert's programme thus: to show that the ideal statements 
of classical mathematics are justified by proving metamathematically 
that a formal system or systems in which the ideal statements are 
expressed, is consistent. How did this programme fare? In short, it 
failed, but its failure was perhaps more interesting and intellectually 
exciting than success would have been. The most interesting way in 
which it failed was demonstrated by G8del. At the International Congress 
of Mathematics in Bologna in 1928, Hilbert stated two problems of 
completeness: the problem of showing that every universally valid 
logical schema is derivable by the rules of the predicate calculus, and 
the problem of showing the completeness of formalized number theory in 
the sense that the formal system of number theory contains no formula 
which, together with its negation, can be shown ~ , ",' ,to be 
underviable in the system. Gt)de,l proved completca~ for the predicate 
calculus but he also proved the incompleteness of formalized number 
theory in the strong sense that no strictly formal system is possible in 
which each true number-theoretic proposition is derivable. 26 
27 Godel's result and others (e.g. those of Church and Skolem ) 
meant that the formalist programme could not be completed. What are the 
philosophical lessons of this failure for formalism ? One of the 
28 important problems for formalists is posed by Kleene, 
"The delicate point in the formalist position is to explain how 
the non-intuistionistic classical mathematics is significant, after 
having intitially agreed with the intuitionists that its theorems 
lack a clear meaning in terms of whieh they are true." 
The thought which underlies Kleene's point can be exp~essed in terms of 
'. 
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the distinction between real and ideal statements. The terms 'real' and 
tideal' suggest a metaphysical distinction: the real statements employ 
terms which denote, ideal statements employ concepts which are really 
nothing more than convenient fictions or idealizations. However, the 
distinction between 'real' and 'ideal' statements should, I suggest, 
merely be taken to represent an epistemological distinction. (There CQuld 
be a happier choice of terms in my view). It is true that any analysis 
must begin somewhere, it must take some concepts for granted, and then 
hope to explain the concepts which seem more problematic in terms of 
the concepts which seem less problematic. The intuitionists were prepared 
to take the concept of natural number as primitive and that might seem 
a reasonable starting"point, but this should not be taken to imply that 
a natUral number is not itself an idealization. For the reasons given in 
section lnatural numbers are not happily thought of simply as some 
kind of abstract entity or thing. 
At this point it is possible, and useful, to compare formalism, 
intUitionism and logicism with pespect to the epistemological status of 
mathematics. Formalism failed to establish a certain foundation for , 
mathematics because the metamathematical programme to which it gave rise 
could not be completed. With the important qualification concerning real 
and ideal statements just made above however, its general metaphysical 
stance seems reasonable to me. Unlike logicists and intuitionists, 
formalists take the inscriptions used in the activity of mathematics 
seriously and that fact augurs well for the possibility of explaining 
the public and intersubjective nature of mathematical knowledge. 
Epistemologically logicism failed in a different way: like the formalists 
logicists wanted to explain the more problematic concepts in terms of 
simpler concepts. One might well say, however, that as it turned out the 
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explanation of number in set-theoretic terms explained the conceptually 
simple in terms of the complex ! With that outcome its attempt to 
provide certain foundations tottered. With respect to the philosophical 
basis of intuitionism I can best explain my view by means of an analogy. 
My analogy concerns the arguments creationists raise against evolutionary 
theory. These arguments begin by pointing out, quite correctly, that 
there are some difficulties in the theory of evolution. (There are 
always difficulties with any major scientific theory). The next step, .-
however, is to propose a radically different theory ('creationism') 
where there seems to be good reason for saying that the problems of the 
new theory make the problems of the old theory appear insignificant. 
It,.is not merely that, one set of problems have been exchanged for 
another set of problems but that they have been exchanged for a much 
bigger and more intractable set of problems. Philosophically speaking, 
intuitionists start by raising worries someone might reasonably have -
worries about non-denumerable infinities say - but philosophically the 
notions of self-evidence and mental constructions upon which the cure is 
based seem worse than the disease. What I, think the intuitionists have 
, 
done, contrary to their intentions, is to show that there can be 
interesting and significantly different kinds of mathematics. 
The loss of certainty was experienced by some philosophers and 
mathematicians as a loss of faith; it would not be exaggerating, I think, 
to say that for some it amounted to a personal tragedy. (I think of 
Frege, Russell and possibly Cantor in this respect). Today we should, 
I believe, view the 'loss' as gain; the failure of the 'foundations' 
has left mathematics and metamathematics in a fascinating position and 
led to 'G5del's proof' - surely one of th, outstanding achievements in 
the history of ideas. 
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(b) Structuralism and Epistemology: Some Speculations 
P~ter recounts a rather charming and possibly instructive anecdote,2~ 
"One of our professors began his first lecture by asking one of the 
ladies: 'Madam, have you ever seen a point l' This was rather 
unexpected, but the answer came: 'No, I have not.' 'Have you ever 
drawn a point l' came the next question. 'I have' came the reply, 
but the lady in question quickly changed her mind and said, 'I mean 
I have tried but never succeeded.' (It is this answer that endeared 
our year to our professor for the rest of his ~ife !)" 
One can understand why the professor was pleased since an important .-
part of acquiring mathematical knowledge consists in becoming aware 
that one is dealing with abstractions and it is probably impossible to 
progress very far beyond elementary arithmetic if one constantly 
demands concrete interpretations. The anecdote suggests something else 
however:one can imagine a mathematics teacher introducing the concept 
ot a mathematical point by saying ot a physical pOint, 'well, it is like 
that but it does not occupy space.' Now that simile raises a thought 
that will seem shocking to some - could mathematical knowledge ultimately 
depend upon such similes ? One motivating thought against my suggestion 
might go something like this: if we say that something is like something 
\ I 
else in certain respects we may just be making a statement which is 
'merely' relative to human experience. A long tradition in philosophy 
has it that (real) knowledge tells us how the world is not merely 
relatively to human experience but how it is absolutely. Philosophers 
who subscribe to that tradition would therefore find my suggestion 
unacceptable - mathematical knowledge is generally (unlike, say, poetry) 
taken seriously as knowledge and therefore, for philosophers of that 
persuasion, can't depend on ineliminable similes or metaphors. Note 
that nominalists, no less than Platonists or realists, share this 
tradition. Indeed, the whole universal/particular debate seems to depend 
,., 
upon taking this tradition. seriously for if one is pr~pared to rest 
content with an analysis which does not necessarily eliminate the human 
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perspective there does not seem to be a problem about universals. The 
problem about universals comes from wanting to say what universals are 
~-relatively to human experience. Since throughout the thesis I have 
been arguing for the view that the human perspective is ineliminable 
I take it that it is clear that I am not engaged in special pleading 
on behalf of mathematics. 
In section 1 I refered to my view as being quasi-empirical and I 
want to be a little more specific about what this means. Perhaps the 
first thing Iought to emphasize is that I do not believe that any 
........ 
mathematical statement is merely an empirical generalization from 
experience. Talk of empiricism in mathematics is bound to bring to mind 
the views of Mill. Miil does seem to have held that mathematical 
statements are generalizations from experience. Mill wrote,30 
! 
ttThe science of number is ••• no exception to the conclusion ••• that 
the processes even of deductive sciences are altogether inductive 
and that their first principles are generalizations from experience." 
My difference from Mill may be expressed in two ways: (i) that 
mathematical statements are not simply generalizations from experience 
but rather idealizations of ~xperience (as with the points ~hat don't 
occupy space). (ii) that it may be the case that sometimes our experience 
of the world is interpreted in terms of mathematics. The positivists 
argued that an arithmetical statement like '2 + 2 = 4' could not be 
empirical because there could be no evidence to disconfirm it; Lehman in 
his (1979), defending an empiricist view of mathematiCS, envisages 
situations where one might want to question such statements. I, however, 
would rather point to the cases such as the 'addition' of one drop of 
mercury to another where we do not obtain two drops of mercury. My point 
is that we have become so adept at interpreting elementary mathematical 
.... 
statements in terms of physical experience that we cease to notice that 
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interpretation is involved at all. That is the point I would urge 
against Mill for I believe it shows that mathematical statements aren't 
simply 'read off' from experience; we interpret physical statements in 
terms of mathematics and vice versa. (Compare Goodman's comments on the 
justification of deduction in terms of making mutual adjustments 
between rules of inference and inferences yielded.) I would, however, 
support Lehman in one contention he makes. To say that some statement is 
.... 
"empirical t is not exactly unambiguous. I take it that most of us 
believe, as lay-physicists, that a perfectly normal table, in perfectly 
normal circumstances, won't explode. If a table does explode we would 
need a lot of convincing that there were not ab,normal circumstances 
involved.: .. Now if one is prepared to say that the belief that normal 
• 
tables, in normal circumstances, don't explode is empirical (a usage 
. 
that seems perfectly acceptable to me but others might count that belief 
as 'metaphysical') then it seems to me that '2 + 2 = 4' is empirical • 
.. 
Certainly we would need a lot of convincing that the addition of two 
'normal' objects ('objects' unlike drops of mercury) with two other 
'normal' objects does not equal four objects but that, surely, is 
I 
\ 
because of familarity based on experience - ultimately there is no 
gainsaying what will happen. 
If mathematics is empirical at all, one might expect that our 
degree of confidence in the truth of mathematical statements would vary. 
Physicists, presumably, don't have the same degree of confidence in some 
well-confirmed, long established experimental result as they do in the 
latest recherche' theory ·about black holes. Yet one peculiOKlty about 
most philosophies of mathematics has been that they have presupposed 
that we are equally certain about all mathematical statements. Partially 
'., 
I suppose that has been because of the domineering dichotomy of the 
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analytic/synthetic distinction. When this is pointed out it does, I 
think, give one cause to pause and wonder whether most philosophy of 
mathematics has really been along the right lines. 
If one of the problems with the claim that mathematics is empirical 
is that elementary arithmetical statements seem to be absolutely certain, 
the converse of the problem is that for relatively sophisticated 
mathematical statements the only potential falsifiers would seem to be 
logical inconsistencies. The interesting suggestion that Lakatos makes 
is that where a formal theory is the formalization of an informal theory, 
then a formal theory could be said to be 'refuted' if one of its 
theorems is negated by the corresponding theorem in the informal theory. 
Lakatos calls such an' informal theorem an heuristic falsifier of the 
-
formal theory. As an example Lakatos imagines the situation where some 
machine churns out a formal proof in a formal set theory of a formula 
whose intended meaning is that there exists a non-Goldbachian even 
number. At the same time someone might prove informally that all even 
numbers are Goldbachian. It this proof can be formalized within the 
system of the set theory the~ the theory will be inconsistent. But if 
it cannot be thus formalized, the set theory will not have been shown 
to be inconsistent but only a false theory of arithmetic (whilst still 
being a possibly true theory of some mathematical theory that is not 
isomorphic to arithmetic). Then the informally proved Goldbach theorem 
may be called an heuristic falsifier of the formal set theory. Similarly, 
a demonstration of the so-called 'N-inconsistency' of a system of 
arithmetic (that is, a demonstration oflxP(x) & -P(D), -P(l) ••• , for 
some predicate 'P') would be a heuristic falsification of it. Lakatos 
goes'on to note that a heuristic falsifier is only a falsifier in a 
Pickwickian sense, it only suggests a falsification. But this does not 
sharply separate mathematics from physics. Lakatos claims, plausibly to 
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my mind, that "One can show that most classical refutations in the 
history of science and mathematics •• are heuristic falsifications.,,3l 
I should like to emphasize two points implicit in the above. The 
first point is that the discovery and acceptance of mathematical 
statements is a tentative process. Even if it now appears that some 
mathematical statements are very unlikely to be rejected or refuted that 
is partially because they have stood the test of time and this does not 
distinguish them from other kinds of statements. Gandy expresses the 
tentative process of mathematical discovery very nicely,32 
" ••• much of a worthwhile mathematical journey will be spent in a" 
fog of incomplete analogies, half-worked-out examples, and hazy 
intuitions. By trial and error, by exploring blind alleys, by 
hard and imaginative thought, the mathematician finally emerges 
on the sunlit summit. The clouds disperse and a direct route is 
seen and retraced. Traditionally - though perhaps wrongly - the 
published account describes only this direct route; the gropings 
and false trails are ignored." 
The second point is that mathematical statements are not tested in 
isolation but holistically. As early as 1928 Hilbert wrote that,33 
"It is by no means reasonable t,o set up in general the requirement that 
each separate formula should be interpretable by itself ••• " In theoretical 
physics "only certain combinations and consequences of the physical 
laws can be checked experimentally - likewise in my proof theory only 
the real statements are immediately capable of a verification." I should 
only add that even the so-called 'real' statements do not confront the 
world in isolation • 
. Lakatos quotes an impressive array of mathematicians and philosophers 
who have reached the conclusion that the epistemological status of 
mathematics is quasi-empirical in the sense that mathematics is fallible 
and ultimately dependent upon experience~ The conclusion gains credibility 
from the fact that it is a conclusion very many have been very reluctant 
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to reach. I won't reproduce the quotations but the list includes, 
Frankenel, Curry, Car nap , Church, G~del, Rosser, Weyl, Von Neumann, 
Bernays, Kalamor and Russell. The conviction that mathematics provides 
absolutely certain knowledge has taken a long time to overcome. Partially 
that was because dogmatism with respect to other areas of inquiry had 
to be overcome first - mathematics seemed to provide the last bastion 
of certainty. Partially it was also because it seemed that mathematics 
must have a very different relationship to reality because of the 
theories that were held about ~-mathematical knowledge. That is to say 
that so long as the analytic/synthetic distinction was unquestioned; so 
long as the 'theory-laden' nature of perception had not beenrealized; 
and so long as the relation between language and reality has an 
I 
'atomistic' rather than an 'holistic' model, it was inevitable that 
, 
mathematics.must appear to have a very different epistemological status 
and a very different relation to the world from other areas of inquiry. 
With the withering of the shibboleths of traditional epistemology the 
vista of a unified account of knowledge has opened up and I hope it is 
clear that the conclusions toward which I am moving do not justify a 
sharp distinction between mathematical and other kinds of knowledge. 
My final speculative suggestion is that if we concentrated upon 
th.e question of the acqui.si tion of mathematical concepts and their 
practical application, we may be enabled to make faster progress in the 
philosophy of mathematics than has been evident to date. 
(3) Mathematics and the World 
Why mathematics should prove useful in our dealings with the world, 
whether it be at the prosaic level of co~n1ing objects, or at the 
highest level of physical theory, is a fascinating question. To explore 
" 
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this issue in the light of the preceding sections, it will be convenient 
for me to compare and contrast my views with those expressed by Field 
in his book Science Without Numbers (1980). It is a particularly 
appropriate work for my purposes because on the one hand I find Field's 
answer to the question of why mathematics is useful interesting and 
suggestive, but on the other hand I do not share his overall philosophic 
ambition. I will begin by describing what Field attempts to do, proceed 
to the important pOints of agreement, and conclude by discussing where 
we disagree. 
The position for which Field argues is nominalism - the view that 
there are no abstract entities. To argue for this view Field proposes 
I 
to ~-show that mathematics needed for application to the physical world 
need not include anything which even prima facie contains references 
to (or quantifies over) abstract entities like numbers, functions or 
sets. To the major part of mathematics which does contain references to 
abstract entities, Field adopts a fictionalist attitude - that is he does 
not regard it as being true. He proposes to justify this fictionalism 
by showing that there is a reformulation of science that does not require 
the use of any'>,> mathematics that refers to or quantifies over 
abstract entities. Clearly this view commits Field to a large programme. 
He does not claim to have completed this programme in this work but he 
does claim to "have gone as far as to provide a sketch of how a nominalist 
version of the Newtonian theory of gravitation could be given. 
How does Field propose to implement this programme ? The basic 
claim that Field makes is as follows: suppose N is a nominalistic 
formulation of a scientific theory (i.e. a formulation that does not 
quantify over abstract entities) and ~ is a mathematical theory, then 
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one couldn't get any nominalistically statable assertions from ~ + § 
that one couldn't get from ~ alone. The mathematical theory however is 
useful in making inferences much easier and quicker to draw than they 
would be if one were to avoid the use of the mathematical theory. One 
caveat must be entered however. Since N is a nominalistic theory it may 
say things which rule ~ the existence of abstract entities and this 
could make N. + S inconsistent. To deal with this Field first introduces 
a one place predicate M(x) meaning 'x is a mathematical entity'; second, 
for any nominalistically statable assertion !, A* is the assertion that 
results by restricting each quantifier of ! with the formula 'not 
M(Xi)'lfor the appropriate variable 'xi'); third, for any nominalistically 
stated body of assert10ns li, let N* consist of all assertions !* for ! 
in !. N* is then an agnostic version of !. If ! says that all objects 
I 
obey Newton s laws, then N* says that all non-mathematical objects obey 
Newtonls laws but allows for the possibility that there are mathematical 
objects which do not. 
Field says that the key to. using a mathematical system S as an aid 
to drawing conclusions from a nominalistic system ! lies in proving 
in H*+ S the equivalence of a statement in !* alone with some other 
statement (which he calls an abstract counterpart of the statement in 
N~) which quantifies over abstract entities. Then, to determine the 
validity of an inference in N* (or of an inference in N) one need not 
proceed directly; instead one can 'ascend' from one or more statements 
in !* to abstract counterparts of them, then use S to prove from these 
abstract counterparts an abstract counterpart of some other statement 
in N*, and 'descend'back to that statement to that statement in N*. 
I will outline an tllustration Field gives. of this procedure. 
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The illustration is where the mathematical theory to be applied 
is the arithmetic of natural numbers plus some set theory. Suppose ~ 
is a theory which contains the identity symbol and the usual axioms 
of identity but does not contain any terms or quantifiers for abstract 
entitiej .• ! does not contain singular terms like '87'. It is convenient 
to suppose that N contains quantifiers like '387 ' (there are exactly 
87) and '187' (there are at least 87). Tiresome though it would be we 
do know how we could dispense with these quantifiers in favour of the 
standard universal or existential. We are now invited to consider the 
following argument in N: 
(1) there are exactly twenty-one aardvarks, 
(2) on each aardvark ,there are exactly three bugs, 
"'" 
(3) each bug is on exactly one aardvark; so, 
(4) there are exactly sixty-three bugs. 
To discover whether this is a valid argument in ! would take a great 
deal of work but if one has a mathematical system §, which includes the 
arithmetic of the natural numbers plus some set theory, things are 
simplified considerably. As an abstract cpunterpart of the first claim 
we have: 
(1') the cardinality of the set of aardvarks is 21. 
(I') is an abstract counterpart of (1) because the equivalence of (1) 
and (1') is provable in li + 2. Abstract counterparts of the other 
premises and of the conclusion are: 
(2') all sets in the range of the function whose domain is the set of 
aardvarks, and which assigns to each entity in its domain the set of 
bugs on that entity have cardinality 3. 
(3') the function mentioned in (2') is 1-1 and its range forms a 
partition of the set of all bugs. 




Now in ~ one can prove: 
(a) if all members of a partition of a set! have cardinality~, 
and the cardinality of the set of members of the partition is ~ , 
then the cardinality of ~ is do .~. 
(b) the range and domain of a 1-1 function have the same cardinality. 
(c) 3.21 = 63. 
Since (1'), (2') and (3') in conjunction with (a}-(c) entail (4'); 
and since (1') - (4') are abstract counterparts of (1) - (4), (4) 
has been proved from (1) - (3) in li + £. 
Field's approach to the usefulness of m~thematic6 is, I think, 







e ....... 1------------------- Me 
'T' = some informal fragment of everyday discourse; a scientific theory 
or a mathematical theory. 
'M' = some mathematical theory (formal or informal). 
'MC' = the conclusion reached in some mathematical theory. 
'e' the conclusion reached in the original theory. 
The horizontal arrows represent mappings from T into M, or from MC into C. 
This picture is no doubt oversimplif~ed but one can view a great 
-. 
deal of mathematical activity in its terms. Sometimes mathematicians 
define and study the structures represented by.tl with the intention of 
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dealing with 1, and sometimes not. The theory of real numbers and the 
theory of differentiation of real numbers was developed in order to 
deal with physical space and time and various theories in which space 
and/or time playa role such as Newtonian mechanics. On the other hand 
it is sometimes discovered that a mathematical theory can be an 
interpretation for some other theory as, for example, when Shannon 
showed that the states, switches and relays in an electric circuit is 
an interpretation of abstract Boolean algebra.34 As an example of the .-
interpretation of one mathematical theory in terms of another one might 
mention analytic geometry, where Descartes showed how to express 
Euclidian geometry in algebraic terms. This is a precise example of the 
vi~w Field suggests ~ having expressed geometric figures in algebraic 
DF 
terms, proof can be carried out more easily by the use~lgebra before 
being reinterpreted geometrically. 
I hope it may be clear--that this view of the application of 
mathematics fits nicely with structuralism. One example of a structure 
described by Gandy has two elements a and 1, and two operations called 
I 
'plus' (+) and 'times' (.). ~e structure is defined completely by the 
following equations: 
o + 0 = 0, 0 + 1 = 1, 1 + 0 = 1, 1 + 1 = O. 
o • 0 = 0, ° . 1 = 0, 1 .- ° - 0, 1 • 1 = 1. 
If one reads '0' as even and !l' as odd, then the equations above give 
the laws of the odd and the even. The equations also give the rules 
of binary arithmetic as used in computing. Further, the structure is 
the simplest example ofa finite number field investigated by Galois, 
and plays a fundamental role in the theory of numbers and algebraic 
geometry. This brings me back to the poin~ stressed in section 1, that 
~ 
the elements and relations that the mathematician is interested in may b~ 
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studied independently of their concrete interpretations. 
In the 'picture' I represented the line from! to f as broken to 
indicate that I am not commited to the thesis Field is concerned to 
argue - that where! is a nominalistic formulation of a scientific 
theory there is a direct route to C which does not require one to 
quantify over abstract entities. The importance of Field's work, I think, 
resides in its suggestiveness with respect to the usefulness of 
mathematics rather than in his nominalist ambitions. The argument Field 
gives for the usefulness of mathematics could, I believe, profitab~ be 
developed further to the benefit of both the philosophy of mathematics 
and the philosophYtof science. Given my views, however, it hardly seems 
likely that Field's desire for a pure nominalism can be satisfied; 
whatever else physics and mathematics may be able to do without it 
hardly seems likely that they can do without relations, and relations, 
I have suggested, are not happily thought of as either purely abstract 
nor purely concrete. The difference between Field's view and mine 
ostensibly concerns mathematics since that is the topic under discussion 
but the source of those differences lie much deeper - they lie deep in 
the conflict between my espousal of pragmatism and Field's acceptance, 
albeit in a modern guise, of absolutism. To bring these differences to 
the fore it will be useful to contrast Field's views with Quine's, and 
both of their views with mine. 
Quine's position on mathematics and abstract entities has been, 
for most of his career at any rate, clear:35 scientists quantify over 
abstract entities, there is no known way of eliminating those references 
to abstract entities, therefore abstract entities exist. Field accepts 
that argument in the sense that he would accept the conclusion if he 
thought that he could not show that the reference to abstract entities 
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can be eliminated. Now although it is nice to have some concord in 
philosophy I can't, as I said in chapter 3, entirely accept this 
argument. From my point of view both Quine and Field have effectively 
started from the wrong question; they both started from worrying about 
whether or not there are abstract entities rather than starting, as I 
would urge, from trying to explain how mathematical knowledge is 
possible. (Note that in effect this is what Benacerraf did and, it seems 
to me, the outcome was very suggestive). So reasonable does the Quinian 
view appear that it comes as something of a shock to realize that 
although we are confidently being told that there are abstract entities 
we have not been given an account of what they are. As I lamented 
earlier, the only gen~ral characterization of what abstract entities 
are is negative,- that they are not observable etc. From my point of 
View, an even more important lacuna in Quine's position is that he 
nowhere explains why reference to abstract entities should be useful. 
Effectively I have been arguing that 'abstract entities' are n~\ther 
purely 'abstract' nor purely 'concrete' - we can't, for instance, simply 
say that numerals!!! numbers but the other conditions that have to 
obtain to make a numeral a number (essentially that a numeral must be 
understood by a language community to represent a place in a numbering 
system) can't themselves be neatly .characterized as either abstract or 
concrete. Given the apparent respectability of the Quinian view it may 
be said that I am fudging the issue, that I am not taking my 
'ontological commitments' seriously, that I am engaged in double-think. 
In reply I would say this: if I am fudging then it is only because this 
is a place where fudging is quite properly called for. To justify this 
claim I would make the following comparison: in the respects relevant 
to these concerns numbers (for instance)' are rather like possibilities. 
Given the analysis in chapter 4, and faced with the question, 'do you 
'. 
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think that there are possibilities l' I should have to give a qualified 
answer. On the one hand there are many sentences of the form, 'There 
is a possibility that 
_______ .' where, in my view, one could fill in 
the blank and obtain a sentence with truth-conditions as clear as we 
generally have any hope of obtaining. That would amount to the case for 
saying that I do believe that there are possibilities. On the other 
hand, a philosopher asking the question, 'do you think that there are 
possibilities ?' might mean, 'do you think that possibilities are things _ 
do you think that there are possible worlds ?', to which my answer 
would be 'no'. Asked whether there are numbers my answers would be 
structurally similar: 'yes, I believe that there are numbers if by 
'numbers' you mean that there are numerals which are understood by a 
. ,. 
language "community to mark a place in a numbering system'; or, 'no, I 
don't believe that there are numbers if by 'numbers' you mean abstract 
entities which exist outside of time and space and independently of us.' 
In the light of those remarks I hope it will be clear what I mean when 
I say that my view is resolutely non-reductionist. 
I should like to draw another parallel between the analysis of 
modality and the analysis of mathematics. It seems to me that many 
analyses of modality have erred because philosophers have approached 
the issue with ontological questions foremost in their minds. That 
entailed that either one had the option of 'reducing' modal statements 
to non-modal statements (thereby supposedly showing that they weren't 
t 
really comm~ed to dubious kinds of things), or of biting the bullet and 
saying that they were comm~ed to a certain kind of entity a possible 
world - and then worrying like mad about what it might be. I suggested, 
however, that if one approaches the analysis of modality with more 
., 
~ 
appropriate questions in mind, questions about how we understand 
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particular kinds of modal statements, what kinds of evidence we 
accept as supporting kinds of modal statement, both of the previous 
options would seem bizarre. Much the same can, I believe, be said of 
the philosophy of mathematics. To approach the philosophy of mathematics 
with ontological questions at the forefront is to start from the 
wrong place. Once one approaches the philosophy of mathematics with, 
roughly speaking, epistemological questions to the fore the whole 
picture changes and becomes far less mystifying. I think it is 
significant that ~ has been philosophers and not mathematicians who 
have worried about the ontological status of abstract entities. In my 
view we do well if we understood - epistemologically understood 
how a given area of inquiry works and let the ontological questions 
• 
turn out 'as they will. 
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Chapter 8 
Philosophy and the Norms of Inouiry 
My aims in this final chapter are ambitious, they are: (i) to 
criticize the three dominant conceptions of morality to be found in 
analytic philosophy; (ii) to attack the basis of the fact/value 
distinction (to be more precise I am going to criticize the usual model 
of the relationship between facts and values supposed to obtain in 
moral thought and the humanities); (iii) to sketch an alternative 
conception of morality and inquiry. My aims are necessarily ambitious·· 
since I believe that these tasks are intimately connected. 
It is a simplification, but notJ I think, a gross over-simplification 
. 
to say that there have been three dominant conceptions of morality in 
the recent analytic tradition: theories of personal preference, Kantian 
theories and utilitarian theories. Section (1) begins my attack on 
, 
personal preference theories and the basis for the fact/value distinction, 
section (2) continues the attack on personal preference theories, 
begins to sketch an alternative and attacks Kantian and utilitarian 
theories; section (3) draws these themes together and presents an 
al ternative conception of the natur.e of inquiry to that dominant wi thin 
recent philosophy and partially embodied in 'common-sense' views. 
I conclude with some reflections on philosophy and pragmatism. 
(1) Facts and Values 
In his article "Value and Valuation", Frankena makes the following 
statement,l 
"Philosophers from the time of Plato had discussed a variety of 
questions under suc~ headings as the good, the end, the right, 
obligation, virtue, moral judgement, aesthetic judgement, the 
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beautiful, truth, and validity. In the 19th. century the conception 
was born - or reborn, because it is essentially to be found in 
Plato - that all these questions belong to the same family, since 
they are all concerned with value or what ought to be, not with 
fact or what is, was, or will be." 
To modern eyes this statement appears inconsistent since truth has been 
placed in the list of value concepts when we think of truth as 
essentially concerned with what is, not what ought to be. But there is 
a difficulty when one probes the apparently sharp contrast between what 
is, was, or will be, on the one hand, with what ought to be on the other. 
For many of us there are, no doubt, many things that we think ought to 
be that are not - a fact which invites the idea that the concept of what 
is is mutally exclusive of what ought to be. For most of us however that 
is not so - it is sur~ly an unhappy person for whom everything that 
ought to be includes nothing that is. 
Endemic in modern philosophy and contemporary (Western) culture 
has been a view of morality which claims that moral statements can have 
no justification beyond the personal preference of the indivi,dual who 
makes the statement. Underlying that view has been the distinction 
, 
between facts and values. Whilst I do not want to deny that there is 
something worth calling 'facts', and that there is something worth 
calling 'values', I do want to deny either the explicit or the implicit 
theories which have been taken to justify personal preference theories 
(and the model of the relation between facts and values upon which they 
depend) is tenable for most areas of inquiry. 
When I speak of personal preference theories I have in mind such 
theories as the following: subjectivism (e.g. Kume); emotivism (e.g. 
Stevenson, Ayer 2); existentialism (e.g. Sartre3). For my purposes the 
., 
differences between these theories are l~ss important than what they 
have in common. The classical source for personal pre "terence theories 
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in modern philosophy is Hume - arguably Hume had a direct influence on 
the logical positivists and the development of emotivism, and an 
indirect influence (via. Nietzsche) on Sartre and existentialism. For 
these reasons, and because it will facilitate the presentation of my 
alternative view, I will attack Hume's version of personal preference 
theory. 
A famous passage in the Treatise reads as follows,4 
"Take any action allowed to be vicious: wilful murder, for instance. 
Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of 
fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In whichever way you 
take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and 
thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice 
entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You 
never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own 
breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which .rises in 
~ you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it is the 
object of feeling not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the 
object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be 
vicious, you ,mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your 
nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the 
contemplation of it. Vice and Virtue, therefore, may be compared to 
sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern 
philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the 
mind ••• " 
I believe that there are essentially two things wrong with this view: 
(i) the epistemology; (ii) the theory of emotion upon which the theory 
depends. To enable me to make my criticisms it will be useful to recall 
a~ther famous passage,5 
"A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification 
of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which 
renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I 
am angry, I am actually possessed with the paSSion, and in that 
emotion have no more reference to any other object, than when I am 
thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. It is impossible, 
therefore, that this passion can be opposed by, or be contradictory 
to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the 
disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects, 
which they represent." 
At this point both in this thesis and in contemporary philosophy 
generally I need not labour the epistemological difficulties: the idea 
of 'copying' and the difficulties of finding any 'rea~ existence' even 
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when there is a true factual statement (upon what 'real existence' does 
the statement, 'The earth is not flat' depend ?); and the dubious claim 
that we can make a sharp distinction between properties which depend 
upon us (colours, sounds) and those that do not. 
The second aspect of Hume1s theory that I wish to criticize, his 
theory of emotions, stands in a more interesting relationship to 
contemporary philosophy since whilst this th~ory has been criticized 
(see, for example, Pitcher 6) I have not seen those criticisms embodied 
in an attack on Hume's moral subjectivism. What is essentially wrong 
with Hume I s theory of emotions is that he treats them as though they .. 
were merely bodily sensations when emotion is a much more complex 
,-
matter. It seems just false that emotions do not have reference to 
other 'objects'; emotions have 'intentional objects', one is angry at 
someone or some state of affairs, in love with some person, and so on. 
Hume anticipates this objection and, in effect, claims that it is not 
the emotion which I refers I but the accompanying belief. Hume ,makes 'this 
point when he claims that emotions cannot be said to be reasonable or 
unreasonable ,7 
" ••• it is only in two senses that any affection can be called 
unreasonable. First, when a passion such as hope or fear, grief or 
joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition of the 
existence of objects which do not really exist. Secondly, when in 
exerting any passion in action, we choose means insufficient for 
the designed end, and deceive ourselves in our judgements of 
causes and effects." 
Not all cases that fall into Hume1s first category can be said to be 
cases of unreasonable emotion. Suppose someone has read in a local 
newspaper that a lion has escaped from the zoo and that when they are 
out walking they hear what they think is the roar of a lion, then their 
emotion of fear would be reasonable wheth~r or not there was a lion. 
The more general problem is whether one can say something as follows: 
'A 
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emotions can only be said to be reasonable or unreasonable to the extent 
that the accompanying belief is either true or reasonable; or false or 
unreasonable, respectively. Even this general model does not work 
however: suppose that some minor incident happens, e.g. someone breaks 
one of my coffee sups, and I fly into a fit of rage; here it would seem 
that my belief about what has happened may be true but my emotion 
unreasonable. It is true, I think, that in those circumstances one might 
be inclined to think that the breakage of the c~~ wasn't the real .-
or the sole cause of the emotional reaction (one would be tempted to 
say something like 'He got out of bed the wrong side this morning') but 
I do not think that is of much comfort for Hume's view since it is the 
di~crepency between wpat happened and the unreasonableness of the 
emotion that would justify the inference. More generally, what a Humean 
view of emotion requires is that one make a sharp distinction between 
the cognitive element of someone's reaction (the belief) and the' non-
cognitive, but that distinction cannot always be drawn. We cannot 
always distinguish emotions purely by reference to their phenomenal 
properties - the very difference between ~nnoyance and indignation 
depends upon what the individual believes about the situation. Moreover, 
contrary to what HUme claims, it seems that some emotions ~ have an 
intentional object - one cannot be in a state of grief without grieving 
over something. 
Consider the following three distinctions: 
belief 
applicability of predicates of 









Hume's view is that the three distinctions in the list on the left-hand 
side are coextensive and mutually exclusive of the three distinctions 
in the list on the right-hand side. So far I have provided some reason 
for thinking that the first two distinctions are not mutually 
exclusive but what of the third distinction? Can emotion playa 
cognitive role? 
Consider the sentence tAll men are mortal' uttered in two different 
.-
contexts. On the one occasion the person uttering the sentence is a 
logic lecturer taking a logic class, uttering the sentence as he writes 
it on the blackboard, intending to complete the famous syllogism. On 
the other occasion the sentence is uttered slowly, almost inaudibly, 
by'a pat~ent in a doctor's surgery who has just been told that they 
only have six months to live. To make the case vivid suppose that it is 
the same person involved in both cases - the lecturer went straight 
from the logic class to the .. doctor's surgery. Now the question is: do 
the logic teacher and the patient ~ the same thing ? One response to 
this is as follows: 'well, of course, the patient knows something that 
the logic teacher doesn't - that he is gotng to die in six months time. 
However, in the sense that the logic teacher and the patient know 
'All men are mortal' is a true sentence they do know exactly the same 
thing. It would, after all, be a pretty poor logiC teacher who did not 
know that he was included in the class of all men.' Against this I think 
one can say the fallowing: in the situation as described it would be 
entirely natural to say of the patient that as he uttered the words in 
the surgery the words took on a new meaning, a new significance for 
him. Moreover, it is the knowledge that he is going to die in six 
months time that put the patient in a new relationship to the sentence, 
'-
'All men are mortal'. I am inclined to think that it is, admittedly, a 
moot pOint as to whether they ~ something different but it is on a 
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pOint as moot as this that the whole idea that emotions are non-cognitive 
depends. I won't claim therefore that this distinction amounts to a 
difference in ways of knowing - call the difference between what is 
involved in the two cases the difference between the evaluative 
significance and the non-evaluative significance of a statement. 
One response to the above might be to question whether the 
distinction between the evaluative and the non-evaluative significance.-
of a statement could have any general application; if it can't then its 
possible significance for moral philosophy would be in severe doubt. 
It seems to me that the distinction does have general significance. 
For example, it was only recently in Britain the the wearing of seat-
belts in cars was made compulsory. Now one liberal argument against the 
wearing of seat' belts being made compulsory might have gone as follows: 
'Accepting that the wearing of seat-belts saves lives we ought to have 
a publicity campaign to make sure that every driver is aware of. the 
facts. Once they are aware of the facts however, it ought to be up to 
them to decide what to do.' One response to this might be: 'in the sense 
\ I , 
in which people know that wearing seat-belts saves lives, the general 
theoretical case, everyone already knows !h!!. What is more relevant is 
that when people get into a car they do not know (and can have no way 
of knowing) whether an accident will happen to them. In this sense, most 
people unconsciously believe, 'It won't happen to me.' We can't, and it 
would be undesirable to try to convince them that it !!!! happen to 
them (inculcating a fear of life) but we can give them an extra incentive 
to wear seat-belts by making it a legal requirement.' The second 
argu~e~t 1s intended to suggest a parallel between the way in which 
the logic teacher knows that all men are mortal and how drivers know 
that they might be involved in an accident, and the i~portance of the 
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fact that there isn't generally a sense which parallels the way that 
the patient knows that all men are mortal and knowing that it really 
could be oneself involved in an accident. If this point is correct 
then the distinction between the evaluative and the non-evaluative 
significance of statements is of practical importance and morality, I 
take it, is a practical business. 
I shall return to the distinction between evaluative and non-
evaluative significance in section (3) but for now I should like to sow 
the seeds of an idea that I hope may germinate before the end of the 
chapter - that the following parallel between Quine's attack on the 
analytic/synthetic distinction and my view of the cognitive role that 
• emotion ~ay play is reasonable: 
"Science has its double dependence 
upon language and experience; but 
this duality is not significantly 
traceable into the statements of 
science taken one by one.,,8 
Moral statements have their dual 
dependence upon emotion and belief; 
but this duality is not signifi-
cantly traceable into the 
statements of morality taken one 
I 
by one. 
(2) Towards a Pragmatic Conception of Morality 
Humeipersonal preference theory was expressed in another famous 
passage in the Treatise,9 
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I 
have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the 
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or 
makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am 
surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations, is, and 
· is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an 
oug~or an ought ~. This change i~ imperceptible; but is, 
however, of the last consequence. F~r this ought, or ought not, 
expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that 
it should be observed'and explained; and at the same time that a 
reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconeivable, how 
-.. 
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this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are 
entirely different from it." 
Attempts have been made to meet Hume's argument directly (e.g. by Foot 
and Searle lO) but the line of resistence I wish to explore starts from 
a view l1acIntyre has recently been defending. ll This point of view 
starts by noting that certain concepts - functional c.oncepts - do allow 
one to derive evaluative conclusions from factual premises. For instance, 
from 'this watch keeps time very accurately' and 'this watch is very 
convenient to carry around and is easily read' it follows that this is 
.... 
a good watch. What allows this derivation is that we heve sOlIle idea·' gf thE 
purpose or function of a watch against which, given factual premises, 
we can deduce that the watch is good for serving those purposes. The 
qu~stion is whether apy reasonable parallel can be made for the view 
that the concept of ~ is a fUnctional concept. That is a large 
question but to begin to ask it suppose that one asks someone to make 
a list of the qualities they admire in a person. Suppose that they come 
up with the following list (they admire people who are): honest, kind, 
sympathetic, unassuming, unpretentious. One point about this list is 
that it is simultaneously evaluative and ~ list of qualities for which 
\ 
we know, roughly at least, what kinds of evidence, what kinds of 
behaviour, would lead us to attribute or refuse to attribute these 
qualities to some individual. But are any of those moral qualities? 
Is there a sharp distinction between moral and non-moral qualities? 
I'm afraid that to answer that question I must raise the general 
question of what morality is. I think that it is important to 
l 't 12 distinguish between two .ways of trying to define mora ~ y: 
Autonomous contextual 
Moral beliefs or moral values Mor.ality or moral values represent 
" represent a special class of the ordering of an individual's or 
beliefs or values to be con- a societies priorities. In this 
-.. 
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trasted for instance, with 
scientific beliefs or aesthetic 
values. In this sense someone 
may be said to place more 
importance on aesthetic values 
than moral values. 
sense, if an individual or society 
placed great emphasis on aesthetic 
values that would be a part of 
the individual's or that 
societies morality. 
As things stand, of course, what I have placed beneath the 'autonomous' 
.... 
label does not define the moral at all, for the question arises as to 
what characteristics moral beliefs or moral values share that scientific 
beliefs or aesthetic values do not. I think it is very much open to 
doubt whether that question can be answered if one is attempting not 
merelytc? define one's own morality but attempting to define a concept 
of morality neutral between all individuals or societies. Certainly I 
see little promise in the attempt to '3i"~ such a definition by invoking 
grammatical criteria (e.g. that moral statements take the form of 
universal prescriptions). What I have written under the 'contextual' 
label might be said to suffer a similar problem for one may ask, 
'place greater emphasis on aesthetic valu~s in preference to what ?' 
The answer moral values would obviously take us back to square one. 
I think, however, that things are a little more promising in this case, 
It is true that not every ordering of priorities that an individual or 
a society makes can be described as moral: if someone decides to read 
a book rather than go to the cinema that is an ordering of priorities 
but hardly a moral choice. Perhaps one can say something as follows: 
with respect to an individual their morality consists in their overall 
ordering of priorities that are important for their overall aims, 
projects, and character; with respect to a society, its morality 
'>, 
., 
consists in its overall ordering of priorities partially embodied in 
'. 
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its legal system and partially embodied in its political actions and 
policies. Even these qualifications are likely to leave many ambiguities 
but since, for reasons I shall come to, I do not believe that the 
distinction between the moral and the non-moral is necessarily always 
very sharp or very clear this may suffice for my purposes. 
As a partial specification of how we talk of moral beliefs and 
values I take it that both the autonomous and the contextual descriptions 
.-
capture something but I want to suggest that things look very different 
according to whether one approaches normative ethics via the autonomous 
or the contextual concept~on. The large difference between these 
d 
appr9thes (as the labels are intended to suggest) is that an appr~oach to 
no~mative ethics via the autonomous conception implies an approach that 
operates at a high level of abstraction and is compatible with the 
search for very general moral principles and a moral decision procedure. 
The approach to normative ethics via the contextual conception is less 
likely to yield general principles since if one considers how an 
individual orders his priorities in the course of their life we are 
likely to find that those priorities are ~nextricably bound ,up with 
\ 
specific historical circumstances, the nature of their personality, 
and their projects and commitments. Now an adequate decision procedure, 
if one could be found,would be very ,desirable but it seems to me that 
not only are we not liable ever to find one but also that the attempt 
to find one has damaged moral philosophy by encouraging gross over-
simplification. To explicate and defend this claim I will first examine 
Kantian approaches to morality. 
As Williams notes, some of the elements in a Kantian outlook are 
these: l3 that the moral point of view is essentially different from a 
non-moral, self-interested point of view; that the moral point of view 
1s specially'characterized by its impartiality and its particular 
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relations to particular persons; that moral thought requires 
abstraction from particular characteristics of the parties, including 
the agent, except insofar as these can be treated as universal features 
of any morally relevant situation; and that the motivations of a moral 
agent involve an application of moral principle and thus are different 
in kind from the sorts of motivations that a moral agent might have for 
treating some particular persons differently because he or she happened 
.-
to have particular interesbtowards them. 
The abstraction of moral motivations and the moral point of view 
from the level of particular relations to particular persons, obtains 
even when the moral point of view is explained in terms of the self-
t 
interest'of contracting parties under conditions of ignorance as it is 
in the work. of Rawls, since the contracting parties are entirely 
abstract persons making this choice in ignorance of their own particular 
'. 
characters, interests and so forth. This perspective is also explicitly 
embodied in Singer's book The Expanding Circle which precisely identifies 
(as have theorists of 'moral growth') the ability to abstract from one's 
I 
\ 
own particular circumstances and character as constituting the essence 
of morality. 
Kant's own moral philosophy drew a sharp distinction between 
acting in conformity !!!h duty and acting !!£m the motive of duty which 
seems to me as unattractive as it is difficult to apply,14 
"To help others where one can is a duty, and besides this there are 
many spirits of so sympathetiC a temper that, without any further 
. motive of vanity or self-interest, they find an inner pleasure in 
.spreading happiness around them and can take delight in the 
contentment of others as their own work. Yet I maintain that in 
, such a case an action of this kind, however right and amiable it 
may be, has still no genuinely moral worth." 
",. 
'" Susan Wolf suggests, to my mind rightly, that such phrases as 'I cannot 
tell a lie' and 'He couldn't hurt a fly' are not exemptions from 
-.. 
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praiseworthiness but testimonies to it.l5 She makes the point in the 
course of defending a compatibilist view of the relation between 
freedom and causality but the point is equally telling, it seems to me, 
against Kant's view. It seems to me that we should (both normatively 
and descriptively) not withdraw moral praise on the grounds that someone 
acted from a 'sympathetic temper'. 
Another aspect of the demand for impartiality is raised by Fried,~§ 
" ••• surely it would be absurd to insist that if a man could, at no 
risk or cost to himself, save one or two persons in equal peril, 
and one of those in peril was, say, his wife, he must treat both 
equally, perhaps by flipping a coin. One answer is that where the 
potential rescaer occupies no office such as that of captain of a 
ship, public health offical or the like, the occurence of the 
accident may itself stand as a sufficient randomizing event to 
~- m~et the dictates ot fairness, so he may preter his friend or loved 
one._Where the rescuer does occupy an official position, the 
argument that he must overlook personal ties is not unacceptable. II 
, 
One question this view immediately raises is what the person who doas 
occupy an official point of,~iew is supposed to do - do they flip a 
coin ? The more general pOint is that there does seem a reasonable point 
of view from which someone could say that they rescued one person 
rather than another because ~hat person Was their wife. Mor.eover, that 
point of view does seem to be deeply entrenched in our present moralities 
since most people believe that they have obligations and responsibilities 
to family and friends that they do not have to others. Partially some 
of those commitments can be accomedated within a Kantian perspective; 
but only partially. The Kantian view would seem unable to acco~date 
the claim that it would be morally justifiable to save ona's wife 
because she was one's wife. Note the difference here between the 
motivating thought 'It was my wife' and the different motivating thought 
which might be available to a Kantian, 'It was my wife and in situations 
of this kind it is permissible to save one's wife.' In discussing this 
case Williams argues that s'omewhere deep attachments to other persons 
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will express themselves in the world in ways that cannot at the same 
time embody the impartial view. Moreover, unless there are such 
commi~ts there would not be enough conviction in one's life to sustain 
allegiance to life itself. He concludes,17 
"It follows that moral philosophy's habit, particularly in its 
Kantian forms, of treating persons in abstraction from character is 
not so much a legitimate device for dealing with one aspect of 
thought, but is rather a misrepresentation, since it leaves out 
what both limits and helps define that aspect of thought ... 
The charge that moral philosophy has oversimplified the issues by 
making the wrong kinds of abstraction can also be leveled at 
utiltarianism. This may seem surprising in the sense that utilitarianism 
does at least allow room for empirical considerations insofar as it is 
recognized that the course of action which will maximize utility 
(however defined) will vary with the distinct patterns of desire to be 
found in different social settings. Crucially, however, utilitarianism 
does abstract from the character of the agent making the moral decision 
- according to this view, anyone who happens to be near the appropriate 
causal levers should take that action which will maximize utility. To 
show the significance of this I will disc~ss a case considered by 
Williams. The story goes as follows: Jim finds himself in the central 
square of a small South American town. Tied up against the wall are 
a row of twenty Indians and in front of them several armed soldiers. 
The captain in charge questions Jim and establishes that he got there by 
accident while on a botanical expedition. Th~ captain explains that the 
Indians are a random group of the inhabitants who, after recent acts 
of protest against the government, are just about to be killed to remind 
other possible protestors of the advantages of not protesting. However, 
since Jim is an honoured vistor from another land, the captain is happy 
~ 
~ 
to offer him a guest's privelge of killing one of the Indians himself. 
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If Jim accepts, then as a special mark of the occasion, the other 
Indians will be let off. If Jim refuses there will be no special occasion 
and all the Indians will be killed. 
I take it that the answer utilitarianism gives is clear - Jim 
should kill the Indian. The point of discussing this case however is not 
that that is the wrong answer but that utilitarianism cannot accomodate 
considerations which are, arguably, morally relevant considerations. 
These considerations lend some weight to the contention that 
.~ 
utilitarianism cannot treat the concept of integrity seriously. To bring 
these considerations to the fore imagine (Williams doesn't) that Jim 
has been a life-long pacifist; that he has spent a large part of his 
life articulating, defending and working for pacifist goals. This adds 
a factor to the' situation which, it might be said, would make a 
difference to the utilitarian calculation, since one would have to 
calculate the amount of disutility to Jim (however that could be done). 
That is, at best, marginally relevant since it seems clear that Jim's 
feelings can't outweigh the lives of several people. The real question 
\ ' , is whether this is the right way of looking at things. The concept of 
integrity is related to the idea that each of us is specially responsible 
for our own actions and the idea that someone might be morally right in 
refusing to perform an action even if someone else would is, at the 
very least, comprehensible. If Jim had not been a pacifist but a long 
standing utilitarian it would perhaps be more accurate to describe 
Jim as facing the task of performing a morally unpleasant action rather 
than a moral dilemma; that is so since for a utilitarian there would 
be ~o moral consideration to weigh against the course of action the 
theory recommends. But for Jim the pacifist there is a dilemma between 
his long standing commitme~ts on the one hand and the appalling 
consequences of staying true to them on the other. In this case I want 
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to say that although utilitarianism may give the right answer it does 
so by employing an oversimplified conception of morality that cannot 
accomedate cruical, relevant, considerations. Of course, a utiUtarian 
might conclude that utilitarianism cannot acco~date the concept of 
integrity but1P~to say 'so much the worse for integrity'. That response, 
I think, won't do. There are hints throughout Smart's defence of 
utilitarianism that a part of the theory's attractiveness for him stems 
from its compatibility with a scientific and materialist conception of._ 
the world. But since integrity is certainly an indispensible value 
for the pursuit of science that response would be self-defeating for 
a utilitarian such as Smart. 
.... 
In his defence of utilitarianism, Smart discusses a counter-example 
posed by McCloskey. The point of the counter-example is that a utilitarian 
t 
may, in unfavorable circumstances, be commi~d to killing an innocent 
person in order to maximize utility. Smart accepts the conclusion but 
bites the bullet and says that, unhappily, the utilitarian would be 
18 commited to this action. In his comments Smart says, 
"It is ••• true that we should probabllf dislike and fear a man who 
could bring himself to do the right utilitarian act in 'a case of 
the sort envisaged by McCloskey. Though the man in this case might 
.have done the right utilitarian act, his act would betoke~a toughnes~ 
and lack of squeamishness which would make him a dangerous person." 
One might wonder whether there ought to be some sort of connection 
between someone being the kind of person we admire and the kind of 
person who would do the morally right thing. Should we not fear a moral 
philosophy whereby the kind of person who could do the morally righit. 
thing is simultaneously the kind of person we would have reason to fear ? 
Smart's comment also makes one wonder whether we really know what a 




It is now time to draw some of these themes together. I began this 
section by quoting Hume's argument that one cannot derive tought' from 
'is'. I then went on to point out that for certain functional conc.~ts, 
factual premises can entail evaluative conclusions. I then raised, 
without answering, the question of whether there is a perspective from 
which ~ can be seen as a functional concept. Now it might be said 
that from a secular point of view one can't treat 'man' as a functional 
concept for a functional concept requires reference to a Eurpose, and 
there simply is no overall purpose one can describe given a naturalistic 
view of man's place in nature. What, though, if we ask not for an 
overall purpose but for the purposes people find in the full context of 
their lives? Don't people find purposes as artists, scientists, 
philosophers, novelists? Don't people find purpose in their relation-
ships as lovers, husbands, wives, friends ? The suggestion is that if 
one considers people in their full historical context the gap between 
'is' and 'ought' looks less foreboding: to be a scientist is to be 
someone who will not knowingly falsify the evidence; to be a lover is 
to be someone who will not willingly inflict suffering on the person 
loved. Of course we know that people do do these things but we, and they, 
know that insofar as they do they have failed as a scientist or as a 
lover. This way of meeting the challenge of personal preference theories 
is far from being that embodied in either Kantian or utilitarian 
theories. Those theories have equally, in important respects, treated 
morality in abstraction from social particularity. It is true that what 
I have termed a contextual approach to morality has the consequence 
that moral philosophy would be seen as a much more difficult enterprise 
than before but that, it seems to me, is a price we must pay. With 
,-
respect to this contextual approach to morality I am only able to offer 




Those who dissent from personal preference theories have two 
options: (i) to argue that moral statements may, like other statememts, 
simply be true or false; (ii) argue that at least with respect to many 
moral decisions, non-arbitrary reasons can be given for claiming that 
one course of action is superior to another. The second option promises 
to be easier than the first, and is the option I favour, but it is 
worth saying why these options are not so very different. One view in 
the philosophy of science, a view with which I have considerable 
sympathy, would say that whilst scientific theories are not true or F~Li~ 
simpliciter (since they depend upon many statements some of which may 
,-
be true and others false) nevertheless non-arbitrary reasons can be 
given for prefering some theories rather than others. My suggestion 
is that moral statements are in a similar position - if they are true 
or false they are true or false in the same way as scientific theori.es 
are true or false but that in both cases it is easier, and sacrifices 
nothing important, to make the ~ore modest claim that although not true 
r 
or false non-arbitrary reasons can be given for prefecing some to 
others. (This is a point I shall return to in section (3). 
The second issue of importance, concerns the problem of moral 
diversity, I take it that the prima facie sociological and psychological 
evidence suggests that, both cross-culturally and within one culture, 
different people have different opinions as to the morally correct 
course of action in relevantly similar circumstances. Those opposed to 
to persona~ preference theories have the option of denying that the 
apparent diversity is genuine or of explaining how that moral diversity 
is compatible with the view that there are non-arbitrary reasons for 
SOme courses ot actions rather than others. First I want to examine the 
' .. 
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reasons that might be given for denying that the diversity is genuine. 
Perhaps the strongest reason for denying the existence of moral 
diversity may be given by concentrating upon the phrase 'relevantly 
similar circumstances'. The more emphasis one places upon the relevance 
of the historical situation the more reason there will be for denying on 
that cross-culturally, or even within one culture (if one counts 
someone's personal circumstances as a part of the historical situation) 
that the circumstan.ces which give rise to apparent moral diversity are 
relevantly similar. Pettit and MacDonald take this view in their 
discussion of the Ik. They point out that when one takes into accoumt--
the harsh env~mental conditions under which the Ik live, actions 
which from our point of view appear cruel may rather be a reflection 
of the necessity for their adjusting to those conditions. That is an 
important point and raises another: the extent of moral diversity 
appears differently depending upon the generality of the level of 
descriptions one is prepared to employ- For example, we are now liable 
to suppose that the practice o~ cutting off someone's hand is hard to 
justify but many people in our culture would find nothing difficult 
about the idea that theft should be punished - yet, of course, both of 
those descriptions may be given of the same action. Important though 
both of those points are they should not, I think, lead us to deny the 
existence of all moral diversity. Pettit and MacDonald, who do seem to 
want to deny the existence of all moral diversity, seem to me to be 
forced to some unconvincing argument. For instance, when discussing 
whether the treatment of a woman called Lo'ono can properly be called 
cruel they say that the action,19 
" ••• need not involve a misperception! a belief to the effect that 
it is not cruel to treat La'ono in ~he way described. All that may 
be involved is inattentiveness to the cruel aspe~t of such 
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actions, or underweighing of the cruel aspect in relation to 
other considerations." 
Is that a distinction with a difference 7 If there is genuine moral 
diversity however, does this not support the central tenet of personal 
preference theories ? The best way of reconciling these tensions, I 
think, is as follows: first, one should note that the essential function 
of morality is social, to answer the question 'how shall we (a given 
community) live 7' That question arose as a consequence of evolution, 
i.e. simply out of the fact that communities of beings with ceratin 
capacities for appraisal, choice and decision, emerged at some point 
in evolution. Therefore the essential limits on what is morally possible 
are finally set by the fact that certain kinds of actions, if allowed 
~ ~ 
to prevai~, would destroy the community as a community, e.g. arbitrary 
murder or wholesale dishonesty. Members of a community have an interest 
in preserving the community and hence of limiting those actions that 
could lead to its destruction.:Although one can find in history almost 
any practice 'justified' in someway it is hard to imagine a s,ociety 
where practices such as murder or mutililation were not thought to stand 
in any need of justification at all. Clearly, however, although this 
view gives one some grip on the idea of a naturalistic basis for the 
concept of the morally possible, those limits are nevertheless 
compatible with wide variations in the sets of values adopted within 
a community. Although at one level of description one would expect to 
find similar lists of the virtues (e.g. one would expect to find honesty, 
Sincerity, kindness, courage, valued to some degree in any community) 
there is still room for endless permutations and emphasis with respect 
to the ordering of those values. That is the more to be expected if 
recognizes the fact that the overall patt~rning of values in a society 
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will be inextricably linked with the cognitive beliefs and the 
envi ·mental conditions within which an individual or society functions. 
Much of moral philosophy has been insensitive to the kind of moral 
diversity that I have in mind for the reason stated earlier, i.e. that 
it has abstracted from most kinds of social particularity. To discover 
moral diversity one need not consider exotic cultures or even two 
people. ·in. our culture. This is wonderfully expressed in a passage by 
Anthony powell,20 
"Trapnel wanted, among other things, to be a writer, a dandy, a 
lover, a comrade, an eccentric, a sage, a virtuoso, a good chap, 
a man of honour, a hard case, a spendthrift, an opportunist, a 
raisonneur, to be very rich, to be very poor, to posses a thousand 
mistresses, to win the heart of one love to whom he was ever 
faithful, to be pn the best of terms with all men, to avenge 
savagely the lightest affront, to live to a hundred full years and 
honour, to die young and unknown but recognized the following day 
as the most neglected genius of the age. Each of these ambitions 
had something to recommend it, from one angle or another." 
Mary Midgeley, who also qUotes this passage, comments, I think rightly, 
that the only difference between Trapnel and ourselves is that he is 
even a little less clear than the rest of us about the consistency of 
his values.2l The culture of mO'dern western society is more diverse 
than most having inherited fragments from many diverse traditions (e.g. 
Christian, Greek, utilitarian). MacIntyre emphasizes this point in his 
(1981) but laments the fact more than I. 
I can summarize the upshot of the above in two points: first, that 
the limits of what is morally possible are naturalistic, set by our 
need and desire to operate as members of a community; second, those 
limits woefully underdetermine the set of values one must live by to 
live in a morally permissible way (and, hence, cannot be captured by 
some simplistic set of moral rules). But ~ow one can imagine the 
.., 
personal preference theorist becoming still more insistent: suppose they 
.... 
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concur that the ultimate limits of morality are non-arbitrary, does 
that not at least prove their point for the very wide range of options 
which I have admitted remain open? They might add that this is the 
more so since I have also said that no one set of abstract moral 
principles will be sufficient for determining one uniquely acceptable 
set of values. What I think this objection overlooks is how large a 
part of our culture and inquiry (in addition to that explicitly recognize~ 
as moral reasoning) is an attempt to give or to find non-arbitrary 
reasons in favour or against particular constellations of values and 
beliefs. The explication of the claim will occupy much of the next 
section. When articulated it will make apparent how very unclear I 
believe the moral/nonrmoral divide to be. 
(3) Truth, Values and Inquiry 
"'Beauty is truth, truth beauty', that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know." Keats.21. 
"The human mind always has and always will be able to interpret 
facts in accordance with its moral ;i.nterests." James. 23 
\ ' 
.... 
"In this life, we want nothing but Facts, Sir; nothing but .facts !" 
Gradgrind. 24. 
Although only one of the above quotations mentions the word 
'truth', indirectly they all concern the concept of truth, its nature 
and importance. In one way the statement by James represents a position 
in the middle of a continuum between Keats and Gradgrind. It will come 
as no surprise that it is James' position that I wish to defend but in 
so doing I wish to point to the virtue and vices of the other positions. 
'-
It is perhaps mischievous, but suggestive, to think of analytic 
philosophy' .has having gone from a conception of truth not unlike that 
'. 
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of Keats (e.g. in Plato) to one not unlike that of Gradgrind (e.g. on 
one interpretation of the Tractatus) - a process of going from the 
sublime to the ridiculous. Even in making that comparison I don't wish 
to suggest that there are not good (rational) reasons why philosophers 
have trodden that path but it is, perhaps, time to retrace a few steps. 
Partially the resons why philosophers have trodden that path are 
technical - philosophers have found it hard enough to give the semantics 
for 'A cat sat on the mat' let alone anything more ambitious. Mora .~ 
fundamentally however, (although these reasons are not ultimately 
separable) the reasons are cultural. Plato thought of philosophy as the 
pursuit of wisdom and since philosophers no longer see that as a 
realistic aim, students and others sometimes seem to think (1 know 
because I-used to think) that philosophers have abrogated their 
responsibili ty by giving up that. role and, like social security 
investigators, they want to know the reason why. What they overlook is 
that the role is no longer ~acant - the job has been abolished. The 
reasons why would really amount to a history of western culture so here 
I will simply note the fact and rush to the other end of the spectrum. 
\ 
(See, however, my comments in section 4). 
In deference to Gradgrindts view it must be admitted that there 
are facts of the kind he had in mind - millions of them. 'Facts' in 
this sense refers to the kind of statement Gradgrind wanted drummed 
into the heads of children - the nine times table, the capital cities of 
the countries of the world etc. What characterizes all such facts is 
a tough philosophical question and the only answer that seems adequate 
to me is that there are agreed and uncontroversial methods for their 
discovery and confirmation. I don't believe that such facts can be 
characterized either by the way they are'learnt, their being observable, 
'. 
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or in their 'corresponding' to reality. Another philosophical question 
is whether we should restrict the predicate ' •• is true' to those 
statements where we do have agreed methods for their discovery or 
confirmation. If we do then we can't speak of scientific theories being 
true or false since scientific theories are certainly more than mere 
collections of such facts. That need not invite epistemological scepticisn 
however since one may still argue that even though scientific theories 
are not strictly true or false they are subject to rational methods 
of appraisal, argument, and evidence. Although there is no very clear 
dividing line, I do incline towards restricting the predicate , . • • • ~s 
true' to those statements where we do have agreed methods for their 
discovery or confirmation. (Thas moving away from the Keats end of the 
.,. 
spectrum). This is, in a broader context, the point that underlay my 
distinction between a direct and indirect pragmatic theory of truth 
in chapter 1. Favouring an indirect theory, I said, makes it clear that 
other things than truth do matter. That point brings me to the first 
of Gradgrind's mistakes, viz. that in this life we do want many more 
things than facts even for science. The second of Gradgrind's mistakes 
, 
lay in supposing that the existence of facts justified his miserable 
philosophy of life. That is a point I shall come back to. 
To raise the next question I want to discuss I need to employ 
the distinction between the context of justification and the context 
.... 
of discovery. As the labels suggest, this is a distinction between the 
way in which the results of an inquiry may be discovered and the ways in 
which the results of an inquiry may be justified. In the recent 
philosophy of science it is now commonplace to recognize that the values 
of the scientist may, quite legitimately, playa role in the context 
of discovery that they may not play (or,should not be allowed to play) 
in the context of justification. My question is whether this view 
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of the role that values play in inquiry can be upheld for all areas of 
inquiry. To examine this question I propose to discuss the following 
model of inquiry. 
Figure 7 
A Model of Inguiry 
sciences humanities/arts 






A.~~ words of explanation: 'theoretical' implies that the primary 
purpose of tne inquiry is explanatory; tpractical' that the inquiry is 
addressed to tne question, 'how shall we live ?' The shading indicates 
that in those areas evaluative significance plays a greater role than 
in the unshaded areas. The most' important point of the model however 
is to suggest that the humanities have a more or less direct role to 
play in answering ~ the theoretical and practical questions. How far 
tne social sciences fit into the natural sciences is, for.reasons I 
shall come to, ambiguous. I dare say that I hardly need add that I do 
not see the ends of the spectrum running from the cognitive to the 
non-cognitive. I shall now try to defend and explain what may seem 
to be my arbitrary model by working from the right-hand side to the 
left-hand side. 
Morality, in the sense of the autonomous definition, obviously 
-. 
~ . 
occurs near to the right-hand side since it is explic~tly concerned 
with the question, 'how shall we live ?' (In this sense, of course, my 
'. 
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placement of ph~losophy further to the left is uncomfortable since 
moral philosophy, or a part of it, belongs here). However, the merit of 
the model, I shall try to show, resides in its relationship to the 
contextual approach to morality. 
Literature and morality occur next to one another since I believe 
that evaluative significance plays an important role in understanding 
either. In section (1) I tried to show that even a statement such as 
'All men are mortal' could have an evaluative significance when placed 
in a particular context. Note that this is ambiguous between the 
evaluative significance for the person concerned - the patient - and the 
evaluative significance for the reader - someone who did not . 
understand that people do not generally want to die would not have 
understood my point. I tried to convey what the evaluative significance 
was by hinting at how the patient felt - in effect I was making the first 
crude steps in story-telling. Emotion, I suggest, plays a cognitive 
role in morality and literary experience. Emotional insensiti~ity in 
these areas prevents cognition. If this is true then evaluative 
significance plays a role in the context of justification and not merely 
in the context of discovery. There would appear to be a similarity 
between the significance of evaluative significance and the distinction 
between form and content. Mathematical.and scientific theories are 
relatively insensitive to transformations into logically equivalent 
forms - one can understand Einstein's theory of relativity without ever 
having seen any of his original papers but Shakespeare1s plays, for 
instance, are very much more sensitive to their means of expression. 
(It is worth noting, however, that other parts of the humanities are 
ambiguous on this point. It is unclear, for instance, whether the 
'-
,., 
content of Wittgenstein's philosophy can be fully understood independently 
'. 
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of the form in which he expressed it. That makes the business of 
'extracting arguments' from Wittgenstein~ work a sensitive enterprise). 
Literature appears to the left of 'morality' and the right of the 
other humanities since, on the one hand, it is certainly not its 
purpose to tell us how to live (although didactic tracts are not unknown) 
but, on the other hand, it explores the issues which are highly 
relevant to the question of how we shall live. Moreover it does so in a 
way that is a great deal more senstive to the issues involved than moral 
philosophy has been. For an understanding of moral life, novels offer a 
deeper understanding than moral philosophy has yet attained. 
.. How does the statement by James stand with respect to the 
humanities ? I want to suggest that it gives a very good description of 
their purpose and that this provides an important link with the 
contextual conception of morality. The way in which this is true is that 
in the hUmanities the value of the inquirers (be they the producers. or 
the critics, of some work) playa crucial role in the context of 
justification: they play the role of being a partial criterion of 
success. That is a large and controversial claim - to begin to defend it, 
and to help define when a piece of work counts, on my view, as belonging 
to the humanities, I will first consider the situation with respect to 
social sciences. 
There has been a long-standing and inconclusive debate over the 
question of whether the social sciences can be 'value-free'. Now one 
of the important ways of understanding that question is to ask whether 
in the social sciences one can restrict the role played by the values 
of the inquirers to the context of discovery, i.e. of whether values 
can be held to play the same role in social sciences as they do in 
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natural science. It seems to me that the answer to this question is 
not the same for all parts of the social sciences now classified as 
such. For instance, one thing social scientists do is to study the 
methods for carrying out social surveys; in particular they attempt to 
find methods of eliminating the various complex problems that stand in 
the way of discovering what people really believe about some issue. Here 
I see no difficulty in principle in claiming that values play no more 
fundamentdL role in the study of those techniques than they do in the 
natural sciences. Similarly for experiments in social psychology: the 
values of the experimenter may affect what issues or questions the 
experiment is designed to investigate but given careful methodology 
(e.g. the use of control groups) there does not seem any greater role 
played by values here than in the natural sciences. Suppose, however, 
one turns to a much more complex case, e.g. Marx's analysis of 
capitalism. It is, I take it, uncontroversial that Marx's analysis was 
intended to be Politically revolutionarY,and only slightly more 
controversial to suppose that it could only be revolutionary if it were 
saying that there is something fundamenta~ly and morally wr~ng with 
\ 
capitalist society. Now suppose that someone sets out to discover how 
.-
much of Marx's analysis is true independently of any value commitments 
that Marx had. I rather doubt that this is likely but suppose that there 
is a considerable amount of Marx's analysis which is true and which does 
not presuppose any value commitment pro or anti capitalism. Call this 
analysis 'm' (Marx in a low key). As I said, I have no idea how far 
such an analysis could s.ucceed but in any case there is a very real 
doubt as to whether ~ could really be called Marxist at all. More 
importantly perhaps, there is even more doubt as to whether this analysis 
would settle anything for what we would then get would be Marxist and 
non-Marxist analysis of ~ ! ·The point is that whether· one has pro or anti 
' .. 
- 246 -
Marxist values one wants a theory which is consonant with those values, 
so that for this kind of enterprise a 'value-free' analysis would not 
achieve what is wanted. More generally, a point I shall be trying to 
vindicate in much of what follows, a large part of our inquiries, I 
claim, derive their purpose and point from attempting to interpret the 
world in such a way that that interpretation both articulates and 
develops our values. That such inquiries are interpretations, that there 
.~ 
are facts to which they have to be true, is a partial vindication of 
the claim that such values are not arbitrary. 
Before proceeding with my main theme it may be worthwhile to 
digress slightly on the issue of whether the social sciences should be 
• 
classified as belonging to the natural sciences. A part of the trouble, 
I believe, is that there have implicitly been two kinds of criteria 
a discipline must satisfy (in some intuitive way) for it to be considered 
a part of the natural sciences and that those criteria are logically 
independent. On the one hand there is, as I have said, the question of 
whether values play a role in the context of justification. On my view, 
I parts, perhaps even large parts, of the social sciences may'reasonably 
be classified with the natural sciences by this criterion. On the 
other hand, there are epistemic criteria: because of the very success 
of the natural sciences there has cOme to be a reluctance to classify 
any theory as scientific which does not attain a considerable degree 
of power and economy which would enable it to make accurate predictions. 
By that criteria the social sciences, to put it mildly, seem to fare 
badly. Some arguments in sociology and philosophy have tried to show 
that the reason why the social sciences have not produced powerful 
theories is either because the subjects Of the inquiry have values, or 
~ 
because of the involvement of the investigator's values. In my opinion 
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none of those attempts to argue that view have yet been either very 
clear or very cogent. Davidson (and Fodor) seem to me to have produced 
compelling reasons why, even if a materialist view of mind is correct, 
it does not follow that we must therefore be able to obtain 'covering 
laws' which would enable one to predict human behaviour. 25 I don't, 
however, understand Davidson's further argument for the conclusion that 
it is in principle impossible to obtain covering laws applicable to 
human behaviour. 26 
Returning to my major theme, that in the humanities values play 
a significant role in the context of justification, it seems to me that 
it is a significant fact that disciplines such as philosophy, literary 
criticism, and history have a different relationship to their history 
than does) say, physics. That is so in two ways: (i) that in these 
disciplines the original texts are still of fundamental importance; 
(ii) the each new 'age' needs its own philosophy, literary criticism or 
history. I don't mean merely that as time passes new problems arise, or 
in the case of history that there is a new period to study (although 
\ 
.-
that is true), I mean rather that as the culture in which we work changes 
we acquire new values and the need for new values. We need, therefore, 
a new philosophy, a reinterpretation of past literary texts, or period 
of history consonant with those values. One can't, of course, quantify 
'new age' - a new age in this sense arises when, for whatever reasons, 
the current or traditional views don't fully meet the demands of the 
situation. In philosophy, for instance, the need for a fallibilist 
epistemology began to emerge as soon as the apparent certainties of 
Newtonian mechanics, Euclidian geometry, and Christian religion began 
to be undermined. That meant not only that 'a new set of 'technical' 
..,. 
issues arose but also that there had to be a reworking. of values and 
'j 
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beliefs to enable us to live with the new kinds of uncertainty. Lest 
it be thought that this is only true of very broad generalizations, true 
only of past changes in philosophical climate, I should like to press 
this view of philosophy a little further. 
Consider an issue currently at the centre of philosophical research _ 
the philosophical implications of artificial intelligence (A.I.) 
It seems to me evident that a part of the reason why that issue is .-
currently under discussion is that the results of A.I. threaten, or 
appear to threaten, our image of ourselves as people. It is not, I think, 
adE?r..\1! to say that the problems posed by A.I. are confined to the 
context of discovery for the philosophical problems are defined by the 
ten'sion between between our value impregnated picture of ourselves as 
free, rational, 'responsible beings and work which may appear to show 
that we may not be any of these things. The very problem is whether we 
have. to modify our value impregnated picture of ourselves or not. One 
way of trying to reconcile these tensions is to argue that the results 
of A.I. can't possibly show we aren't any of the things we think we 
27 I 
are (e.g. Searle ); another ~ay is argue that our picture of ourselves 
is incoherent (e.g., albeit in a different context by Skinner. 28 It 
seems to me that Skinner's views would remain unpopular even if he had 
written much better philosophy than 'he did); another way is to show that 
our picture of ourselves may only need modifying somewhat (e.g. 
Dennett29). If someone such as Dennett can really convince us that the 
potential results of A.I. don't really threaten anything essential to 
our image of ourselves then we could breathe a sigh of relief and move 
on. fn certain respects the debate over the significance of A.I. 
resembles the 'crises' prompted by evolutionary theory: given the values 
of the participants some were prepared to accept the new theory; some 
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were prepared to reject it; and others sought a reconcilation with 
religion. Now although I think arguments can be produced in favour of 
some views rather than others it is important to notice that there is 
not a neutral standpoint in the sense that there is a standpoint that 
does not involve the values of the inquirer. Skinner and Dennett have a 
value commitment to science which will not be easily overridden. (Even 
if one finds Skinner's view of science naive). Searle has a value 
commitment to the image we have of ourselves. (Dennett, unlike Skinner, 
is fully aware of the importance of that commitment). The point, though, 
is that they !!1 do have a value commitment, a commitment which in part 
defines the very nature of the problem. 
At this point I want t~ consider two possible objections. The first 
objection is that whilst the tensions between our' values and philosophical 
arguments may be evident with respect to a large issue such as that 
concerning A.I. it is not evIdent with respect to many other relatively 
'technical' issues. I accept that point and would add that with respect 
to minor technical issues philosophers with different values may accept 
I 
\ the same conclusions. One needs to be cautious however: on the face of 
it the analytic/synthetic distinction was an arcane technical 
distinction but Quine's attack on it threot~~ what was then a prevalent 
conception of philosophy in Oxford associated with a particular 
constellation of values. As Quine put it, his attack implied a shift 
towards pragmatism and a shift towards pragmatism was as unwelcome in 
some senior common rooms then as, I suspect, it is now. Arguments over 
technical issues in philosophy seem to me like battles in a campaign 
where the campaign consists in attempting to develop a coherent picture 
of the world and man's place in it that articulates and defines a 
'cultural space' where values and beliefs can he held in reasonable 
'" 
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harmony. In that sense Quine's cultural space is very different from 
Goodman's, and both are very different from Russell's, in spite of the 
issues on which they agree and the lack of animosity between them. 
The second objection I want to consider might come from a personal 
preference theorist who agreed on the importance of values in the manner 
I have indicated and then claimed that this was a vindication for their 
view. This claim would be that any appearance of rationality in 
philosophical argument was a sham; that at the end of the day one merely 
has the imposition of different wills. This, I believe, is simply wrong. 
In the course of any inquiry standards of success and failure do get 
developed, standards which to some extent are independent of values, 
I 
and this is true in philosophy. Philosophers can and do recognize that 
someone's argument is good or bad philosophy independently of whether 
they agree with the conclusion or find in the work values to which one 
is sympathetic. Given that there is this independence to some degree, 
this gives four kinds of response one philosopher might have to another's 
work: (i) the ideal case where the work is technically competent (or 
, 
better) and incorporates valdes to which one is sympathetic; (ii) 
technically competent but incorporating values to which one is not 
sympathetic; (iii) not technically competent but incorporating values to 
which one is sympathetic; (iv) neither technically competent nor 
incorporating values to which one is sympathetic. Now although life 
would be depressing if one never came across work which falls into 
category (i), the real challenge comes from work which falls into 
category (ii). By definition the work contains no obvious mistakes or 
flaws so the challenge is either to find some subtle flaws or mistakes 
or to amend one's own values (or some comq~nation thereof). 
That last picture was explicitly about philosophy but it seems to 
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me to incorporate the appropriate model not just for other areas of 
inquiry but also for much of our 'moral life' in general. Two people 
discussing a television programme or a film are not terribly likely to 
be having an explicitly 'moral' argument, but it is quite likely that 
they are having, in various degrees, an argument over aesthetic values, 
political views and theories, and are attempting to alter each other's 
values and/or beliefs. It is here that my attack on dominant conceptions 
.-
of morality, my advocacy of a contextual approach to morality, and my 
conception of the nature of inquiry meet. By ignoring the substance and 
structure of our everyday life, utilitarian and Kantian theories leave 
the way open for the personal preference theorist to claim that there 
can be no non-arbitrary choice of values. But if we consider people in 
their social context one can surely understand how and why people value 
I 
what they do for non-arbitrary reasons. 
When it comes to the natural sciences my view of the fact/value 
distinction, for once, albeit briefly, follows conventional wisdom. I 
think that implicitly we are inclined to make it a necessary condition 
\ 
of some inquiry counting as a part of the natural sciences that the 
values of the inquirer can be limited to the context of discovery. But 
now the question arises as to how James' statement that we can always 
interpret the world according to our moral interests stands with respect 
to the natural sciences. Does the fact that values in natural science 
only play a role in the context of discovery entail that the view of 
James is false for the natural sciences? I think not. The idea that the 
discoveries of science dictate what our moral values shall be is 
Gradgrind's mistake writ large. The way I view these matters is that 
when one starts to ask what the results of ' science imply about oursleves, 
the metaphysical nature of the universe, or what is mo~ally possible, 
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one ceases to be engaged in science and becomes engaged in something 
like the philosophy of sCience, i.e. the question shifts back into a 
question within the humanities. On the view I have advocated, in the 
humanities values playa role in the context of justification - 'success' 
in constructing an adequate metaphysics or moral system is partially 
judged by how well it encapsulates and defines our present values or 
leads us to want to adopt new ones. 
(4) Philosophy and Pragmatism 
By way of a coda to the previous sections of this chapter and to the 
entire thesis, I want to compare and contrast my views with those of 
Kekes and.Rorty. Within the last few years Kekes and Rorty have produced 
works which.reach diametrically opposed conclusions; Rorty has argued 
that philosophy as traditionally conceived ought to disappear, whilst 
Kekes has argued that philosophy ought to return to its traditionally 
defined role as the pursuit of wisdom. That such works, reaching such 
opposite conclusions, should appear within a short period of time, raises 
I 
\ 
the question of whether a view of philosophy between the extremes posed 
by those authors is tenable: can the centre hold? In addition to that 
important question, reading Kekes and Rorty I find an additional, ironic, 
reason for discussing their works: from my point of view I find that 
Kekes is more of a pragmatist than he realizes, and Rorty is less of a 
pragmatist than he claims • 
. I find much to admire in Kekes (1980) (The Nature of Philosophy). 
Kekes claims that the central task of philosophy is the development and 
justification of a world-view, where a world-view is understood to 
consist of five elements: a theory of thi nature of reality or 
. . 
metaphysics; an account of the human significance of the nature of 
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reality or an anthropology; a system of ideas or a culture; an explanation 
of the discrepancy between the ideal and the actual state of affairs 
or a diagnosis; and a programme for overcoming or mininimizing the 
discr~pancy or a policy. The examples of world-views which Kekes gives 
are: the philosophies of Plato, Spinoza and Hegel; the theology of 
Christianity; the pragmatism of Dewey; the existentialism of Sartre; 
the liberal utilitarianism of Mill; the positivism of Comte, Spencer 
and the Vienna Circle. 
Much of Kekes' work is concerned with arguing that rational 
justification of the five elements that constitute a world-view can be 
given; that is, non-arbitrary reasons can be given for supposing one 
~- . 
world-view to be superior to another with respect to the elements 
, 
mentioned. Very often I find that Kekes reaches similar conclusions to 
.~ 
those that I reach although we come to those conclusions via different 
routes. It is not appropriat"e to review these similarities and differences 
here, but it is appropriate to discuss the one major difference of 
opinion between us. 
I can begin to articulate the major difference of opinion betwe'en 
Kekes and myself by examining Kekes' claim that philosophy ought to 
return to its traditional role as being the pursuit of wisdom. I find 
that claim, at this stage of our cultural history, too strong; I find 
myself unable and unwilling to look someone in the eye and say that I 
am engaged in the pursuit of wisdom ! That is not, I think, a mere 
idiosyncrasy of my psychology; I believe that it is a realistic 
reflection of what is and what is not culturally possible at this stage 
ot history. 
One of the difficultie~ I find with Kekes' work is what exactly 
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his central thesis amounts to. Although I believe that Kekes provides 
much convincing argument to show that ~ world-views (or parts of 
world-views) can be rationally justified over others, he seems to be 
suggesting that philosophers should assume that there is ~ uniguely 
~ world-view which it is their task to discover. Certainly Kekes 
cannot claim to have demonstrated that there is one such uniquely best 
world-view for in practice he only produces arguments to show that in 
.-
principle some world-views can be justified in preference to others -
ne produces no substantive argument to show which world-view(s) is (are) 
best. I am sceptical of the suggestion that philosophers should assume 
that tnere is a uniquely best world-view and attempt to discover what 
it.1s. Partially for the reasons given earlier in this chapter I believe 
that whilst the underdetermination of theory by data is an interesting 
theoretical possibility in physics, it is an almost incontrovertible 
fact with respect to our 'moral life'. My view of what philosophers can 
hope to achieve is therefore less optimistic than the view taken by 
Kekes. The task of articulating a world-view, as conceived by Kekes, is 
a formidable one, one such that it seems philosophers would be doing 
\ 
well if they were even partially successful. (It seems to me salutory to 
bear in mind that even the greatest social thinkers have rarely, if ever, 
developed a world-view in the sense defined by Kekes; very few thinkers 
have had a fully-articulated theory of !l! !!!! elements that co~~~tute 
a world-view). One way of accomodating the tensions between my views 
and Kekes' would be to employ a distinction between a philosopher's 
personal vision and his public utterance. That is, one could agree with 
Kekes that the personal ambition of philosophers ought to be to develop 
a wo~ld-view, but, being more realistic with respect to the sheer 
<, 
complexity of our cultural Situation, resognize that it is unlikely that 
many philosophers will complete the task in such a manner that every 
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part of their personal vision will receive, or stand the burden of, 
public utterance. 
Above I said that from my point of view Kekes was more of a 
pragmatist than he realized. At one point in the book he says,30 "It 
would be a radical misunderstanding of my view ••• to suppose it to be 
a version of pragmatism." Toward the end of the book, however, Kekes 
writes,3l .~ 
" ••• my view of philosophy implies that a long-standing philosophical, 
and also religious, mystical, scientific, ambition is misdirected. 
If the human perspective is inescapable, then all attempts to form 
a view of the world independently of the anthropocentric view are 
doomed. The ambition to understand reality sub specie aeterniatis 
is unrealizable." 
The apparent difference between Kekes and myself here seems to me 
largely verbal - a question of how broadly or narrowly one defines 
pragmatism.' In the introduction to the thesis I characterized pragmatism 
as the rejection of both absolutism and subjectivism and Kekes 
certainly also rejects both of those views. From my point of view the 
second quotation could well be a motto for all pragmatists (supposing it 
is not taken as an endorseme~t of subjectivism). 
My feeling towards Rorty's (1980) and (1982) is just the opposite 
to my feeling toward Kekes - a feeling that Rorty's kind of pragmatism 
is certainly a very significantly kind of pragmatism from mine if, 
indeed, it is a variety of pragmatism at all. The theme of Rortyls 
(1980), that knowledge can never simply be a pure reflection of reality, 
(that there is no 'mirror of nature') 1s, of course, one to which I am 
sympathetic. However, although Rorty explicitly mentions three major 
phi19soph1cal heroes (Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger) the overall 
conclusions of his work are much nearer to-Wittgenstein than to Dewey; 
Rorty, like Wittgenstein, reaches the conclusion that what we need is 
'. 
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not better philosophy but the ~ of philosophy. Horty seems to think 
that the conclusion that philosophy cannot provide or attain theoretical 
knowledge (as opposed to therapuetic enlightenment) follows from the 
rejection of the 'mirror of nature'. I do not believe that that 
conclusion really does follow, and I do believe that philosophy can and 
should attempt to provide theoretical understanding of the world. Horty 
has a characteristic way of arguing that L find unsatisfactory; this 
way of arguing consists in presenting two extreme positions and then 
claiming that since the one position is wrong the other must be right. 
For example t in his paper, "Philosophy as a Kind of Wri ting-: An Essay 
on Derrida", Horty begins by contrasting two views of science. According 
to (part of) the first view of science,32 
n ••• there are some invisible things which are parts of everything 
else and whose behaviour determines the way everything else works. 
Physics is the search for an accurate description of those invisible 
things, and it proceeds by finding better and better explanations 
of the visible. 1t 
According to the second view of sCience,33 
" ••• the physicists are men looking for new interpretations of the 
Book of Nature. After each pedestrian period of normal SCience, 
they dream up a new model, a new picture, a new vocabulary, and then 
they announce that the true meaning of the Book has been discovered. 
But of course, it never is." 
Horty then goes to draw two opposed pictures of morality and philosophy, 
claiming that in each case the second view is the view that is more or 
less correct. In each case, however, I want to say that there is 
something right about ~ views and that the philosophical problem is 
to show how that can be the case. I really can't believe that Dewey 
would have accepted those dichotomies. I think that we need philosophy 
without the mirror of nature, but we still need philosophy. Kekes' 
(1980) seems to me to provide (unintentionally of course) a very good 
reply to Horty's (1980) for Kekes, no less than Horty, rejects the 
absolutism which underlies- the mirror of nature metaphor. 
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The appearance in the same year of works which reach such 
diametrically opposed conclusions naturally raises the question of 
whether the philosophical status quo is stable. For my part, I believe 
that philosophy should move in the direction favoured by Kekes - that 
it should be more ambitious rather than less. I have already said that 
I don't believe that philosophy can achieve all that Kekes demands; but 
that is not a case for not trying. contrary to Rorty, I believe that if 
.~ 
the current state of analytic philosophy is unstable that is not 
because there can be no philosophy after the rejection of the mirror of 
nature (for the concerns of philosophy are perennial), but rather 
because there has been a failure of nerve and a tendency to 'play it 
safe'. 
00000 000 000 
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Appendix 1 
The Development of Quine's Philosophy 
It would hardly be surprising if, over a distinguished career 
spanning more than fifty years, Quine had had occasion to reject or to 
modify radically some of his views; what is surprising is that Quine 
has nowhere ennummerated or admitted to any significant change of mind • 
.... 
It is true, I think, that there is a remarkable continuity in Quine's 
philosophy but I do detect a very significant change of emphasis - a 
change of emphasis which leaves one wondering about the general import 
of Quine's philosophy. The change of emphasis to which I refer concerns 
• the central concept of Quine's relativism to which my comments will be 
restricted. 1 
In his seminal collection of essays From a Logical Point of View 
.. 2 Quine made the following statements, 
"The fundamental-seeming philosophical question, How much of our 
science is merely contributed by language and how much is a genuine 
reflection of reality?, is perhaps p. spurious question ••• "(1950) 
, ' 
" ••• it is meaningless •• to inquire into the absolute correctness 
of a conceptual scheme as a mirror of reality. Our standards for 
appraising basic changes of conceptual scheme must be, not a 
realistic standard of correspondence to reality, but a pragmatic 
standard." 3. (1950) 
" ••• there is in principle no separating language from the rest of 
the world ••• " 4. (195lb) 
"The lore of our fathers is fabric of sentences •••• It is a pale 
grey lore, black with fact and white with convention. But I have 
found no substantial reasons for concluding that there are any 
quite black threads in it, or any white ones." 5. (1954) 
These views seem to constitute a radical relativism; they clearly seem 
to imply the rejection of absolutism. Yet by the time of his (1960) 
, .. QUine was speaking of " ••• limning the tr+le and ultimate scheme of 
reality ••• ,,6, and in his (1975c) of his " ••• fully-realistic attitude 
'" 
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toward electrons and muons and curved space-time ••• ,,7 It sounds like 
a different philosophy but is it merely a change of emphasis? My 
explication of relativism has employed the central concept of internal 
justification and it is true, I think, that Quine, both early and late, 
has been an advocate of that view. In his (1960) Quine wrote,8 
"It is •• when we turn back into the midst of an actually present 
theory, at least hypothetically accepted, that we can and do speak 
sensibly of this and that sentence as true. Where it makes sense 
to apply 'true' is to a sentence couched in the terms of a given .~ 
theory, complete with its posited reality." 
Even later in his (1975b) Quine still emphasized that we always work 
within our conceptual scheme,9 
It ••• there is no extra-theoretic truth, no higher truth than the 
truth we are claiming or aspiring to as we continue to tinker 
~. with our system of the world from within." 
There are, I th;nk, two related problems here. The first is that as I 
understand it any non-trivial version of internal justification denies 
that there can be any way o~ separating our contribution to knowledge 
from that of the world. (A part of the motivation for a theory of 
internal justification, in my View, is to avoid having to try). Yet in 
10 his '1973) Quine wrote, 
" ••• we ought to be able to see just to what extent science is mants 
free creation; to what extent, in Eddingtont.s phrase, it is a put 
up job." 
That, to my mind, is straightforwardly inconsistent with the views 
expressed in From a Logical Point of View. Moreover, and this leads to 
the second problem I mentioned, in Words and Objections, Quine replied 
to Smart's suggestionll that there had been a change from the 'pragmatism 
and instrumentalism t of From a Logical Point of View to the 'realism' 
of Word and Object by saying that the " ••• appearance of vacillation is 
a mi~understanding.,,12 I think that there is a way of agreeing with 
" .. 
Quine but at a certain cost. ..,. 
'" 
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An absolutist like Williams is sensible enough to admit that we 
always have to work within our conceptual scheme in the sense that we 
always have to use concepts which are ours, we always have to use a 
language which is ours, but goes on to say that if we are lucky we may 
discover true statements which will correspond to 'what is there 
anyway'. One might call Williams' view a trivial version of internal 
justification since it concedes a minor pOint but still demands a 
.~ 
correspondence theory of truth which it is the purpose of the non-trivial 
version of internal justification to avoid. The problem for the 
interpretation of Quine's philosophy now becomes: does Quine merely 
uphold a trivial versiom of internal justification 1 The emphasis in 
From a Logical Point Of View suggested that he upheld a non-trivial 
version of internal justification, but much of what Quine has written 
since suggests that either (i) he does uphold the trivial version, or 
(ii) that he has not specif~ed how his version of internal justification 
differs from the trivial version. 
The suggestion that Quine's view of internal justification may, 
\ ' 
after all, be the trivial version, gains support, I think, from 
reflecting upon the importance Quine attaches to the ontological 
enterprise. Campbell, in his (1976), represents Quine's ontological 
programme as an attempt to list the distinct categories of things that 
there are. There are two points to be made about this. First, I find 
nothing in Campbell's representation of Quine's ambitions which seems 
like a misrepresentation. Second, there is point to Campbell's ontological 
programme only for someone who either rejects internal justification or 
only accepts the trivial version. (See chapter 3 for my reasons for this 
assertion). One could agree with Quine that there was no vacillation 
between From a Logical Point of View and Word and Object in the sense 
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that he still upholds a form of internal justification but claim that 
there was vacillation in that there was a shift from a non-trivial version 
of internal justification to a trivial version of internal justification. 
Certainly I find it hard to avoid the feeling that at some point in his 
career Quine wanted to uphold more than the trivial version of internal 
justification, but very hard to read his later work (from Word and 




Davidson on Conceptual Schemes 
I find Davidson's (1973b) somewhat enigmatiC; I find it difficult 
to decide if or why I disagree with his argument. The problem is twofold: 
(i) that Davidson's argument is conducted at a very high level of 
abstraction; (ii) that some of Davidson's targets are views that I 
would not care to defend, e.g. that there is a scheme/content dichotomy; 
that cultural relativism' consists in the complete untranslatability 
of one language into another. It may be the case that the kind of 
cultural differen~es I believe to exist, Davidson would not challenge • 
• 
Davidson'discusses supposed exotic and radical differences between one 
conceptual scheme and another, but the kind of CUltural differences that 
concern me are the kind that one might find charted in almost any 
history of any subject. Where we may disagree is that I believe that 
even at ~ level the differences ra~se's questions about the' concept of 
truth. 
One example will suffice to illustrate the problem of the level of 
abstraction. Davidson says,l "Charity is forced upon us; - whether we 
like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count them 
right in most matters." At the very least there is trouble with the 
word 'most' here for if, for example, I want to understand a Nazi it 
seems that I must translate his words in such a way that his beliefs 
come out wrong in 'most' matters. A translation of a Nazi's words that 
made his values and mine similar would be a mistranslation. Now of 
course the Nazi is (happily) a rare and extreme case, but the kind of 
~ 
case that I believe is important is like that but closer to home. 
People may have values with which one may sympathize without sharing. 
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One example might be arguments over the claim that a foetus is a person. 
Now I do not have in mind the arguments between people radically 
opposed to one another, where it may be the case that even if they 
could agree on all the 'facts' they would still reach different 
conclusions. What I have in mind is the kind of argument that might 
occur between two pro-abortionists over whether it is proper to classify 
a foetus as a person or not, for here we have a case, I think, where 
the decision about which way to 'organize~ the 'facts', about how to .-
'classify experience', is both significant and not open to Davidson's 
objections to the scheme/content dichotomy. What makes the decision 
important is its potential ramifications for many of our other beliefs 
and practices. I believe that this kind of example provides an instance 
of the kind Davidson seems to imply cannot occur: a case where we might 
have a significant choice between 'schemes'. I think it may also be 
true that that kind of case is far more typical that we suppose because 
of our natural tendency to 'take our assumptions for granted; a tendency 





Extensionality as a Philosophical Commitment: Some Questions 
Quine and Goodman may, reasonably I think, be spoken of as 
extensionalists meaning, roughly, that they favour extensional languages. 
To say that they favour extensional languages seems far too weak but 
there are great difficulties in describing what else extensionalist .~ 
philosophers have in common that does not sound wildly imp14w~ble. 
Taking the less problematic case first,Quine's view might be described 
as the view that extensional languages are adequate for the whole of 
science and mathematics. There are, however, very powerful objections 
~. 
to that view. Marcus, in her (1960), makes the important point that 
extensionality comes in degress, but even if one takes the definition 
of extensionality for granted, the problems for the Quinian view soon 
multiply. There are very good reasons. it seems to me, for doubting 
whether extensional languages are adequate for science itself. I argued 
in chapter 4 that modal idioms are not dispensible in science, and modal 
I , 
\ idioms, of course, create intensional contexts. Even if one grants that 
extensional languages are adequate for science itself, the question 
should be asked as to whether extensional languages can be adequate for 
philosophy and, if not, where this leaves the 'extensionalist philosopher.' 
That extensional languages are not adequate for philosophy seems almost 
obvious. A number of problems have been raised about Quine's criteria 
for ontological commitment, problems which essentially turn on the 
non-extensionality of most of Quine's criteria of ontological commitment 
or the inadequacy of his extensional versions of ontological 
commitment. l To my knowledge these problems have never been satisfactorily 
~ 
resolved. In any case the general claim would give rise to some apparent 
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paradox: the only philosophy of mind that, presumably, would be 
acceptable would be some version of behaviourism but surely, whether 
behaviourism is right or wrong, behaviourism has to be an issue within 
philosophy. Would that mean that it was acceptable to talk about 
intensional languages but not to ~ them? Suppose, then, that it is 
claimed not that philosophy can be expressed in extensional languages 
but only that science can. That, I think, would be a very uncomfortable 
.... 
position for Quine to adopt given his stress on the continuity of science 
and philosophy. One would also want a clear justification for this 
double standard - if philosophy can be intelligible when it employs 
intensional languages, why can't science? 
-If Quine' s position seems difficult, Goodman's seems impossible. 
Goodman argues that art is cognitive but an 'extensional version' of, 
say, War and Peace, seems to be even a theoretical impossibility yet, by 
Goodman's own lights, ought"to be counted a contribution to knowledge. 
I find it surprising that, to my knowledge, these very general 
problems about what a commit~ent to extensionality might amount to have 
never been discussed, but I raise them with some trepidation, feeling 
like the boy who claimed that the emperor is naked. 
'" 
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to its use or users) as fundamental. Strawson, for example, in his 
(1979), argues in favour of taking pragmatics as fundamental. My 
talk of 'linguistic contexts' rather cuts across this distinction 
since whilst my major focus of attention is semantic, linguistic 
contexts are partially individuated by their purpose. I am inclined 
to think that an approach which does not set up an opposition 
between semantics and pragmatics is desirable. 
29. Recently, for example, by Grayling (1982), chapter 2. 
30. Pitcher (1964), p.5. 
31. Cargile (1978), p.105. 
32. ibid., pp.105-6. 
- . 
33. Quine, (195la) , p.42. 
34. Hofstadter,'ibid., p.4l0. 
35. In a letter published in Harding «1976), p.132) Quine wrote, 
" ••• my holism is not as extreme as those brief vague paragraphs at 
the end of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' are bound to sound." 
36. Quine (195la), p.43. 
37. Haack (1978a), p.234. 
38. Lewis,C.I. (1923), p.365~ 
39. Similar views are developed by Goodman in his (1964) tribute to 
Lewis. 
. ... 
40. This is not proposed as a serious test since I have not defined 
who counts as a 'competent speaker'. In fact 'competence' might have 
appeared on my list of linguistic phenomena - a fact which, I believe, 
supports rather than casts doubt on my holistic approach. 
41. McGinn (1976) in Platts (1980.), p.19. 
Chapter 3 
1. Quine (1975c), p.293. 
2. Russell once said that philosophy ".~must make only such assertions 
as would be equally true however the actual world were constituted." 
(1914) in his (1953), p.l07. Generally I think it'would not be 
unreasonable to define the beginings of contemporary analytic 
'. 
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as being identical with the rejection of the idea that philosophy 
can possibly have such a role independently of contingent experience. 
That view would be of a piece with the idea that logical positivism 
and pragmatism were the first movements of contemporary analytic 
philosophy.One might speculate that Russell's influence over Quine 
(especially via the theory of descriptions) might be responsible 
for Quine's somewhat ambivalent attitude to the idea that philosophy 
has an ontological role to play that is independent of science. 
3. One other area of philosophy this doesn't fit is the philosophy of 
mind. My view here would be that philosophy can legitimately be .~ 
concerned with both the philosophy of psychology and with the nature 
of everyday explanations of actions. 
4. Ultimately it is for each philosopher and, more generally, each 
inquirer to decide what counts as a 'legitimate' inquiry. The 
community of inquirers will, however, impose constraints: a scientist 
whose view of scientific method is extremely bizarre will find 
himself unable to obtain research grants etc. (Sometimes, I suppose, 
.. - the community may' be 'wrong' and the indi vidual 'right'). The 
difficulty in philosophy, as I said, is that what a philosopher will 
count as a reasonable approach to what questions is inextricably 
bound up with their substantive philosophical beliefs; in science, 
it would seem, there is a larger gap between methods and results. 
5. I see an important diffe~ence between the so-called ontological 
argument for the existence of God and the 'argument from design'. I 
don't see how purely a-priori arguments can establish the existence 
of anything. The argument from design is, I think, acceptable in 
principle (feeble though I think it is) being a kind of induction 









think one would have to r~ject the argument from the problem of evil -
and that seems to me a perfectly good argument. 
Dewey (1929), p.309. 
Alston (1958), pp.9-l0. 
Quine (1950), p.78. 
Quine (1973), p.3. 
QUine (1951a), p.45. 
Campbell (1976), p.l08n. 
Cambell ibid., p.108. 
Quine (1968b) in his (1968a), p.69. 
14. In this section I have treated pluralism only in the context of 
ontological questions but ultimately much bigger issues are at stake. 
In Quine's (1951a) there,is a passage which speaks. of physical 
objects and Homer's gods where he says, " •• in point of epistemological 
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footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree 
and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only 
as cultural posits." p.44. Whilst I welcome the epistemic liberalism 
of this passage there is, I think, a dangerous assumption that 
necessarily the 'cultural posit' of Homer's gods was intended to 
serve precisely the purpose that all cultural posits are intended to 
serve in our culture. An anthropologist has said recently that a 
mistake of earlier anthropology was to assume that what 'primitive 
people' are doing is what we are doing but doing it badly. (See 
Geertz (1983». That, it seems to me, is the view that Quine implies 
in the passage referred to and the view explicitly, and unashamedlY, 
adopted by Jarvie in his (1970). There are very considerable 
, . _d~culties in classifying the beliefs of peoples of different 
cultures but if, for example, we accept some description of some 
peoples' beliefs as 'magical', I think that it is wrong to assume 
that if they are rational then they must at some time abandon those 
beliefs. I do incline to the view that so long as they stick to a 
magical belief system their explanations of the physical world and 
their metaphysics will be poorer than ours, but their art, system 
~. of socialization'and their moral behaviour, say, may be better than 
ours. In a reasonable sense of 'rational' the rational thing to do 
is to develop the overall best culture but it is not necessarily 
the case that overall our culture is superiour to any culture with 
a magical belief s~stem. There is a sense in which, if their 
actions were primarily motivated by their desire to preserve (or 
improve) their moral b~lief system, they would be choosing a non-
scientific way of life - one which has a different motivation from 
that which has been behind a great deal of Western achievement. 
This is clearly a large and contentious topic but see chapter 8 and 
appendix 2 for discussion of related themes. 
15. Hilbert (1925), p.376. 
16. Goodman (1956), p.156. 
17. Goodman ibid., p.158. Compare the tone of these remarks with my view 
stated above that the length of an inventory is irrelevant. 
18. Haack (1978b), p.492. 
19. Goodman (1956), p.168. 
20. In certain respects it seems to me that my conclusions are not very 
different from those for which Carnap argued in his (1950). Carnap 
was, for instance, sceptical about the importance of the nominalist/ 
_realist debate. However, Carnap's way of reaching those conclusions 
depended upon his distinction between 'internal' and 'external' 
questions - a distinction which is, at best, unclear. (See Haack 
(1976b) for criticism). 
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2. Mellor (1974). 
3. Mellor ibid.p.167. 
4. Quine op.cit., p.223. 
5. See Davidson (1970), (1973) and (1974). 
6. Quine (1973), pp.11-2. 
7. Campbell (1976), pp.17l-2. 
8. This description of combinatorialism is due to Lycan (1979) in 
Loux (1979), pp.304-5. 
9. See his (1965~), p.147 ff • 
• 10~ See Goodman (1973), Chapter 2. 
11. Goodman has· consistently and explicitly repudiated possible worlds. 
Perhaps' his views, in general, fit better into my category of 
'redescriptivism' but in that case the example he provided was 
misleading. 
12. Rescher (1973) in Loux (1979), p.179. 
13. Quine (1948), p.4. 
14. Rescher (1973), p.177. 
15. Lewis,D., (1973), p.84. 
16. Hacking (1975), p.322. 
17. This view is indebted to a paper by Morton and Mondadori, (1976) in 
Loux (1979). 
.<-
18. Hacking employs 'L' and 'M' to represent what I have denoted. by 'M' Ie 
'M·'. I have changed the notation in order to avoid confusion with 
the use of 'L' for necessity in the standard modal logics. 
19. Hacking (1975), p.323. 
20. Hacking (1967), p.15·0. 
21. Hacking (1975), p.325. 
22. See references in note 5. 
.... 
23. Reichenbach (1947), p.290. 
24. See Morton and Mondadori (1976), p.247 ff. 
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25. Morton and Mondadori (1976), pp.250-1. 
26. There are, as Goodman points out in his (1951), problems about 
defining optimal conditions, "Exactly what is involved in ascribing 
•• a property to a thing has been the subject of some controversy. 
Some maintain that to say that a thing is carmine is to say that all 
presentations of the thing that occur under pure daylight and 
otherwise optimal conditions exhibit the quale carmine. This optimimurr 
theory has some initial plausibility since it is under optimum 
conditions that the most acute distinctions can be made and a 
property most precisely determined ••• But there are serious difficuit-
ies. Optimum conditions may not always be uniquely determinable ••• 
A better theory has been proposed by C.l.Lewis. He holds that to 
ascribe a certain property to an object is in effect to describe 
the complete pattern of qualla (of the kind in question) exhibited 
under all sorts of conditions. This pattern theory meets the 
difficulties of the optimum theory but perhaps may err in the opposite 
direction ••• Perhaps the truth is that to apply any ordinary property 
predicate to a th~ng amounts to describing its appearance under 
~. those sorts of conditions that are regarded as critical or standard. II 
pp.95-6. Although there are, therefore, questions of detail, what 
is important from my point of view is the general approach. This 
approach enables one to distinguish between, say, " ••• looks green" 
and " ••• is green" by reference to complex patterns of usage of those 
predicates in a language community. This approach only explains 
such distinctions relative to patterns of language usage within a 
language community - but that is all relativists require; 
absolutists, presumably, can't rest content with such an approach. 
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4. (1969), pp. 362-3. 
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9. (1969), p.362. 
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18. Popper (1960), p.225 
19. McGinn (1976) in Platts (1980), p.19. 
20. Platts (1979), p.238. 
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21. In 'his (1979) McGinn says, "The external world of material bodies 
and events has the characteristic of objectivitl; i.e. it is to be 
conceived in an absolute way, as not owing its intrinsic nature to 
the relative and subjective sensory modalities and conscious 
experience of the sentient beings that inhabit it." p.131. 
22. Popper (1970) in his (1972), p.46. 
23. Popper (1971) in his (1972), p.328. 
24. Davidson (1969), p.759. 
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25. Davidson (1977) in P1atts\ (1980), p.133. 
Chapter 6 
1. This illusion was demonstrated on television by R.L.Gregory in the 
series "States of Mind", BBC television. 
.~ 
2. This phrase is Zift's in his stimulating discussion of Quine's notion 
of stimulus meaning. See Zitf (1972), p.99. 
3. See Carnap (1953) in Feigel and Brodbeck, pp.63-4. 
4. Newton-Smith (1981), p.27. 
5. Nagel (1960), p.131. 
< •. 
6. ibid., p.152. .... 
7. ibid., pp.146-7. 
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8. ibid., p.147. 
9. ibid., p.151. 
10. ide 
11. Quine (1970b), p.179. 
12. This was DUmmett's reaction in his (1973a). There he wrote, "Quine's 
argument for indeterminacy ••• is based on the claim •• that there can 
be empirically equivalent but logically incompatible theories. Even~ 
if this claim is granted, the argument is not compelling, since 
theories might diverge irreconcilably in internal structure: but the 
claim is absurd, because there could be nothing to prevent our 
attributing the apparent incompatibility to equivocation." p.6l7n. 
13. Quine (1975b), p.313. 
14. Quine ibid., p.318. 
15:' ib1d.~ p.320. 
16. ibid., p.327. Quine's way of saying that there are bound to be 
alternative, empirically equivalent, logically incompatible theories 
lends itself to a modal misunderstanding. If we speak of branching 
theories whenever there are alternative theories, a way of mis-
understanding the thesis' would be: 
(1) It is unavoidable that there will be branching. 
But what Quine intends is that the modal operator has smaller scope: 
(2) It is possible that there will be unavoidable branching. 
If the branching were avoidable the thesis would lose its theoretical 
interest (see pp.322-3). I think Newt9n-Smith failed to ,appreciate 
Quine's intention and wa~ led to distinguish between strong and weak 
versions of the underdetermination thesis (roughly corresponding to 
1 and 2 above) whereas it was only the latter Quine intended. 
17. Newton-Smith (1978), p.7l. He also mentions what he calls the 
'causal ingredient' but adds that this is 'arguably not independent.' 
18. Newton-Smith (1978), p.72. 
19. Surprising in view of his avowed commitment to realism. 
20. Quine (1975b), p.324. 
21. ~bid., p.327. 
22. Putnam (1979), p.73. Later Putnam (1978, part 4) abandoned this form 
of realism. 
23. See, for example, Putnam (1978); Newton-Smith (1978); R.Boyd (1980). 
24. See Laudan (1981). 
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26. Stebbing (1937), p.51. 
27. See Feyerabend (1962); Maxwell (1968); Sellars (1961). 
28. Mellor (1969). 
29. ibid., p.182. 
30. ide 
31. Unger (1979), pp.237-8. 
32. Ayer (1979), p.324. 
33. Quine (1981a), p.36 • 
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Chapter 7 
1. Bourbaki (1968), p.316. 'N.Bourbaki' is the pseudonym for a group 
of French mathematicians who became active shortly before the 
second world war. 
2. Gandy (1972). 
3. Benacerraf (1965). 
4. Resnik (1975). 
5. Benacerraf op.cit., pp.54-5. 
6. ibid. p.55. 
7. ibid. p.56. 
.-
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9. Quine (1968c), p.45. 
10. ~enacerraf op.cit., p.69. 
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13. Korner (1960), p.l04. 
14. ibid., p.60. 
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16. In his (1884). 
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18. Hilbert (1925), p.375. 
. .... 
19. Frege (1893), p.xxvi. 
20. My discussion of logicism and formalism is indebted to Kleene (1952) 
chapter 3. 
21. Whitehead and Russell (1925), Vo1.la, p.xiv. 
22. •. Weyl (1946), quot,;!d by Kleene (1952), p.45. 
23. Brouwer (1952), quoted by K5rner (1960), p.122. 
24. This dispute was reported by Heyting (1956) in Benacerraf and putnam 
(1964), p.63. 
25. Quoted by K1eene (1952)-" pp .54-5. 
26. See Gode1 (1931). 
27. The generalized version of Church's theorem states: there exists a 
predicate such that there is no corrept formal system which contains 
a decision procedure for'both the predicate and its negation. The 
generalized version of Skolem's theorem states: there is no consistent 
categorical formal system having the natural numbers as its 
intended interpretation. See De Long (1970), p.l95 ff. 
28. Kleene op.c1t., p.57. 
29. P~ter (1957), p.2l5. 
30. Mill (1843), pp.165-6. 
31. Lakatos (1967), p.40. 
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15. See Wolf (1980), p.156. 
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18. Smart (1973), p.71 
19. Pettit and MacDonald (1981), p.178. 
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25. The essential point of the argument is that there is no reason to 
expect the relation between mental states and neurophysiological 
states to be type-type. If, on the other hand, the relation is token-
token then even knowledge of the covering laws couched in physical 
vocabulary need not produce knowledge of, or produce any, covering 
laws couched in mentalistic vocabulary. See Davidson (1970)· Fodor 
(1975), chapter 1. J 
26. I am not alone in failing to understand this argument in Davidson's 
(1970).. Nagel in his (1974) in his (1979), p.178n expresses the 
same incomprehension as have other philosophers in conversation. .~ 
27. See the argument in his (1980). 
28. Skinner (1971). 
29. See the arguments in the papers throughout his (1978). 
30. Kekes (1980), p.108. 
7' 
31. ibid., p.196. 




1. One other major issue where there would seem to be unequivocal 
evidence that Quine has changed his views is that of fallibilism with 
respect to logic. In his (1951a) Quine argued that there was no 
difference in principle between a change in logic and a major change 
in scientific theory (See (1951a) p.43), but in his (1970a) he asks 
rhetorically "If sheer logic is not conclusive, what is 7" p.8l. 
Quine's change of mind stems from considering the problem of 
translation.(See Haack (1974) chapter 1). It is arguable that the 
more conservative viewpoint I detect in Quine's attitude toward 
relativism is implied by the change of view over the epistemological 
status of logic for ,there is good reason, as Haack says, for supposing 
that acceptance of the view that there cannot be a real change of 
logic commits him to " ••• admiting a distinction between linguistic 
change and factual change •• " (Haack (1974), p.15). Significantly, 
perhaps, this change of view can be traced roughly to his (1960} -
which is the point where I detect a most significant change of 
emphasis in Quine's general outlook.~ 
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10. Quine (1973), pp.3-4. 
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2. Rescher (1980) also seems to me make some telling points against 
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